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ABSTRACT
The  problem  presented  to  the  writ,er  has  been  t,o  determine  the
t,actical  contributions  of  Lieutenant  General  Richard Heron Anderson,  to
evaluate  his  military  significance  and  to  explain why  an  officer who
attained  the  rank  of  next  to the  highest  grade  ln the  greatest  arny  of
the  Confederacy,  the  Armor  of  Northern  VirginiaL,  is  an  almost  forgot,ten
figure  in  the  history  Of  his  count,ry,  his  section  and  even  his  our  state.
The  task  has  not  been  an  easy  one.    Of  the  many  batt,1es  in which
his  command  was  actively  engaged,  General  Anderson  filed  a  report  on  on].y
four  of  them,  a  failure  that  provoked  no  small  amount  of  resentment  among
subordinates,  and  one  which,  in the  final  analysis,  must,  figure  into  his
anonymity.    An  excessive  modesty  which  marked  his  character  throughout
the  life  of  this  able  soldier  is  the  invariable  explanation for his  reluc-
tance  to  recol`d  these  deeds,  but,  without  a  full  conviction  of  th{i  just,ice
of  his  cause,  the  Genel.al  may have  simply  followed  the  dictates  of  his
conscience.    Thus,  he  neither  offered  such  plaudits  nor  wished  to  receive
them,
The  pl.oblem  of  Anderson  is  further  aggravated by the  fact  that
most  of  his  official  correspondence  was  lost  during  the  war  (see  photocopy
of  letter  following  page  116)  and  most  of  the  lit,tie  that  he  salvaged
was  turned  over  to  a  professor  at  South  Carolina  College,   in  whose  hands
it  suffered  precisely  the  same  fate.
There  has  been  no  thorough  study  of  Anderson  as  a  military  com-
mander,  and,   although  himself  a  Confederat,e  brigadier.,  his  biograT)her,  who
fully  captures  the  character  of  the  General,  falls  short,  in  describing
(ii)
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his  military  contributjions.    Although  straightforvJard  and  honest,  a.
Irvine Walker's  The  Life  of  I,t.  General  R.  H.  Anderson  tells enough  of
what  Anderson  did,  but  tells  little  of  how he  did  it.
Hence  the  chief  source  of  the  writer  has  been  the  st,andard  Off icial
Records of  the  Civil War,  and  it  is  believed  that  enough  evidence  has  been
obtained  to  ascertain the  martial  qualities  of  his  subject  and to  acquaint
the  reader with his  part  in the  operations  of that  conflict.    In  keeping
wit,h  the  sentiment  that  war  is  nat  to be  glorified,  the  t,hesis  presents
some  of  the  lett,eps  wl.itten by  the  subject  to  shed  new  light  on  the  temper,
mind  and  character  of  General  Anderson.    Thus  the  writer  has  consulted
various  libral`ies  and  archives  and has  examined  sons  of  Anderson's  unpub-
1ished  papers  and  letters.
Fran the  f oregoing  investigation,  the  writer  now  holds  the  con-
viction  that  General  Anderson  can well be  considered  one  of  the  greatest
tacticians  and  field  commanders  in  American  military history  and believes
that  this  study  supports  this  conclusion.
REFACE
It  is  hoped  that  the  following  study  in  some  wa.y  will  not  only
contribute  t,c)  a  reappraisal  of  the  military  achievements  of  Confederate
General  Richa.rd  }Ieron  Anderson  but,  presently  more  important,,  that  it
will  lead  to  a  simple  recognition  of  them.    If  such  is  the  result,,  then
his  reput,ation will  increase  of  it,s  own  accord.
Therefore,  most  of  this  work  pertains  to  the  military  aspect,  of
Anderson's  career  in  the  Civil War  during  his  bl`igade,  divisional  and
col`ps  commands.    Although  cast  as  more  a  militar}r  study  than  a  full  biog-
raphy,  it  has  not,  neglect,ed  the  importa!.lee  of  his  early  life  and  character.
Indeed,  the  moral  excellence  of  the  man  offers  one  of  the  few  explanations
for  historyls  seemingly  poor  memory,  and,  for  this  reason,  chapters  on
his  pre-war  and  post-war  careers  have  been  added.
But  the  purpose  of  this  work  has  been  confined,  in  large  measure,
to  a  simple  present,ation  of  as  much  of  his  Civil War  career  as  possible,
and  it  has  not  been t,he  writ,er's  intention,  nor  is  it  within his  capacity,
to  launch  an  exhaust,ive  treatise  on  military  science.    It  has  not  been
attempt,ed  to  analyze  the  Generalls  every  move  on  the  battlefield,  but
t,he  uriter  has  tried  to  give  more  than  a  simple  enumeration  of  them.
Acknowledgement,s  are  due  to  the  staff  of  the  Duke  University
Library  for  sending  me  phot,ocopies  of  Anderson's  lett,eps  and  papers,  to
the  staff  of  the  Virginia  St,at,e  Library  and  the  Manuscript  Division  of
the  Library  of  Congress  for  the  same  service,  to  the  staff  at  the  North
Carolina  Department  of  Archives  and  History  for  allowing  me  t,o  examine
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V
to  the  staff  at Wilson I.ibrary,  University  of North
Carolina  for.  access  to  the  E.  !B=±e=  Alexander  =3pe=I_E=  of  the  Southern
Historical  Collection,  and  a  special  note  of  tbanl{s  to Dr.  Chalmers
Davidson  and  his  staff  at  Davidson  College  Library.  for  their  friendly
assist,ance.    An  especial  debt  is  due  Professor  Eugene  Drozdowski,  whose
dil`ection  and  guidance  of  this  study  have  been  invaluable.
Joseph  a.  Elliott August  3,  1970
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CHAPTER   I
THE  mssoNs   OF  FAMII;I,   SCHOOI,  AND  WAR
(ocTonm,  i82i-FEBRUARE,  i86i)
On  October  7,   1821,  Richar`d  Heron  Anderson was  born  in  Stateburg,
South  Carolina,  a  litt,le  village  just  south  of  Camden  and  sit,uated  in  a
region  knoun  as  the  "High  Hills  of  Santee."    West  of  Stateburg  lay  the
swift Wateree  River.,  and  along  this  meandering  red  estuary  of  the  great,
Santee  developed  a  culture  from  Camden  to  Charleston  that  rivaled  any
that,  every  graced  t,he  Cooper,  i,he  York  and  t.,he  James.
The  fat,her  of  Richard  Anderson  was  Dr.  William Wallace  Anderson,
who  left  Maryland  for  S6uth  Carolina  in  1810.1    He  was  a  gI.aduat,e  of  New
York's  Medical  College  and  became  one  of  the  most  distinguished  surgeons
of  his  day.    Dr.  Anderson was  the  first  on  record  to  have  rerroved  a  jaw-
bone  for  cancer,  a  manifestly  delicate  operation  for  the  .hir.et,eenth  Cen-
tury  physician,  but  a  successful  one  nonetheless.2    He  did  not  entirely
limit  his  energies  to  this  ancient  art,  however,  and became  a  quite
respectable  amateur  architect.
LFor  an  interest,ing  Brit,ish  ancestry  see  Josie  Platt  Parler,  ''AFTFRGLOW:
A  Record  of  Two  Centuries  of  I,iving  at  Borough  House,"  reprinted  from
The  Sout,h Atlantic XXXVII,  no.1   (1938),   73-8,5.     Cit,ed  here-
inaft,er  as  Parler,  "Living  at  Borough  House."    The  proud  family  tree
casts  a  long  shadow  on  William  Faulkner's  and  others'   shameful  allusions
to  Southern  genealogy.    What  is  even  more  sharreful  and  ungracious  is  t,he
general  acceptance  of  then.
2For  this  informat,ion  the  unit,er  is  indebted  to  Dr.  Cha]mers  Davidson
of  Davidson  College.
(1)
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Before  the  Amel.ican  F.evolution,  Thomas  Hooper3  of  Massachusett,s
bought  a  mansion  in  St,ateburg  known  as  "Borough  House,"h  built  sometime
before  1760.    The  curious  appearance  of  this  Boston  Brahmin,  who  lat,er
became  a  Loyalist,,  had  a  special  sj.gnificance  for  Dr.  Anderson.     In  1818
Anderson  married  Mary  Jane  MCKenzie,  an  English  lady  who  was  a  niece  of
Hooper's  wife.    When  Thomas  Hooper  died,   possession  of  "Borough  House"
and  its  plant,ation  1.rend  to  Mary  and  was  thereafter  known  as  ''The  Anderson
Place , 'l
Dr.  Anderson's  father  had  been  a  Colonel  in  Washington's  Conti-
mental  Arny5 and,  for  a  time,  all  seemed  well  in  i,he  house  of  t,he  Tory
daughter  and  the  Patriot,  son--all but  the  house  itself .    The  prevailing
architecture  of  middle  and  lat,e  eighteent,h  c3ntury England was  Georgian
and wealt,hy Americans  duplicat,ed  it  with  a  persist,ent  loyalt,y.    AIthough
t,he  Borough  House  presented  a  fine  Georgian  example,  Dr.  Andel.son  simply
would  not  have  it.    Colonial America  was  an  era  of  the  past  and  so  must
be  its  vestiges.    In  1821  he  stuccoed  the  house  with  a  plaster  of  rammed
earth,  added wings  on both  flanks  of  the  main  stI.ucture  and,  as  final
3He  was  the  brother  of William Hooper,  signer  of  t,he  I)eclaration  of
Independence .
hThe origin  of  the  name  "Bol.ough  House"  comes  from  t,he  fact,  that,  for  quit,e
some  time  it  was  the  only  structure  in  the  area.    Other  popular  names
for  the  house  were  ''Yellow  House"  and  ''Hill  Crest.''    The  plantation  was
also  given  these  names  at  one  time  or  anot,her,  but  in  ant,e-bellum  days
it  was  usually  referred  t,o  as  ''Red  Hill  Plantation."
5He  was  Colonel  Richard  Anderson  of  the  famous  Seventh  Maryland  Line  of
Regulars.     One  of  the  heroes  of  the  Bat,tie  Of  Camden,  he  fell  itounded
on  it,s  field,  and  has  t]een  closely  ident,ified  with  t,he  area  ever  since.
He  revisited  Camden  in  1825  upon  the  occasion  of  t,he  re-interment  of
Baron  DeKalb,  who  was  killed  at,  the  Bat,tie  of  Camden.    Lafayet,t,e  laid
the  cornerst,one  and  Anderson  acted  as  a  T>allbearer.    When  he  visited
Camden  again  in  1832,   Colonel  Anderson  was  toast.ed  at,  a  banquet,  W.   M.
Shannon,   ''The  Family  of  Colonel  Richard  Anderson,"  address  t,o  Camden
Historical  Society,  June,  1913,  n.  p.
3
addenda,  sixteen  proud  colurms  boastingly  displayed  independence.    The
6
Revolution  was  now  complet,e.
The  eldest  of  the  Doct,orls  seven  children,  Richard  Anderson,  was
born  in  the  Borough  House  dun.ing  its  reconstruction.    As  a  boy  he  probably
asked  many  questions  of  the  ancestral  port,raits  that  adorned  the  walls  of
his  home,  and  t,heir  austere  expressions  captured  by  court  paint,ers,  and
famous  American  artists,  such  as  John  Singleton  Copley,  must  have  espe-
cially excited  his  curiosity.
Fond  of  t,he  outdoors,  young  Anderson  must  have  enjoyed  his  boy-
hood  strolls  i,hrough  his  father's  gardens,  where  among  the  primeval  oak
that  shaded  t,he  gI`ounds  were  plants  and  shrubs  of  rare  luxuriance.    Some
were  planted by  the  statesman  and world  traveler,  Joel  Roberts  Poinsett,
a  close  family  friend  who  died  in  the  Borough  House  and,  along  with  Mrs.
Poinsett,  was  buried  in  the  Anderson  family  plot  in the  old Episcopal
cemetery-  across  the  way.
Young  Anderson  grew  up  in  a  community  that  possessed  a  dignity
and  charm  all  its  own.    His  father was  one  of  it,s  pillars  and  t,o  the
people  of  the  little  village  of  Stateburg  ''Dr.  Anderson was  i,he  beloved.
physician,  the  trusted  confidant,  the  arbit,er  of family difficulties,  t,he
guardian  of  orphans,  t,he  trustee  of  estates,  the  father  confessor  of  the
entire  neighborhood."7    He  was  responsible  for  an  unusual  event  that
occurred  only  a  short  while  befol.e  the  outbreak  of  the  War  between  the
6For  an  ar9hi±ec?'s  :ppr=±sa|  9f  this  E±3± S ±£I££  structure,  see Waiter
The  Plant,ati on RooH|ijril€eF5I€j;F.   Perry,  A.I.  A.,
n.  d.), opposit,e  Plate  7.
7par|er,  "I.iving
graphical  sketch
186h,   Sec.   A, P.
of  South  Carolina-Press,
Borough  House,"  pp.   76-78.     For  an  obituary  and  bio-
Dr.  Anderson, see  Charleston  Daily Cap_urty,  May  27,
h
Stat,es,  an  arrangement,  to  accommodat,e  an  unusual  family.
In  St,ateburg was  a  free  Negro  family,  the  head  of  which  made
parts  for  cotton  gins.    In  most,  Southern  communities.free Negroes  were,
at best,  only tolerated,  but  Dr.  Anderson  invited  the  family to  attend
services  at  t,he  Episcopal  Church  of  the  Holy  Cross,  which  he  had  helped
to  design  in  1850.    Assenting,  the  Negro  family  did  not  sit  in  the  balcony
as  was  the  usual  practice  in  those  days,  but  was  assigned  a  separate  pew
among  the  white  families  of  t,he  community.
Just  north  of ,  and  adjacent  to,  the  Borough  Plantation was  that
of  Governor  Stephen  Miller.    He  was  the  father  of  Mar.y  Boykin  Miller,
who  became  t,he  famous  diarist  and  wife  of  Unit,ed  States  Senator  James
Chesnut.       M+s.  Cheshut`   iAJrote  most  of  her  diary  during  t,he  Civil War,
but  she  I.ecords  the  memories  of  a  lifetime.    Fondly  remei`iibering  Richard
Anderson  as  a  "playfellow"  Of  her  youth,  she  styled  him  ''t,he  most  silent
8
and  discreet  of  nan.''
The  Andersons  had  a  butler  whom they  referred  to  as  "Dick,"  obvi-
ously  the  namesake  of  the  future  General,  and  Richard  Anderson  had  no
greater  admirer  than  he,  who  emulated  Anderson  to  such  a  degree  and  became
so  silent  that  ''he  would  make  a  veritable  sphinx,"  insist,ed  Mrs.  Chesnut.u
After  t,he  war  "Dick,"  the  butler,  was  a  proud  individual  and  had  litt,le
to  say  to  any  member  of  i,he  whit,e  community.     He  did  stop  Mirs.  Chesnut
once  to  inquire  about  Richard  Anderson,  however.     ''He  was  nor  young  master
once,"  the  whilom  slave  told  the  Senatorls  wife,  ''1  always  will  like  him
better  t,ham  anybody  else.w9
:#r¥68?e29n3u:' c±t¥rg:f¥s (E£::n°:i, H°ffi? MiffL±n Co..19h9L
9E2¥.,  pp.   292-293.
5
Dr.  Anderson  had  taken  great  pains  to  make  ''Dich~"  a  polished
butler.    He  easily  acquired  t,he  necessary  social  graces  and,  at,  first,
he  proud].y  performed  his  duties.    He  was  not,  t,oo  proud  to  fall  in  love,
however,  and  in  the  course  of  but  a  few  weeks  Mrs.  Anderson  saw  the  impos-
sibility  of  continuing  t,he  present,  arrangement.    She  conveyed  the  pr.oblem
to  DI`.  Andel.son:     ''Dick"  had  fallen  in  love  with  Het,ty  of  t,he  Miller
plantation.    Dr.  Anderson  solved  the  problem by  allowing  ''Dick"  to  marry
Hetty  and  join  the  Miller  household.    Ifrs.  Anderson  in  laJiL,er years  regretted
only  that  ''Dick"  did  not,  seem  grateful,  but  she  and  the  Doct,or were  happy
for  him  in  his  new  circunst,ance.     ''This  was  magnanimous  on  their  pal.t,"
urote  Mrs.  Chesnut,r   `'for  Hetty  was  only  a  lady's  maid,"  and  had  not  the
Andersons  allowed  the  butler's  removal,  Hetty would  have  had  to  move  to
10
the  Borough  Plantat,ion.
11
The  Andersons  ouned  quite  a  large  nuhoer  of  slaves      and  the
Doctor was  forever  the  benign  master.    He  could  never  be  accused  of  ''ab-
sent,ee  landlordism"  and  he  had  no  winter  home  in  Charleston.    He  cared
for  ''his  people"  as  if  they were  his  ohm  children,  but  he  never  once
thought  Of  freeing them.    His  family  in  Maryland was  of  a  different  per-
suasion,  however..
Dr.  John Wallace  Anderson was  the  youngest  brot,her  of William
Wallace,  and  he  died  in  early  manhood.    He  dedicated  his  short  life  to
t,he  American  Colonization  Society,  and worked  with  all  the  zeal  his  yout,h
would  indicat,e.    At  age  t,went,y-eight  he  cl`ossed  t,he  Atlantic  to  Liberia
as  the  Societyls  agent  and  physician.    Upon  arrival,  however,  t,he  young
|Omid.
LLThe  w|.iter  has  not  determined  how  many  slaves  Dr.  Anderson  ouned,  but
the  nuhoer  exceeded  one  hundred.     For  this  information  he  is  again  grate-
ful  to  Dr.   Chalmers  Davidson  of  Davidson  Co].1ege.
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devotee  was  st,ricken  with  African  fever  anc]  died  before  rendering  his
services.    Somewhere,   on  the  western  coast  of  the  ''Dark  Cont,inent,"  he
Sleeps  in  a  lonely,  unmarked  grave.12
The  reticent young  Richard Anderson  said  little  of  the  instit,u-
tion  that,  as  the  eldest  son,  he  would  be  expected  to become  a  par.t  of
upon  t,he  death  of  his  father.     In  the  years  to  come,  however,  he  would
become  convinced  of  its  evils.    Perhaps  it  even  played  a  part  in  his
decision  to  become  a  soldier.    At  any  rate,  when  Anderson  graduated  fl.om
Edgehill  Acadeny  in  Stateburg  in  1838,  he  secured  an  appointment,  to  the
United  States  Military Acadeny through ,his  father's  friend,  Poinsett,  who
was  at,  the  time  t,he  Secretary  of War  for  President  Van  Buren.
Anderson  was  but  sixteen years  of  age  when  he  entered West  Point
in  June,  1838,  and  he  matriculated with  such  fut,ure  military  leaders  as
D.  H.  Hill,  James  Longstreet,  Lafayette  MCLaws,  John  Pope,  William
Rosecrans  and  Abner  Doubleday.
Educated  in the  Southern tradition  of  the  ''seven  liberal  art,s,"
young Anderson  did  not  excel  in  the  Acadeny's  engineering-oriented  curricu-
lum.    He  did  manage  to  finish  in  the  top  half  of  the  class  of  18h2,  how-
ever,  one  of  the  most  celebrated  in  the  history  of West  Point.L3
Upon  graduating,  Anderson  became  a  Second  I,ieutenant,  in  the  U.  S.
L2Like  most  of  the  many  doctors  in  his  family,  John Wallace  Anderson
graduated  from the  Univel.sit,y  of  Pennsylvania.    Beyond  i,his,  lit,tie  is
known  of  him.    His  interest  in  the  Society  may  have  come  from  his  brot,her,
•Dr.  Alfred  Anderson.    Alfred  married  Elizabeth  Ann  Bol]ing,  relative  and
friend  of  the  Virginia  Randolphs,  founders  of  t,he  American  Colonization
Society,  W.  W.  Andel.son,   ''The  Anderson  Family  Record,"  July  28,   1906,
n.  p.    The  wl`iter  of  this  bl.ief  genealogy,  also  a  physician,  served  as  a
courier  for his  first  cousin,  t,he  General.
13G.  w.   Cullumj
U.  S.  Milita:T=   -   L-
Company,   i
Biogra hical  Regist,er  of  Officers  and  r]raduat,es  of  the
Boston  and  New
®
Houghton,  Mifflin  and
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Dragoons,  and  served  at  t,he  Cavalry School  for  Practice  in  Carlisle,
Pennsylvania.    After  one year  at  Carlisle  he  was  transferred to  front,ier
duty,  where  he  would  spend  t,he  nerfu  two  years.    Here,  Anderson  must  have
impressed  his  superior  officers,  for  in  18hh,  the  Governor  of South  Caro-
lina,  Pierce  M.  Butler,  wrot,e  his  family that  excelleut  reports  concerning
Lieutenant  Anderson were  coming  in  ''from all quarters.wlh
'With  good  features  and  agreeable  expression,"  the  tall,  muscular
framed Anderson would  have  been  a  pleasing  complement  to  King  Frederick
Williamls  famous  regiment  of  grenadiers.15   Even ty the  strict  standards
of  Robert  E.  Lee,  he  was  already  considered  ''a  good  officer®''    At  this
tine  Lee  knew  lit,tie  else  of  the  South  Car.olinian  except  i,hat  Anderson
''Was  a  favourite  in  his  Regt.wL6
When  hostilities  ensued  with  Mexico,  Ander.son  was  with  General
Zachary Taylor.    Later  he  was  transferred  from Taylor's  Arny` to  that  of
General  Winfield  Scott,  and  served  under  Scot,t  from VeraL  Cruz  to  the
capture  of  Mexico  City.    His  great  performance  of  the  war was  at  Sam
Augustine,  where  he  led  a  detachment  against  a  far  superior  Mexican  fol`ce,
which  he  held  at  bay  i,o  enable  Scott  to  reach  the  Mexican  capital  much
more  quickly  t,ham  he  would  have  been  able  to  do  otherwise.    For  this
action Anderson was  brevetted  First  Lieut,enant.
After  t,he  war Anderson,  along  with  a  small  party  of  officers,
1h=}±g §±±±±,   Co|ufroia,  South  Carolina,  September  17,   1922,  See.   C,  p.  2.
L5Quote  from  Sorrel' Recollections  of  a  Confederat,e  Staff  Officer  (Jackson,
a:,-i9     ,  p.  i28TThCited  hel`einafterTennessee:   McCowat-Mercer  Press,   Inc
as  Sorrel, Recollections .
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which  included  U.  S.  Grant  among  it,   secured  leave  to  scale  t,he  for`eboding
heights  of  Popocatapet,1,  t,he  highest  volcano  in  t,he  two  Americas.    The
trek began  from t,he  little  village  of  Ozunba  and  the  only  accident  during
the  rugged  ascent,  occurred  when  one  of  the  overloaded  pack  mules  lost,  its
footing  and  rolled  over  the  steep  precipice.    hat,er,  having  set
up  camp  and  believing  t,hat  the  poor beast  had been  dashed  to  bits,  t,hey
were  greatly  amazed  to  view  the  ouner  coming  up  the  ascent  with  mule  and
cargo  intact;  the  load  had  provided  the  animal  with  a  soft  cushion  and
had  protected  it  from injury.
The  next  morning  t,he  excursion  was  renewed,  but  the  howling  wind
blew with  such  force  that  it  picked  up  the  loose  snow  from the  mountain-
top  in  such  volume  t,hat,  it  was  impossible  t,o  continue.    So  the  party
descended  below the  snow  line,  mounted  it,s  horses,  and  by  night  it  was
back  in  Ozufroa.    Soon,  on  a  bare  dirt  floor  they were  all  asleep,  but
before  morning,  every  member  of  the  party began  to  scream with  pain.     ''The
feeling  was  about  what  might  be  expected  from the  prick  of  a  sharp  needle
at  a  white  heat,"  said  one  of  the  members,  and  by  daylight  the  eyes  of
most,  of  t,he  part,y were  swelled  to  such  proportions  t,hat,  they wel`e  entirely
blinded.    Probably  their  eyes  had been badly burned by  t,he  glare  of  i,he
snow.    After  bathing  them  in  cold  water,  however,  the  swelling  went  down.
Most  of  i,he  party  concluded  to  give  up the  journey  at  this  point,  but
not,  Anderson,  however.     He  and  a  few  bl.awe  companions  deter.mined  to  conquer
t,he  element,s,  and  they  resumed  the  trip  upward.    This  time  they  succeeded
in  reaching  t,he  crater  at  the  t,op.    When  he  returned  to  Mexico  City,
Anderson  sat  down  and  recorded  his  account  of  the  adventure,  and  it  was
Published  a  short  t,ime  afterwards.L7
L7u.  s.  Grantt Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grand   (New  York:   Charles  L.
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After  the  }1exican War,  Anderson  ret,urned  to  Carlisle  as  an  inst,ruc-
tor  in  cavalry  tactics,  where  he  met  and  married  Sarah  r7ibson,  the  daught,er
of  the  Chief  Justice  of  Pennsylvania,  Judge  John  8.  Gibson.18    From 1852  to
1859  he  was  mostly  assigned  t,o  front,ier  duty,  and  it  was  during  this
service  t,hat  he  received  a  curiously timed  pl.esentation  for  his  service
twelve  years  earlier  in  the  Mexican War.    In  1859  t,he  stat,e  of  Sout,h
Carolina  presented  him  a  handsomely  inscribed  sword.    At  the  top  of `t,he
scabbal.d  was  a  shield  of  gold  ingrained  with  the  statels  coat  of  arms.
What  was  ironic  about,  the  sword  was  the  handle.    To  remind  him  of  his
loyalty,  the  hilt  waLs  surmounted with  the  head  of  John  a.  Calhoun.    When
the  nullification  crisis  arose  in  1832,  along with  their  friend  Poinsett,
the  Ai`idersons  were  staunch  Unionists,  and  were  therefore  opponents  of
OaThoun.19    Nevertheless,  Anderson  graciously  accepted  the  sword  and
wrote  i,he  following  letter  of  appreciation.
camp Floyd.  X::¥iT;5?±=85¥:
Sir:    I  have  t,he  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipb  of your  letter
enclosing  a  copy  of  the  I.esolution  of  the  Senate  and  House  of Repre-
sentatives  of  the  General Assefroly  of  South  Carolina,  which  conferred
upon  me  the  high  dist,inction  of  its  commendation  and  rewarded  nor  nil-
itary  service  by t,he  gift  of  a  sword.
It  is  with  unalloyed  pleasure  and  deep  gr.atification  that  I
receive  t,his  token  of  remembrance  and  approbation  from nor  native  State,
and  it  is  with  just  pride  that  I  welcome  so  unlooked  for  and  flatt,ering
a  recognition.
Webster  and  Company,  1886),   I,  18h.    Hereinaft,er  cited  as  Grant,Memoirs .
That  Andel`son  wl`ote  and  had  published  an  account,  of  this  adventure  is
st,at,ed  by  GI.ant,  ±±±±.    The  writer,  however,  has  not  been  successful
in his  attempt  to  locate  the  publication.
18For  a
Dictiona
separate  article  on  Judge  Gibson,  see  Allen  Johnson,  ed„
of  American Biograwhy  (New  York:   Charles  Scribner's  Sons,1928),
Cited  her.einafter  as  D.  A.  8.
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It  also  affords  me  great  happiness  to  remember  that  this  high
honor`  has  been bestowed  upon  me  for  service  in  a  campaign  t,o  t,he
successful  and  glorious  termination  of which  the  heroic  Palmetto  Regi-
ment  so  gallantly  cont,ributed.    Twenty-one  years  ago  I  left  mr home
to  enter  the  Milit,any  Acadengr  of  the  United  States.    Since  that  time
I  have  revisited  nor  native  State  only  at  long  intervals,  but  nDr
affection  for  it  has  not  been  diminished by  nor  absence.
I  have  been  led,  by  rngr  services  to  our  common  country,  into  almost
every  quarter  of  her wide  and  magnificent  domain;  but  I  have  no  where
found  a  land  to  prefer  to  our beloved State,  nor  have  I  ceased  through-
out  all  ny wander.ings  t,o  entertain  the  hope  that  at  some  future  day
I  may  find  a  home  and  a  resting  place  upon  its  soil.
The  feelings  and  reflections  which your  letter  excit,es  are  all
additional  incentives  to  me  to  prove  nyself  not  unwortty  of the  com-
mendat,ion  and  regal-d  so  generously bestowed;  to  cherish  attachment  to
the  Government  and  institutions  of  E[  _c__o_qutry;  to  preserve  a  high
admirat,ion  of  the  noble  patriotism  of  the  gI.eat  statesman  whom you
nana;  to  be  guided  by  his  wisdom  and  to  emulate  the  stainless  purity
of  his  privat,e  life.
The  good  wishes  wit,h  which you  present  it,  enhances  the  value  of
's gift,,  and  increases  the  pleasure  of  acceptance.
Will  you be  so  good  as  to  communicate  to  the  General  Assembly  nyr
most  grateful  acknowledgements,  to  which  I  feel  t,hat,  I  have  given
very  imperfect  expression.    For  your  cont,inued  happiness  and  pros-
perity  allow  me  t,o  offer  you  nor best  wishes,  and  believe  me,  with
great,  regard  and  respect  your  most  obedient  servaho,
R.  H.  Anderson
To  his  Excelleney,
R.  F.  W.  Alston,
Governor  of  South  Carolina. 20
Thus  Anderson  had  made  his  decision.    If  the  need  arose,  the  sword
presented by his  "country,"  as  he  referred to South  Carolina  in his  letter
to  Governor    Alston,  would  not  be  used  against  her,  and  South  Carolina
could  assure  herself  of  his  loyalty.    Although  Anderson  may  never have
said  so  publicly,  he  doubtlessly had  reservations  about  secession,  and
one  can  safely  sul.mise  that  the  sentiments  expressed by  his  father's
friend  Poinsett  could  have  easily been  his  our.    Poinsett  stated  in  1850
that  ''if  revolution  comes,  for  there  can be  no  peacable  secession  or
::Cfh:r¥:nrfe¥:::::'sT#e¥rm9y£(
Lieut,enant  General  Richsrd  Heron Anderson
Charleston,  South  Carolina:  Art  Publishing
d  hereinaft,er  as  Walker.  R.  H.  Anderson.a5mEFy,  1917  ,  pp.13=ZF.ngted  hereinafter  as  Walker, i.  I
try  it,alics.
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dissolution  of  t,he  Un-ion,   I  am  ready  t,o  t,ake  ny  part  and  nor  st,and  anon,g
the  sons  of  t,he  South  in  t,he  ranks  or  in  organizing  our  defences,  but
21
wit,hout  hope.''
Anderson  did  not,  resign  his  commission  until  almost  t,wo  years
after  he  received  this  ''honor"  from his  State  Assembly,  however,  and  the
true  ''first  shot"  of  t,he  Civil War  had  already been  fired  when,  on  January
9,  1861,  the  '`Star  of  t,he  West"  attempted  to  garl`ison  Ford  Sumter.    On
February  15,  1861,  almost,  two  months  aft,er  South  Carolina  seceded,  and
while  stationed  at  Fort  Kearney,  Nebl.aska,  he  resigned  from t,he  Unit,ed
St,at,es  Arny.
21u.  Fred  nippy. Joel  Robel`tf,  Poinset,t,.  Versatile  American
Carolina:  Duke  UnlFEFSI t,y  Press,1935),   p.   237.
(I)urham,  North
CHARTER   11
FIGHTING  wlTH  BRAGG  Arm   joHNSTON
(mRCH,   i86i-mT,   1862)
After  resigning  from  the  ''01d  Arry,"  Captain  Anderson  was  cormis-
sioned  Colonel  of  the  First  South  Carolina  Regular  Regiment,  pat.t,ly
because  of  his  earlier  recol`d  of  distinction,  but  equally  diet,a.ted t]y
the  shortage  of  Acadery-trained  officers  of  that  grade.    Anderson  com-
manded  t,his  unit  as  a  reserve  force  during  the  initial  firing  at  Fort
Sunder,  and,  although  he  saw  no  act,ion,  he  was  commended  for  inspiring
"good  order,  spirit  and  energy."1    Andel`son  relieved  General  P.  G.  T.
Beauregard  as  commander  of  the  South  Car'olina  forces  and  defenses  on  May
27,  1861,  and  he  was  pr.omot,ed  t,o  Brigadier  General  four  days  later.2    He
served  in this  capacity  until  he  was  ordered  to  report  to  Genel`al  Braaton
Bragg,  August  21,  1861,  at  Pensacola,  Florida.3
Fol`t  Pickens  on  Santa  Rosa  Island,  which  guarded  the  entrance  to
Pensacola  Harbor,  was  the  last  fortress  in  the  South  to  be  held by  Union
forces.    Wishing  to  enhance  his  prestige  after  a  somewhat,  inactive  season,
General  Bragg,  the  commander  of  Confederate  troops  at  Pensacola,  designed
Lu.  S.    War  Department, The  War  of  the  Rebellion:    A  Compilation  of  the
Official  Records  of  t,he  HHloE
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an  offensive  under  the  prete]ct  of  a  retaliatory  measure  for  the  destruc-
t,ion  of  the  Confederate  war  schooner  Judah.    The  mission  was  to  destroy
a  camp  and  supply buildings  set  up  outside  of  For.t  Pickens,  and  General
Anderson was  chosen  to  effect  it.b
On  the  night  of  October  9,  1861,  General Anderson  saw  his  first
action  of  the  war  when  he  landed  a  force  of  one  thousand  men  on  Sant,a
Rosa  Island.    In  columns  of  bat,talions,  Anderson  launcr!ed  a  three-pronged
attack  on  the  Union  outposts.    To  insure  silence,  he  ordel`ed  two  of  the
columns  to  march  along  the  east,ern beach  of  the  island  while  the  remaining
battalion  moved  on  the  western beach.    Aver.aging  only  thl`ee-quarters  of
a  mile  in  width,  t,he  island  permitted  close  cont,act,  bet,ween  the  troops,
and,  after  a  march  of  several  miles,  the  force  approached' the  Federal
camp.    The  rear  column  led  the  assault  as  it  sliced  diagonally  and  stormed
a  party  of  unsuspecting  New York  Zouaves,  driving  t,hem back  toward Fort
Pickens,  while  the  remainder  of  the  force  burned  the  camp  and  supplies.
Ander.son  t,hen  ol`dered  his  troops  back  to  the  steamers,  and,  for  a  while,
it  seemed  as  if  there  would  be  no  pursuit.    1then  a  propeller  of  one  of
the  steamers  became  entangled  in  some  mesh,  however,  it,  delayed  the  trans-
port  long  enough  for  the  Federals  to  adjust,  their  artillery.    A  panic
t,hen  ensued  that  took  several  terrified  Confederates  overboard,  where
5
they  either  drouned  or were  shot  in  the  water.
Except  for  being  one  of  t,he  two  night,  assaults  of  the  war  and  to
focus  attention  on Bragg,  the  consequences  of  this  little  nocturnal
hwi||iam  R.  Boggs,
C.   S.   A.   (Durham,
Military  Reminiscences  of  General William
Ea PrintekyTrmt-p.
Cited  hereinafter  as  Boggs,
5g.  E.,  vl,  h6o-h63.
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ad.`7enture  did  nothing  to  remove  t,he  Federals  fran  Fort  Pickens.     Its
importance  was  expanded  to  colossal  proportions,  however,   and  Bragg  dis-
patched  three  separate  report,s  concerning  the  affair  to  the  Adjut,and-
General's  office.    He  was  laLvish  in  his  praise  of  Anderson.    One  of  the
accounts  is  worthy  of  not,e,  however,  for  it  demonstrates  the  early  notice
of  Anderson's  congenital  modesty.     Bragg  informed  Ad.jut,ant-General  Cooper
t,hat  "Brigadiel`-General  Andel`son  commends  in  very  just  terms  the  gallantry
of  his  little  band,  who  have  fully  justified  the  high estimate  I  had
formed  of  this  excellent  litt,1e  arlw.    They  have  shorn  it  is  only  neces-
sary  to  order  and  t,hey will  promptly  execute,  however  desperate  the  under-
taking.    The  general  modestly  omits  to  mention  t,hat  at  the  close  of  the
affair  he  I`eceived  a  painful  wound  in  the  left  arm  from  a  muskett)all,
Which  will  disable  him  for  several  weeks.N6
The  ne]de  encounter  with  Fort  Pickens  occurred  on  New Year's  Day,
1862,  and  was  occasioned  when  the  Federals  attempted  to  sink  a  small  Con-
federate  transport,  permitted by Bragg  to  land  at  the  Navy Yard.    Confed-
erate  batteries  across  the  bay returned  the  salvo,  but  they did  lit,tie
damage  to  the  for.t.    Due  to  superior  Union  artillery,  however,  proper
range  was  effected  from Fort  Pickens  and  considerable  dest,ruct,ion was  done
to  the  Navy Yard.7    Incensed  at  t,he  prospect  of  being  discredited  and
seeing  an  opportunity  to  disparage  his  accomp].ished  subordinate,  Brags
wl`ote  a  very  unfair  account  of  Anderson's  involvement  in  the  incident.
The  result  gI.eatly  damaged  Anderson.s  reput,ation  as  a  soldier  at  this
time  and  gave  birth  to  a  rumor  from which  he  never  entirely  escaped.
6Eng.,  pp.  h58-h60.
7Boggs' - Reminiscences pp.   log-109®
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The  following  is  a  summation  of  Bragg's  charges:
1.    The  firing  from  the  N.Ivy Yal`d  int,o  Fort  Pickens  was  ordered
by  General  Anderson.
2.    General  Anderson  was  intoxicated.
3.    The  steamer  fired  upon by the  Federals  was  "imprudently  allowed"
ty  Gent;:Pal  Andel.son  to  cone  up  to  t,he  Navy  Yard.8
Brigadier-General William  R.  Boggs,  who  had  his  problems  with
Bragg  and resigned  shortly  after the  affair,  labeled  the  report  "a  vile
libel  on a  gallaho  officer  and  an honorable  gentleman."    When  hearing
that  Bragg  had  prefel`red  charges  against  Anderson  and  t,hat  an  arrest  would
probably  follow,  Boggs  quickly wrot,e  to  Anderson  and  offel`ed  to  serve  as
a witness  on  his  behalf .    A  little  earlier,  he  had written Bragg  a  letter
that  had i7indicated Anderson  of  every  accusation.
Boggs  had been  present  at  Anderson's  private  quartel`s  when  the
firing  had  first  begun,  where  Ander`son  and  "his  estimable  wife"  were
greeting  New Yearls  callers.    'rmen  the  fir.ing  commenced,"  said  Boggs,
'`all  officers  quickly  mounted  and  rode  to  the  Navy Yard."    Boggs  insisted
that  Anderson's  conduct  was  so  courageous  in  mounting  the  parapet  t,hat
it  "may have  appeared  t,o  a  new  soldier  an  act,  of  intoxication  rat,her  than
that  of  a  corrmiander  who  wished  to  instill  confidence  in  his  command.''
Thus,  if  Boggs  was  wit,h  Anderson  at  his  headquarters  and  the  two  generals
arrived  at  the  Navy Yard  after  t,he  firing  had  begun,  Anderson  could  not
have  ordered  the  shooting  from the  Navy Yard.    It  occurred  precisely
because  Anderson  had  been  absent.    Finally,  Anderson  did  not  give  his
approval  to  permit  t,he  "private  steamer,''  as  BI`agg  chose  to  term  it,  to
8For  Braggls  report  see  9.  E.,  Vlj  h97-h98.
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dock  at,  the  Confederate  wharf  at  the  Navy Yard.    In  fact,  the  so-called
"private  steamer,"  in  reality was  one  of  Braggls  own  tl.ansports,  under
the  direct,ion  of  one  of  his  officers  on  a  special  detail,  by  command  and
design  of  Bragg  bimself.    Neither Anderson  nor  most  of Bragg's  own  staff
knew  anything  of  this  special  detail,  and,  when  questioned  for  bringing
t,he  steamer  to  t,he  Navy Yard,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  detail  admitted
''That  it  was  done  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  General  Bragg."9
Although  Boggs  did  not  choose  it,  perhaps  the  best  defense  he
could  have  given  Anderson  involved  the  reverse  process  of  simply  an
examination  of  t,he  character  of  the  accuser  rather  than  of  the  accused.
Braxton Bragg  was  the  most  cont,entious  and  unpopular  generalL°  nort,h  or
south  of  the  Potomac,  and,  before  the  end  of  t,he  war,  he  stood  indicted
before  almost  every  general  officer  in  the  Confederate  armies.    Curiously
enough,  however,  chief  among  his  few  protagonists  was  the  President  of
the  Confederacy  himself ,  and  to  oppose  Bragg  one  would  oppose  Jefferson
Davis  and  t,he  Administration.    The  relat,ionship between  Bragg  and  Davis
seems  to  be  one  of  the  few  explanations  for  the  I`etention  of  Bragg  as  a
full  general when  he  continued  to  discredit  himself  in  almost  every  sub-
sequent  campaign  that  he  entered.
Thus  Anderson's  brief  career  at  Pensacola  had  not  been  a  glorious
one,  and,  alt,hough  Bragg  eventually  dropped  all  charges  against  him,
rumors  of  an  affinity for alcohol  followed  Anderson  into  t,he  Arngr  of  Northern
Virginia,LL  where  he  was  sent  after  Bragg  had  persuaded  the  President  to
9Boggs' - Reminiscences pp.   105-109.
L°For  a  humorous  anecdote  concerning  Braggls  disposit,ion  see  Grant,
Memoirs 11,   86-87.
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have  him  supplanted.     On  February  15,  1862,  Anderson  was  ordered  from
Pensacola  to  Virginia  t,o  assume  command  of  a  Sout,h  Carolina  brigade  in
the  division  of  Major  General  James  I,ongstreet,  where  be  would  redeem
himself  shortly  afterwards.12    All  of  I,ongstreetls  brigades  had  competent
leaders,  said  D.  S.  Freeman,  but  of  all  t,he  brigadiers,  ''lDick'  Anderson,
13
then  forty-four,  was  the  most brilliant."
Anderson  arrived  in  t,i"e  to  take  part  in  the  evacuation  of York-
tovn  by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston.     Union  General  George  Mcclellan  had
just  superseded  General  Irwin  MCDoirell  and  was  planning  an  offensive.
Johnston doubted  the  value  of  his  position  at Yorkto"m  and  anticipated
an  attack  by  Mcclellan.    He  believed  that  the  Union  gener.al  planned  i,he
destruction  of  Confederate  Vat,el--batteries  there  and  at  Gloucester  Point,
and,   if  he  could  slip  by  t,he  Confederate  ram  y=±ngip_i=3_  (M_e_I_F_i_qu_a_e ) ,   t o
transport  his  arngr  up the  York River,  attempt  to break  through  the  Con-
federate  lines  and  thus  threaten  Richmond.Th   Acting  on this  belief ,  he
informed  the War  Depart,ment  that,  a  retreat  was  in  order.
After  spiking  the  largest  of  the  guns  that  would be  left  behind,
Johnst,on  ordered  the  retreat,.    It,  was  an  extremely hard  march  that  fol-
lowed  and  ''rivers  of  mud''  slowed  logistics  almost  to  a  standstill,  allowing
12g£ E.,   11,  h88.
L3Doug|as  Southall  Freeman,  i.  E.  !£g  (New  York:   Charles  Scribner's  Sons,
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the  rearguard  of  D.  H.  Hill  an  average  of  less  than  a  mile  per  I,       ,15
For  a  while  it  seemed  as  if  Hill  would  t>e  permitted  to  escape  un„       itedL6
when  General  ''Jeb''  Stuart's  little  cavalry  suddenly  dug  in  t,o  meet,
assault.    Immediately,  a  brigade  of  General  John  Magruder's  divisio:
under  General  Paul  Sermes  was  detached  as  the  rear  column,  proximity
17
determining  the  choice.        The  brigade  was  placed  in  the  bast,ioned  ea.i
works  of  Ford  ifegruder  and was  soon  afterwards  reinforced by  another bl'.
gade,  bot,h  of  which  were  placed  under  the  command  of  General  Lafayette
MCLaws.    Just  narrowly  did  the  garrison  have  time  to  man  the  guns  before
they were  attacked.    But,  the  action was  brief  and  the  Federals  withdrew
almost  as  quickly  as  they had  cone.18
At,  sundoun  on  Mfay  h,  1862,  Fort  ragruder  was  I.e-occupied  by  two
brigades  of  Confederates  under  General  Anderson.    Longstr.eet  had  been
ordered  to  send  only  one,  but,  as  his  brigades  were  small,  he  decided  to
send  Andersonls  and  General  Roger  Pryorls.19    Because  of  t,he  approaching
darkness  and  a  dl.iving  rain,  Anderson  occupied but  one  of  the  thirteen
redoubts  that,  flanked  t,he  fort  and  could  only await  sunrise  to  adjust  his
lines.    The  next  moming  he  occupied  six  mol.e  redout>ts  and  braced  himself
:::?w:::i:::t;:i::::::;errieRE)#.
Alerander,  Milit.any Memoirs .
of  a  Confederate  (Blooming-
hereinafter  as
:::I:::::e:p::I:::::¥±:np;u:3]±:Ea:yM€£:e::::::t::L#::::::v:°A::::;k
concerning  the  numerical  strengt,h  of  Johnston's  army.
`17
Douglas  Southall  FI.eeman,  Le_e's  Lieut,enants:     A  St,udy  in  Command   (New
Fork:  Charles  Scribnerls  S6n5THh3  ,   I,  17  .    CltEaTHarE
Freeman, I.ee 's  Lieutenants.
18johnston. Narrative pp.   119,   120.
[9g.  a.,11,  pt,.1,  56h.
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for  the  onslaught.20
The  Federals  were  well-equipped  for  this  engagement  with  their
rifled  cannon  opposing  the  Confederate  ''smooth  bore,"  and  their  telescopic
rifles  drew bead  on  Confederate  pickets.21    These  pickets  encountered  the
Federals  at  six  o'clock  that  morning  and  met  with  a  steadily  increasing
resistance.    At  t,en  o'clock  Johnston  sent  Cadmus Wilcoxl  and  A.  P.  Hill's
brigades  as  reinforcement..  This  assistance  temporarily  shook  t,he  Federals
loose,  but,  when  they were  reinforced  by  another  division,  Johnston  de-
tached  George  Pickett's  and  Raleigh  Colstonls  brigades  to Anderson.22
It  was  manifestly  a  demanding  enterprise  for  a  newly  commissioned
brigadier who,  as  yet,,  had  not  even  had  i,he  opport,unity  to  lead  a  single
brigade  into  action.23    Now,  in  his  first  general  action,  Anderson  was
commanding  seven  brigades2h  against  three  Federal  divisions!    For  t,he  most
experienced  officel`s,  combining brigades  on  the  field was  a  most  diffi-
cult  task,  but,  as  he  had been  ordered  to  take  advantage  of  any  opportunity,
Anderson  arranged  t,hem  in  solid  phalanx.    Most  of  the  brigades  were  maneu-
vered  to  the  right  toward  the  position being  most  threatened,  and  the
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Yorktown.    Even  at  this  early  date,  however,  the  f:eneral  consensus  was
that  this  act,ion was  a  minor  affair.
2hGenera|  Juba|  Ear.1yls  brigade  was  also  det,ached  to  Anderson,  but  Eat.ly
decided  t.o  attack  on  the  left  side  of  the  Williamsburg  road.    IJis  advance
was  a  complet,e  failure.
20
was  to  keep  their  thr`ee  divisions  from  setting  up  artiller.y.    This  he
accomplished,  and  when  darkness  approached,  Anderson  moved  his  t,roops
t)ack  int,o  the  fort,  having  captured  or  silenced  all but  one  piece  of  the
Union  carmon.25    Only  the  shortage  of  horses  prevented  him  from  hauling
in  two  Federal  batteries  intact.26    Johnst,onls  rear was  now  safe,  and  he
was  allowed  to  cont,inue  his  ret,feat  with  little  or  no  pursuit.27    It  was
now  apparent  t,hat  Richard  H.  Anderson was  no  ordinary brigadier.
The  Battle  of Williamsburg  was  soon  foreshadowed  ty  lal`ger  affairs
and  t,he  circumst,ances  of  t,hat  engagement,  have  been  all  but,  forgotten.
Against  a  nunerically  superior  force,  however,  Anderson,  in  his  first,
general  engagement,  perhaps  saved  Johnst,onls  arrry  from  defeat.    A  briga-
dier  for  less  than  one  yeal`,  he  commanded  what  amounted  to  half  of  Johnston's
entire  arty.    The  action  at  Fort  Magruder  constitut,ed  t,he  at,tack  on  t,he
right  at Williamsburg  and was  the  only  successful  phase  of  the  battle  on
the  Confederate  side.28
Concluding  his  official  report  of 'the  t>attle  Anderson  states:
''The  fearless  bearing,  and  the  unceasing  assist,ance  rendered  by  them
requires  from me  a  particular  notice  of  t,he  mefroers  of  ny.  st,aL ff .    Captain
25g.  a.,  |1,  pt.  1,  581.
:::;:g;:;gg;?::i:3.
Bethel  to  Sharpsburg  (Rale
27For  johnstonls  appraisal  of  Anderson'S
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actions  at  Fort  Magl`uder  see
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For  a  listing  of  the  forces,  bot,h  North  and  Sout,h,  active  at,  this
engagement  see:     Robert  Underwood  Johnson  and  Clarence  Clough  Buel,   eds.,
the  Civil  War   (New  Yol`k:  Thornas  Yoseloff,   Inc.,Batt,1es  and  Leaders  ofEFTII 200.201
in  t,his  volume  totaled  only  h68  killed,  but  J6hHston  cont,ends  that  llooker
stated  under  oath  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct,  of War  that,  the
losses  in  his  division  alone  totaled  seventeen-hundred  men.    See
Johnston, Narrative
TirEa HEF5.IriEfFer  as  8.  &  L.    Union  losses  quoted
p.   123.
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T.  S.  Mills,  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  Captain  Edward  J.  Means,  Acting
Aide  de  Camp,  and  ltr.  E.  M.  Anderson,  Volunteer  Aide  de  Camp.     The  last
of  these  waLs  rnyr  brother.     He  has  given  his  life  to  his  count,ryls  cause.W29
Perhaps  it  will  give  us  insight  into  t,he  character  of  the  General
to  read  a  letter  to  his  fathel.  concerning  the  death  of  his  younger brother
MCKenzie :
A  most  heavy  affliction  has  fal].en  upon  you  and  me  and  all  other
members  of  t,he  family  in  the  cleat,h  of  MCKenzie.    The  suddenness  with
which this  calamity  has  befallen  us,  renders  it  appalling.    The  instan-
taneous  transmission  from  life  and  healt,h  and  excit,ed  animat]..on  to
death  of  one  so  near  to  me  fills  me  with  inexpl.essible  grief  and
wretchedness.    I  loved  nor  br.other  wj.th  nor whole  heart,  and  during  the
last,  thirty  days,  in which  he  has  1.een  const,andly  at  nor  side--his
unconcealed  satisfaction  of being  with  me--his  deep  int,erest  in  all
that  was  going  on--his  eager  and  cheerful  performance  of  all  his  duties
and  his  constant  anxiety  that  all  should  go well with  our  country's
:::S8--increased  nor  attachment--if  indeed  anything  could  have  done
After  he  had  visited  his  brother's  remains  at,  the  home  of  a  Dr.
Garrick,  he  urote  anot,her letter  to  his  father.    ''It was  here,"  said
Anderson,  ''that  I,  for t,he  first  tine,  fully realized the  dreadful fact.
The  hand  of  death  was  laid  upon  the  face  of  him whose  count,enance  had
only  a  little  while  before  delight,ed  me  by  its  animation,  its  courage,
its  intelligence  and  its  strong  affection.    It  was  the  most  agonizing
moment  of  ny  life.w31
It  was  a  painful  duty,  surely,  for  the  General  ''to bury  t,he  love
and  affection  of  a  lifetime"  and  to  resume  his  responsibilities  as  a
soldier.32    But  as  Jackson's  actions  in  t,he  Valley  had  militated  against
29g.  E.,  |1,  pt.  1,  581.
3°Wa|ker,   R.  H.  Anderson
31EnI.,  p.  72.
32Eng.'  p.  71.
p.   71.
22
any  conjunction  between  MCDowell  and  Mcclellan,  Johnston  saw  a  good
oPportunit,y  t,o  attack.33
Part  of  Mcclellan's  arngr  was  camped  at  Seven  Pines  to  which
several  roads  from Richmond  led.    The  vanguard  of  Johnst,on's  arty was  the
division  of  D.  H.  Hill,  who  became  engaged  on  the  morning  of  lfay  31st.
At  t,his  time,  Andel.son  waLs  in  command  of  the  left,  wing  of  Longstreet's
division,  but,  when  Longstreet  ordered  him to  send  a  brigade  to  Hillls
support,  he  instructed  Anderson  to  accompany  it  and  direct  its  operations.
Anderson  select,ed  his  own  brigade  and  reported  t,oHill.3h    Before  he
arrived,  the  brigades  of  Gabriel  Rains  and  Robert  nodes  had  entangled
themselves  in  the  abatis  on  the  right,  of  the  Williamsbur.g  Road,  and,
after  Rodes  received  a  wound  in  the  arm,  his  senior  colonel,  John 8.
Gordon,  wit,hdrew  his  men  from  the  woods.    The  situation  was  even  more
critical  on  the  left  of  the  road  as  the  enelnyr  mercilessly  mowed  down  fl.on
behind t,heir  strong  position  Hillls  two  remaining  brigades.35
After  a  quick  survey Anderson  divided  his  brigade  into  regiment,s
and  the  regiment,s  into  battalions,  a  division that  D.  H.  Hill believed
had  not  yet  been  attempted  during  the  war.36    Although  the  division  of
forces  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  maxims  established  by  the  great
French  theorist  Antoine  Jomini,  the  result,s  were  soon  to  justify Anderson's
action.    As  t,he  troops  on  both  sides  were  busily  pl`e-occupied  and  t,he
33g.  i.,11,  pt.1,  933.
3hAnderson  to  Hill,  october  26,  1867,  2.  ¥.  !!±±± !±sE.,   70-3360j  Virginia
State  Library,  Richmond.
35g.  E.,   |1,  pt.1,  239-2h3.
36southern  Histol.ical  Societ
18i6=RE' IX'   92. H.   S.   P.E±ge=i  (Richmond:  Southern  Histor.ical  Society,Cited  hereinaft,er  as  S.
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enerngr  being  dl.iven  slowly  back  into  t,he  form  of  a  horseshoe,  Anderson
ordered  t,wo  of  his  regiments  under  Colonel  Micah  Jenkins  to  get  posit,ion
in  the  rear  of  the  unsuspecting  Federals  throur:h  the  cover  of  the  thict{
37
woods.         As  Jenkins  at,tacked,  Anderson  rammed  his  column  into  where  the
Federals  had  retired.    The  three  regiment,s  ''at,tacked  lit{e  demons  possessedw38
and,  after  being  joined  by  one  of  G.  8.  Anderson's  regiment,s,  one  after
another  of  the  Union brigades  were  svept  aside.    At  the  end  of  the  day,
Anderson's  troops  held  t,he  most  advanced  position  of  the  batt,1e,  having
driven  back  the  Federals  for  more  t,ban  a  mile  beyond  t,heir  main  line  of
works,   capt,uring  two  gun  positions  and  several  camps,  including  commis-
39
saries  and  quartermaster's  supplies.        The  extent  of  the  force  with  which
Anderson  hit  and  the  ensuing  panic  which  gI.ipped  the  retreating  Federals
is  t,estified  to by  the  fact  that  not  a  single  soldier  commanded by him
ho
was  taken  prisoner.i
Seven  Pines  seemed  destined  to  legend  and  Anderson  along with  it.
James  I.  Coker,  writing  some  year.s  after  the  war,  still  maintained that
''it  was  the  most  bloody,  while  it was  our  most  successful  fight  of  the
whole  war.    Three  regiments  of  R.  H.  Anderson's  brigade  led  in  this  tre-
hl
mendous  onslaught.t'         Even  Longstreet,  who  was  disappointed  at  not
getting  into  the  action,  had  to  concede  that  ''The  severest  part  of  the
37uames   L.
G  9t,h  S.   C. V.  Infant,ry,  C.
Coker,   A_  Hist,or.y.  of  CompanyE6t
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:::::::?e8:k:¥,J±:;±±,C3¥e:6.who  Served  as  a  Capt,ain  in  Andersonl s
hLE2i£.    Although  this  quotat,ion  is  an  obvious  exaggeratj.on,   it  does  repre-
sent,  t,he  pride  which  t,he  Confederat,es  took  in  their  great  success  at
Seven  Pines.
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work  was  done  by  Major  General  D.  H.  Hill's  Division,  bj±± the  attack  of
the  two  brigades under  General  R.  H.  Anderson one  commanded  by  General
Kempel.  and  the  other  by  Colonel  Micah  Jenkins,  was  made  wit,h  such  spirit
and  regularit,y  as  to  have  driven  back  a  most  determined  foe--this
± fa i± = ±."h2
decided
Hill  would  have  been  the  last  to  question  Longstreet's  assertion
and  so  impressed  .LJas  he  by  Andersonls  performance  that  his  praise  was
the  most  generous  of  all.     ''These  three  regiments,Wh3  he  affirmed,  ''which
say  i,800  men,  began  that  march  to  victory,  which  has  but  few  parallels
in  history,  fighting  the  most  of  Heintzleman's  Corps  wit,h  fragments  of
Keye ls  Corps.wth
The  wounded  Johnston  also  had  a  kind  word  and  recommended  Andt"rson's
promotion.h5    But  the  praise  that  Anderson  cherished  mc>st  of  all  was  prob-
ably that  which was  affectionately bestowed  upon  him by his  men--the
accolade  of  "Fighting  Dick"  Anderson.
h2From  Longstreetls  report,  9.  E.,11,  pt.1,  9u+.    lfy  italics.
h3Actua||y,  there  were  four  regiments  engaged  at  Seven  Pines  under Ander-
son's  direct,ion.    Three  of  the  regiments  were  from his  own  brigade,
while  the  fourt,h  was  det,ached  from the  brigade  of  G.  8.  Anderson,  which
joined  in  t,he  last  phase  of  the  attack.    It  has  not  been  precisely  dete:.'-.-
mined what  part  Kertper's  brigade  had  in  this  assault,,  but  t,he  evidence
at  hand  seems  to  indicat,e  that  the  confusion  in  the  earlier  part  of  i,he
battle  forced  his  brigade  to  retire  before  Anderson  had  become  engaged.
Anderson  believed  t,his  himself ,  fol`,  alt,hough  he  filed  no  I`eport,  he  ur`ote
aft,er  the  war:     ''To  the  best  of  ny  recollect,ion  mr  T3I.igade  was  the  only
one  of  Longstreet,'s  Division  t,hat,  was  act,ively  engaged  at   'Seven  Pines. I
Pickett's  and  perhaps  Kemper's  bl.igades  had  some  slight  skirmishing  and
•bl.ushing  next,  morning,  but,  I  do  not  believe  t,hey  fit.ed  a  shot,  on  the  day
of  the  engagement.     In  this  I  may  be  mistaken  for  you  know  I  was  detached
from  t,he   I=Longstreetlsa  Division .... "    Anderson  to  Hill,  November  lh,
:8S:igE:  E.  E±±±  ±g§E.j  North  Carolina  Depar.timent  of  Archives  and  History,
hLAs
quoted  in  Coker, History
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In  his  appraisal  of  the  aftermat,h  of  the  battle,  Ft.eeman  con-
cludes  that  t,hp,  general  whose  actions  in  this  engagement  were  most  open
to  question  was  the  general  whose  favol`able  I`eputat,ion  as  a  soldier
actually  increased  and  is  a  reputation  sustained  to  the  present.    ''A  reading
of  the  official  reports  of  the  action,"  he  observes,  ''1ed  the  Sout,horn
people  t,o  put  Iongstreetls  name  ahead  of  any  of  t,hose  distinguished  on
h6
that  field  o.f  confusion."        His  summary  of  Anderson's  part  of  the  battle
bc`ars  out  the  testimony  of  the  General's  colleagues,  however:
Richard  H.  Anderson  had  confirmed  all  that  had  been  said  of  him
in  his  battle  on  the  right,  at Williamsburg.    Through  abatis  and  forest,
dripping  and  miry.  at  Seven  Pines,  he  had  led  part,  of  his  own  corrmand
forward  and  had  directed  t,he  operation  of  two  other  Brigades.    No
:±:::t¥d:fi9  0n  tJhe  field had been more  difficult  or  more  admirably
Had  his  fellow  officers  not  supplied  his  laudations,  lit,tie  wo`ild
have  been  known  of  the  contr.ibutions  of  "Fighting  Dick"  Anderson  in  this
remarkable  Confederate  victory.    Anderson  filed  no  report  of  the  affair
and  spend  the  ne]ri  day  at  the  headquarters  of  General  D.  H.  Hill.    Thert?,
the  two  generals  passed  the  time  in  conversation  under  the  shade  of  some
scrub  oak  bushes  where,  much  t,a  t,he  amusement  and  delight  of  Anderson,
Hill  gave  a  captured  Union  chaplain  ''some  edifying  discourse  and  a  piece
of  Ehis.  mind."    It,  was  during  this  pleasant  visit  that  Anderson  was  in-
formed  that  General  Johnston,  who  had  been  wounded  at,  Seven  Pines,  would
be  succeeded  by  another  Virginian,  General  Robert  H.  Lee.    After  receiving
a  mosquit,o  net  from  Hill,  who  had  secured  t,he  covet,ed  article  from  one  of
L'6_
Freeman,  _Leels  Lieutenants
h7ERE.,  p.  2h9.
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his  subordinat-,es'   ovel`abundant  siipply,  Andersr`n  rode  back  to  his  head-
quarters  for  orders  from  t,he  new  comrrander  of  t,he  army.h8
h8Anderson  to  Hill,  Oct,ober  26,1867,  2.  I.  ±l±±±  !!=;£i.,   70-3360,  Virginia
St,at,e  Library,  Richmond.
CHARTER   Ill
WITH   LEH   IN  TRE   SF:VF,N  DAYS
(JtRE-JTELY,   1862)
Except  for  the  unsuccessful  caxpaign  in West  Virginia,  unsuccess-
ful  because  guerilla  warfare  was  an  anathema  to  him,  General  R,obert  E.
Lee  had  been  determining  strategy  from  a  desk  within  the  confines  of
Richmond.    But  now  having  command  in  the  field,  and  after  a  month  of  com-
parative  inactivity,  Lee  decided  to  renew bat,tie.
In the  gray  dawn  of  June  27,  1862,  after  an  artillery  duel  on
t,he  26th,  the  Confederates  advanced  to  Mechanicsville  only  to  find  t,he
enengr  ret,reating.    Continued  pursuit  provoked  occasional  ambuscades  and
finally the  two  armies  confrorited  each  ot,her  as  the  Federals  positioned
themselves  stl`ongly  near  Gaines  Mill,  thus  commencing  t,he  Battle  of  First
Cold  Harbor.    The  columns  of `Longstreet  were  the  first  to  arrive  and
rested  there  while  awaiting  orders.1
Union  field  commander  Fit,z-John  Porter  had  his  lines  in  a  power-
ful  semicircle  with  his  left,  resting  on  flat  ground  near  the  Chickahominy
River.2    Behind  t,his  plateau was  a  deep  ravine  and  a  counterscarped
stream  over  which  the  Confederates  had  to  attack  an  enengr  whose  batt,eries
`were  set  up  on  two  heights.    The  right  lay  sout,h  of  Old  Cold  Harbor  Road.
Naturally  strong,  i,he  line  was  reinforced  by  rifle  pits,  felled  t,rees,




rail  pilings  and  dil.t-filled  haversacks.3    The  Confederatesl  only  avenue
of  assault  on  Port,er's  right  flank was,  wit,h  soggy thrust,s,  across  t,he
swales  and  morass  of  a  broad  savanna  called  Boat,sw;in  Swamp.
The  battle  opened  from behind  a  ridge  near  Powhite  Creek  when A.
P.  Hill  threatened  the  Federal  right.    Again  and  again  Hill  at,tempted  to
break  the  Federal  line,  but  his  r`anks  were  being  decimated  with  each  new
aJu-ut,ack.    At  about  5  o'clock  Lee  ordered ,assault  commander  James  Longstreet
to  make  a  feint  toward  the  Federal  left,  to  relieve  the  pressure on Hill.h
Under  Andel.son,  t,hree  brigades  engaged  the  Federals  with  orders
not  to  cross  the  open  ground.    Portions  of  t,hese  brigades  lost  restraint
and  crossed,  but  they were  quickly  recalled.    In  t,heir  security,  i,he
Federals  were  not  annoyed  by  this  limited  diversion,  however,  and  in
desperation  Lee  sent  a  message  to  Longst,reet  that  ''all  other  efforts  had
failed,"  and  that,  unless  he  was  able  to  l'do  something,"  a  victory would
be  lost.    Longstreet  immediat,ely  send  Anderson's  and  Pickett's  brigades
into  action,  holding  Kemperls  in  reserve.5
Anderson  advanced  his  men  st,raight  down  the  mouth  of  a  wide  chasm,
and  the  first  Federal  line  broke  as  his  bl.igade  started  up  the  slope
toward  t,he  batteries  on  one  of  i,he  heights.    1Then  t,he  brigade  had  posi-
tioned  itself  below  the  fire  of  t,he  batteries,  a  second  lip.e  broke,  and
Anderson` attempted  to  ascend  the  crest,.    Federal  cavalry  delayed  t,he
bl`igade  long  eriough  to  remove  some  of  t,he  reserve  art,illery,  but,,  after
t,hey  retreated  into  the  swamps,  Anderson  took  t,he  battel.ies,  having
3Longstreet, From  ]fanassas,   p.   126.
hE2±e.,   p.   i27;  9.  E.,11,   pt.   2,   757,   836.
5Longstreetj From  Manassas p.   128.
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sliced  through  three  successive  lines  of  infant,ry  fire!      When  he  reac]ied
t,he  crest,  of  the  hill,  he  divided  his  brigade.    Unc]er  his  personal  leader-
ship,  part,  of  it  went  t,o  t,he  aid  of Whitingls  brigade,  of  Jackson's  divi-
sion.    Anderson's  brigade  ''came  in  gallant,  st,yle  to  his  support,"  said
"Stonewall,"  ''and  the  enengr  was  driven  to  the  lower  part  of  t,he  plateau.
The  shouts  of  triumph,  which  rose  from  our,brave  men  as  t,hey,   unaided  ty
al.tillery,  had  st,ol.ned  t,his  citadel  of  their  strength,  were  promptly
carried  from  line  to  line,  and  t,he  triumphant  issue  of  this  assault  .   .  .
determined  the  fortunes.u7
Aft,er  the  battle,  every  major  general  in  I,eels  arry  claimed  credit
for  the  first  break  in  the  eneny  lines  except  A.  P.  Hill.    Brigadier  rren-
eral  Anderson,  however,  who  advanced  no  cia-ims  t,o  t,he  captures  and  neglec-
ted. to  even  file  a  report  of  the  action,  seems  to  have  set,tied  the  contro-
versy  when  t,he  two  brigades  and  two  regiment,s  under  his  direction8  turned
in  five  t,housand  prisoners  to  Leels  provost-guard.    Out  of  this  t,otal
Anderson's  brigade  alone  made  the  capture  of  at  least  two  regiments,  the
Fifteenth  Michigan  and  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania.9
After  his  defeat  at  First  Cold  Harbor,  Mcclellan  hurriedly  re-assem-
bled  his  troops  for  the  march  to  a  new base  he  had  est,ablished  at  Harrison's
6Eng.;  9.  E.11,  pt.  2,   757.
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t,hat,  had  gott,en  lost  and  had  reported  to  Longstreet,  and  that  this  t)rigade
;;;)t=:::st€:age##:: ::f:then::s:a£::;:d:nt::: ::E°::p!:te:.tor:;n::a  2 '
streeta  reached  there,  the  enermr  had  already  been  repulsed  at  that  point
t)y  a  flank  movement  of  Brigadier  General  R.   H.  Anderson.''
8The  troops  under  Anderson's  supervision  in  the  engagement  were  those  of
his  own  command,   Picket,t's  brigade  and  two  regiments  of  Hoodls  brigade.
9Longstreetj From  Manassas pp.1.28-129;  g.  E.,11,   rit.   2,   86,   758-739.
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Landing.    Here  he  would  be  under  the  shelf,ering  power  of  his  gunboat,s  on
the  James  and  safe  until  reinforcements  could  arrive  from Washington.
Only  then  would  Mcclellan  feel  confident  enough  to  resume  the  offensive.10
The  Union  general  had  not  gone  far  before  he  again  encountered
the  Confederates.    Under  General  Magruder  they  attacked  his  rearguard  at
11
Savages  Station,.but  were  repulsed  by  a  single  Fedel.al brigade,      and
Mcclellan  was  allowed  to  cont,inue  his  hurried  retreat.
It  was  a  foreworn  arty that  marched  across  the  fords  and  rivulets
of White  Oak  Swamp  on  t,hat  last  day  of  June,  and  no  one  could  have  been
more  apprehensive  than  its  commander.     Clumsily  pursued  by  Jackson,
Mcclellan's  forces  converged  at  a  crossroads  called  Glendale,  and  con-
gested  logistics  halted  marchers  from every  direction.    Here  the  Federal
commander  faced  the  gI.eat,est  challenge  of  his  career.    He  was  about  to
be  knifed  fl.om the  west,  by  seven  armies.    "Tact,ically,  more  than  one  half
of  Mcclellan's  arngr  was  enclosed  as  within  three  sides  of  a  box,WL2  and
his  exposed  portion waLs  mbmentarily  paralyzed.    The  premonitory  battles
of  the  past  few  mor]ths  could  not  have  told  so wl'etched  a  story.    Confed-
erates  picked  up  Union  stragglers  by  the  thousands,  and  abandoned  wagons
complemented  the  bag.
Mcclellanls  plight  was  somewhat,  nit,igated  when  an  abandoned  old
logging  road  was  discovered  which  led  eventually  to  his  base  at  Harrison's
Landing.    Some  of  t,he  wagon  t,rains  were  sent  on  it,  but  the  crossroads
::::::;:r:93£;:e¥: EE%.S%eD#r::::i:: ra:: :::::;: : ±tE±BE=. and
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still  remained  jammed.         It,looked  as  if  the  fat,e  of  Mcclellan's  al`rmr
had   tEen  sealed.
The  Confederate  line  of  attack  corresponded  to  the  positions  of
the  columns  on the  march.    Six  divisions  would  hit,  Mcclellan  {q_s  they  fol-
lowed  five  roads,  all  of which  led directly  or  indirectly to  Glenda|e.]h
The  main body  of  Mcclellan's  troops  had  to  take  t,he Willis  Church  Road,
leading  dil.ectly  to  Hart.ison's  Landing,  but  this  was  a  distance  of  some
five  miles,  and  Mcclellan  still  had  not  gotten  his  arny  unl.aveled  at
Glendale.    Sending  his  troops  down  a  single  road  when  others  were  close
by  and  paralleling Willis  Church  was  Mcclellan's  greatest  error  of  t,he
whole  campaign.15    ;ut,  even  if  Mcclellan  should  escape,  Holmes'   division
Was  to  be  set  up  and  waiting  by way  of  River  Road  to  hit  his  exposed  flank.16
The  battle  plan  was  for  General  Benjamin  Hugel`,  coming  up  t,he
Charles  River Road,  to  hit  first  as  he  was  first  in the  line  of  march.
The  attack  would  signal  Longstreet  as  his  division  came  up  the  Long  T3ridge
Road,  and  so  on  down  t,he  chain  of  corrimand,  thus  facilitating  the  main
17
assault.        The  Confederates  would  i,hen  be  ready  to  converge  upon  Glen-
dale  and  annihilate,  or  force  the  surrender  of,  Mcclellan's  tired  and
confused  divisions.    There  would  even  be  opportunity  for  shock  tactics,
t,he  inst,rument  of  which  was  the  cavalry.    The  heavy  infant,ry  rifle  had
done  it,s  work  here,  too,  and  except  for  reconnaissance  missions,  t,he  "eyes
13Eng.,  p.  285.
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and  ears  of  the  infantry"  was  becoming  a  thing  of  the  past.    The  light
arms  carried  by  cavalry  could  not  compete  with  t,he  new  and  heavier  breach-
1oad  infantry rifle.
As  Huger  approached  a  position  between  Fisher's  and  Bruckett,'s
Fords,  he  encountered  obst,acles.     Here,  Charles  City  P.oad  was  obstructed
with  piles  of  logs,  and  the  aristocratic  old  Huguenot  from  South  Carolina
\
was  persuaded  to  condone  a  curious  thing;  he  allowed  BI`igadier  General
Williani  Mahone,  ante-bellum  construction  engineer,  to  continue  what  he
had  started  when  Huger  arrived--canst,ruct,ing  a  new  pass  through  the  woods
to  circurrrvend  t,he  road  block.    As  time  was  a  major  factor,  and  his  part,
in  the  assault  being  most  significant,  the  pract,ical  solution would  have
been  to  deploy  a  work  detail  under  the  prot,ection  of  guns  to  clear  the
way.    But,  With  a  zeal  that  would  have  inspired  the  toughest  ''bull  o'  the
woods"  began  the  battle  of  the  axes.    As  Confederates  "stumped"  t,Pees  and
dragged  them  aside,  Federal  axemen  felled  them  to  be  dragged  upon  the
Charles  River  Road.    Little  was  accomplished  except,  to  give  Mcclellan
more  time  to  move  away  more  of` his  t,roops.     In  a  familiar  old  woods  meta-
ls
phor,   says  Freeman,  ''while`.the  hunter  fumbled,. the  quarry  was  escaping."
About  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Mahone's  crew  emerged  into  an
open  field.    As  it  did,  a  Federal  picket  fired  and  Huger  sent  up  a  battery.
About  2:30  it  opened  fire,  and  Longstreet,  who  had  his  troops  in  position
since  11  olclock,  and  taking  this  as  t,he  expected  signal,  ordered  that
one  of  his  batteries  ''return  salut,at,ion."    As  he  heard  only  artillery  and
no  "crackling"  sound  of  I`ifle  fire,  Longstreet  decided  to  wait,  for  the
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at  this  t,ime  were  the  distinguished  personages  of  General  I,ee  and  Presi-
dent  Davis,  perhaps  expectiing the  issue  of  one  hundred  years  t,o  be  shortly
decided,  when  shells  suddenly  screamed  t,hrough  the  forest  and  fell  in
their  midst,  killing  some  horses  and  wounding  t,wo  men.
Again,  as  in  every  action  of  i,he  campaign,  Anderson  was  the  active
commander  in  the  field  whenever  a  portion  of,  or  all  `of ,  Longstreet's
command  became  engaged.     His  own  brigade  was  entrusted  t,o  the  competent
20
Micah  Jenskins.        Instead  of  ordering  a  counter  battery  to  silence  the
Federal  guns,  Jenkins  was  ordel`ed  to  make  shorter  work  of  it,  with  his
21
battalion  of  sharp.  shooters,  but  not  to  charge.        In  an  earlier war,
this  would  have  been  unthinkable,  but,  now  infantry  fire  had  rendered  mobile
artillery tactics  about  as  useless  as  t,he  bayonet,  for when  close  eriough
to  do  any  good,  rifles  could  pick  off the  artillery nen.
So  Jenkins,  with  his  long-range  rifles,  became  engaged.    But
repression  was  too  demanding  and  his  impulsive  South  Carolinians  charged
this  hot  artillery  unit,  and brought,  on the  general  fight,  t,he  Battle  of
Glendale.    Capturing  t,he  bat,t,ery,  Anderson's  brigade  under  Jenkins  moved
ahead.    Over  ravine,  through  abatis,  underbrush  and thick  timber,  the
brigade  continued  straight  into  the  crackling  musket  fire.    Followed  by
Kemper's  and  four  ot,hel`  brigades,  the  whole  division  under  Anderson  now
headed  toward  the  high  ground  occupied  by  the  Federal  division  of  General
22
Geor.ge  M6Call.
After  a  hard  fought,  contest,  Mccall's  line  was  broken  and  his
20Ibid.
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position  t,aden  along  with  another Federal  battery.23    Captured  in Ander-
2h
son's  first  attack was  the  Federal  general  himself.        No  rout  ensued,
however,  for  no  sooner  had  the  Confederates  gained  ground  than  a  Federal
division  under  General  Sedgewick  came  up  and  pressed  Anderson's  right,
while  Keamey's  and  Slocuri's  divisions  checked  his  left.    Then  a  portion
of  Hooker's  division  reinforced  Sedgewickl s.25
Under  t,he  pr.etext  of waiting  for  Jackson to  hit the  Federal rear,
and  for  Huger  t,o  at,t,ack,  Longstreet  cont,inued  i,o  hold  A.  P.  Hill's
division  in  reserve,  while  Anderson,  commanding  t,he  field,  battled  against
five  Federal  divisions!    "Old  Pete"  apparently wanted  his  troops  to  occupy
t,he  entire  field  unassisted.    Finally,  seeing  Anderson  hard-pressed  and
falling  back,  he  send  in  Hill,  who  assist,ed  Anderson  in  I`egaining  t,he
position  he  had  won  earlier.    ''unen  he  cHill=  came  into  the  fight,"  said
Longstreet  somewhat  exaggeratedly,  ''t,he  Federal  line  had  been  broken  at
every  point  except  one.n26
Sometimes  referred to  as  Frayser's  Farm,  the  Bat,tie  of  Glendale
was  notable  for  the  almost  total  disintegration  of  Mcclellan's  command.
Equally  noteworthy,  however,  was  t,he  failure  of  t,he  Confederates  to  take
advantage  of  this  disint,egration.    In the  years  to  cone,  t,he  st,rat,egy
devised by  General  Lee  at  the  Bat,tie  of  Glendale  would  seldom be  more
superb,  but  i,he  tact,ics  of  his  subordinat,es  would  never  be  poorer.    Had
t,he  execution  of  the  plan  been  commensurate  with  it,s  conception,  it  may
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army  wo`nd  have  resulted.a
Although  not  a  major  p`eneral  in  Ijee's  arw  escaped  censure,  the
actions  of  Huger  and  Longst,rciL`b  seem  to  stand  out  among  all  ot,hers.
Huger's  actions  were  manifestly  que`c`t,jonable,  but  by  holding  A.  P.  Hillls
division  in  reserve  while  Anderson  was  battlinp`  against  five  Federal  divi-
sions,  Longstreet  may  have  been  equally  culpable  for  the  out,come  of  i,he
bat,tie.    When  Hill's  division  finally  was  deployecl  on  Anderson's  left,
however,  there  was  no  other  single  inst,ance  from t,he  beginning  to  the
end  of  the  entire  campaign where  two  divisions  fought  together  as  a
cohesive  and  orderly  unit.27    It  was  a  credit  to  both  Anderson  and  Hill.
The  services  rendered  by  Gener.al  Anderson  at  t,he  Bat,tie  of  r]lendale  are
especially  praiseworthy.
Anderson  quiet,ly  t,ook  over  a  command  much  higher  than  his  grade,
and,  although  it  has  not  been  det,ermined  at  how  many  points,  it  was  Long-
st,reet's  division  under  his  command  that  first  broke  through  the  Federal
lines.    Against  a  consolidat,ed  effort  of  five  divisions,  Anderson  held
t,he  field with  only  five  brigades,  and,  had  reinforcement  arrived  earlier
from  Longstreet,  it  may  have  been  all  t,hat,  was  needed  to  force  i,he  sur-
render  of  Mcclellan.    Although  his  name  headed  the  list  of  those  who
distinguished  themselves  at  Glendale,  Anderson  filed  no  report  of  the
engagement  and  the  credit  seems  t,o  have  gone  to  I,ongstreet,  who  made  no
at,tempt  to  correct,  t,he  error.
After  the  battle  Mcclellan's  army  was  allowed  to  slip  away  urider
t,he  cover  of  darkness  to  an  impregnable  eminence  called  }falvern  Hill.     In
t,his  position  Mcclellan  could  have  sat  out  the  balance  of  t,he  war,  and
his  gunboat,s  on  t,he  James  River  were  less  than  a  mile  away.    The  Confederat,es
27Freemani
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made  repeated  att,empts  i,o  t,ake  t,he  he.ights,  but,  were  di.iven  back  wit,h
heavy  losses  in  all  of  them.     It  was  t,he  last  engagement  of  t,he  Peninsula
caxpaign.    Longstreet's  division,  after  the  previous  day's  hard  fighting,
was  held  in  reserve,  and  Anderson  did  not  t,ake  part  in  the  assault,s  on
Malvern  Hill.
CHAITER  IV
FROM  sEcOND  BULI,  RUN  TO  FREDmlcKSBURG
(AUGusT-DECEroER,   1862 )
After  the  Peninsula  Campaign  I.ee  reorganized  his  arrrryr  into  a  more
coordinated  and  efficient,  body.    Throughout  the  cainpaign  each  individua].
division  had  acted,   in  essence,  as  a  small  and  independent  command.    After
ridding  his  arny  of  an  unprecedented  number  of  generals,  lee  merged  his
divisions  int,o  two  separate  wings  under  Jackson  and  Longstreet.    Anderson
was  soon  given  the  old  division  of  Benjamin  Huger  after  Huger  had  been
discreetly  awarded  t,he  sinecure  of  Inspector  of  Artillery  and  Ordnance.1
Anderson's  handling  .of  tl`oops  during  the  entire  campaign  denoted
a  definite  ability  for  field  command.    Indeed,  his  actions  were  so  com-
mendable  that  the  modest  soldier  was  t,he  only  Confederate  general  through-
out  the  war  to  receive  recommendat,ions  for  promotion by two  full  generals
--both  for  act,ion  in  aL  single  campaign.
The  promotion  was  belated,  however.    General  "Joe"  Johnston
thought,  that  Anderson  deserved  a  division  immediately  f ollowing  Seven
Pines  and  he  so  informed  t,he  Confederate  Congress.2    General  R.obert  E.
Lee  felt  the  same  confidence  and  wrote  t,o  President,  Davis  that,  Andel.son
definitely  should  be  elevated  to  divisional  command,  but  prudently  sug-
gest,ed  t,hat  ''Unless  Huger  had  other  dut,y,  I  do  not  lmov  where  to  get  a
E.,  XI,   pt.  3,  6ho.
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division  for  Genl.  A.--yet  awhile.M3    After  Davis  failed  to  act,,  however,
Lee  became  mol.e  explicit.    He  unote  the  President  that  Huger  could  be
sent  to  South  Carolina,  and,  after  Huger  was  given  his  new  position  inst,Cad,
he  relinquished  his  division  to  Anderson,  who  was  commif,sioned  Major  Gen-
eral  on  July  lh,  1862.    ''So  manifestly  was  the  promotion  deserved,"  not,ed
one  student,  ''thcit  it  created  little  comment.Wh
Composed  of  the  bl.igades  of  Mahone,  Arrdstead  and  Wright,  Ander-
son's  division was  a  sizable  unit  at  the  outset,  arid  it,  was  enlarged  by
t,he  brigades  of Wilco]r.,  Featherst,one  and  Pryor  shortly  aft,erwards.    Until
the  two  wings  of  Longst,reet  and  Jackson were  organized  into  t,hree  corps,
Anderson  act,ed  most,ly  in  cctoperation  wit,h  Longst,I.eet,  but,  prior  to  being
specifically  assigned  to  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  in  June,  1863,  his  division
''constituted  a  separat,e  body  and  was  subject  only  to  General  Lee's  orders.W5
After  the  Peninsula  Campaign,  Anderson  was  assigned  for  a  bl.ief
period  to  command  at  Drewry's  Bluff,  near  Petersburg,  in  cooperation  wit,h
6
Major  General  Gustavus  W.  Smith,    where  he  spent  most  of  his  time  setting
up  batteries  near  Bermuda  Hundred.7    In  the  meant,ime,  not  far  down  the
James  River  from Anderson's  position,  Mcclellan  awaited  possible  reinforce-
ment  from  Pope's  arngr  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.    To  prevent,  such  a  union,
Lee  sent  Jackson  to  keep  Pope  occupied.    When  Jackson  effect.ed  a  surprise
attack  on  Pope's  base  at,  Manassas  Junction,   Pope  wheeled  al`ound  and  faced
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him  head  on.    Against  Pope's  superior  force,   Jackson  could  only  delay
him  until  reinforcement  arrived  from  Lee.    On  August  28,  Anderson  received
orders  to  join  Confederate  forces  at  Bull  Run.
Jackson's  forces  at  Bull  Run  were  strung  along  an  unfinished  rail-
road  and  held  off  a  concentrated  effort  to  dislodge  him  on  t,he  29th.
Longstreet,  after  pushing  back  the  Federals  at  GI`oton  on  the  29th,  arrived
the  neat  day  and was  positioned  on  Jackson's  left.    Lat,e  in  t,he  evening
the  Federals  launched  a  det,ermined  assault  on  Jackson's  center  with  such
vigor  that  even  t,he  "Mighty  Stonewall"  had  to  call  for  assistance.    Long-
street  was  placed  by  Lee  in  a  position  diagonal  to  Jackson`s  line  and  on
high  ground  i,hat  overlooked  it.    Evidently  unobserved  by  the  busy  Federal
assailants,  the  line  formed what  amounted  t,o  a  gigantic  pincer,  and
Union  General  John  Pope  rushed  right  into  it  as  Longstreet's  artillery
poured  forth  a  devastating  fire  on  his  defenseless  flank.    When  the  Fed-
erals  at,tempted to  defend themselves  against  the  enfilade  on  their  right,
Hood's  division  of  Longstreetls  corps,led  a  general  assault,  pushing
the  Federals  some  distance  back  before  t,hey  rallied  and  t,emporarily  halted
his  and  the  division  of  General  N.  G.  Evans.
It  was  at,  t,his  time  that  Anderson  arrived with  his  division  and
placed  his  troops  into  action.    The  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Federals
was  short-lived  as  his  division  moved  up  and  ''drove  everything  before
it.W8    By  the  end  of  the  day  Anderson's  men  held  the  most  advanced  posi-
tion  on  the  field.9
Anderson  must  have  presented  a  striking  contrast. that. afternoon
mounted  upon  Cuffy,  t,he  coal-black  charger  that  carried  him  throughout
8The Chariest,on  Courier September  1,   1862,   See.   A,   p.   1.
9g.  E.,  xll,   pt.   2,   557,  629.
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t,he  war,  and  he  was  dressed  in  a  white  waist  coat  with  gloves  ''as  if
going  t,o  a  ball,"  wrote  one  observer.    After  sweeping  across  the  broad
plains  of  lfanassas  and  gaining  the  promontory  of  Chinn  Ridge,  he  was
about  to  regroup  his  forces  for  further  pursuit  when  I,ee's  Assistant
Adjutant-General,  Colonel Waiter  Taylor,  rode  up  and  informed  him that
Jackson's  position was  no  longer  threatened.    General Anderson  smiled  and
1
t,urned  to  his  men:     "Gent,lemen,"  he  said,   ''General  Jackson  says  that  by
the  blessings  of  God  his  necessities  have  been  relieved.    So  we  will  go
10
t,o  the  right  and  help  Longstreet."
The  effective  Federal  rear-guard  action  at,  Henry Hill,  along with
approaching  darLmess,  allowed  Pope's  arny  to  escape  destruction.    Ander-
son  played  no  part  in  t,his  att,ack  but  his  command  constitut,ed  t,he  advance
guard  of  Lee's  counter-attack.    ''.   .   .  If,  as  Moltke  avers,  t,he  junction
of  two  armies  on the  field  of  battle  is  the  highest  achievement  of  mili-
tary  genius,  the  campaign  against  Pope  has  seldom been  surpassed;  and
the  great  counter-st,roke  at  Manassas  is  sufficient  in  itself  to  make  Lee's
reputaLtion  as  a  tactician."]L    Indeed,  it  was  a  remarkable  victory  and
the  commanding  general  could  now  assure  himself  t,hat  he  had  competend
subordinates.    "It  was  not  Lee's  nature  to be  hasty  in  his  judgement  of
men,"  says  one  of  his  biographers,  ''but  after  Second  Manassas  he  reason-
athy  could  feel t,hat,  in  the  dread test  of  unequal battle  he  could  count
L°Governor  W.  E.  Cameron  quoting  Anderson  in  Walker,  E.  I. Anderson
p.  101.    Cameron  was  present  at  t,he  batt,le  as  t,he  Adjutant  of  the  Twelfth
Virginia.
LLThe  quotation  is  from  Colonel  G.  F.  R.  Henderson  in  Francis  F.  Wilshin,
Manassas   (Bull  Run)
Handbook,  Series  No
(Washington,  D.  C.:  National  Park  Service  Historical
.15,1953),   p.   37.
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on  Sucll  men  as   ''Dick'   Ande].son,   and  Jo}in  Hood  and   .Uebl   St\iart.wL2
Lee's  success  at  Second  Manassas  `mdoubt,edly  figurecl  into  his
decision  t,o  launch  t,he  invasion  of  Mar.vland,  which  immediat,ely  followed
Second  B\ill  Run.    His  reasons,  and  t,hey  ar.e  innumerable,  are  unju§tifiable
only because  the  result  was  a  surtposedly  drawn  battle.
Before  he  could  achieve  a  success:ful  campaign  in  Mar.yland,   it  was
deci'ded  that  the  Federal  arsenal  at  Harperts  Ferry  had  to  be  captured.
The  plan  was  for  Jackson  to  attack  from the  south  of  the  arsenal  while
Anderson,  with  six  brigades  working  with  four  of  Mcl,aws,  approached  it
from  the  north  side  of  the  James  Rivet..
On  September  1,  1862,  the  day  before  Anderson  was  det,ached  with
MCLaws,   he  was  camped  around  Frederick  near  Lee.     The  Commanding  General
sent  for  him  and  expressed  an  early  confidence  in  Anderson  by  verbally
instructing  him  in  the  overall  plan  to  take  Har`per's  Ferry..    But,  since
Mcl,aws  was  the  senior  officer  and  would  direct  t,he  operations  against
Hal`per's  Ferry,  Anderson  thought  that,  it  was  soTri6what  strange  that,  he
should  send  for  him  inst,ead  of  MCLaws.     He  report,ed  to  MCLaws  t,he  ne]ct,
day  and  informed  him  of  Lee's  opinions  and  t,hat  Lee  had  repeatedly  stat,ed
that  "Harper's  Ferry  must  be  taken  against  Thursday  evening."]3
After  some  hat.d  fighting  and  tact,ical  maneuvering  on  the  12th
and  13th,  Harper's  Ferry  lay  wide  open  to  Confederat,e  at,tack,  and,  instead
of  to  Jackson,  the  dist,inct,ion  of  capturing  the  arsenal  seemed  destined
to  belong  t,o  Anderson  and  MCLaws.    But,  word  from  ''Jeb"  St,uart  on  the  lhth
L2Quoting  Freeman, Lee I s  Lieut,enant,s 11,   139.
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provided  the  only  instruct,ions,  t,hat,  Anderson  recctived  concerning  the
att,ack  on  Hal`per's  Ferry.     He  received  no  writ,t,en  orders.
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indicated  that  t,here  might  be  t,rouble  at  Crampton's  Gap,  a  rtass  which
Mchaws  had  failed  to  gal`rison  suff icient,1y.    The  judgment  of  St,ual`t  was
justified,  for  late  in  the  afternoon  the  Federals  poured  t,hrough  i,he  gap
lb
in  long  blue  columns.
Barely  did Anderson  have  time  to  form his  six brigades  before  he
was  at,tacked.    At  the  foot  of  Mayrels  Heights  in  Pleasant  Valley  the  Fed-
erals  sent  forward  a  strong  skirmish  line,  which  alone  more  than  equaled
Anderson's  force.    Aft,er  a  sharp but  brief  encounter`  i,he  action  came  to
an  abrupt,  halt,  and  fortune  smiled  upon  the  uneasy  Confederates  as  dark-
ness  approached  and  stopped  t,he  fighting.15    As  t,he  forces  of  Jackson
came  up  t,he  next  morning,  the  Federals  made  no  issue  and  quickly  disap-
peared  from the  vicinit,y.
Anderson filed  no  official  report  of  his  part  in the  battle,  but
he  was  sincerely  grateful  for  Jackson's  timely  approach.    He  did  not
exaggerate  when  he  wr.ote  a  friend  that,  he  ''had  the  most,  uncomfortable
time  of  it.   .   .  until  Jackson  clear.ed  away the  road  for  us.M]6    Mcl,aws
acknowledged  in  his  report,  however,  that  he  was  especially  indebted  to
17
Anderson  ''for  his  8.dvice  and  assist,ance.''
The  deathly  struggles  at  Antietam  Creek,  which  followed  these
Lhg.  E.,  xlx,  pt.1,  818.
L5=±±g.,  pp.  87o.876.    Precisely wh.v  t,he  Feder.als  did  not  deliver  a  full
at,tack  against,  Anderson  has  not,  been  det,emined,  but,  it  has  been  suggested
(Walker, R.   H.   Andel.son
for  t,he-a€taak
p.  108)  that  while  the  Federals  were  preparing
t,he  firing  ceased at,  Harper's  Ferry,  and  their  commanders
believed  that,  Anderson would  be  shortly  re-inforced  by the  Confederates
who  had  just  t,aken  the  arsenal.
16
2.  E.  !!±±| !£EE.j  North  Carolina  Department  of  Archives  and  History,
Raleigh.
L7g.  E.,  xvlll,  pt,.I,  855.
h3
preliminaries?,  made  September  17,1862,  the  bloodiest,  da}r  of  the  entire
war.    In  a  series  of  sanguinary  frontal  assaults  on  the  ''Sunken  Road,"
more  commonly  styled  t,he  "Bloody  Lane,"  Union  General  Anbrose  E.  13urnside
brought  the  action  to  its  highest  pitch.    Here,  D.  H.  Hill's  t]attered
division  held  off  repeated  Federal  advances  until  11  o'clock,  when  Lee/
sent  Anderson  to  take  position  on his  right.
After  Anderson  formed  his  line,  Union bat,tel-ies  were  then  set,  up
to  assist  in  another Federal  attack.    Concentrating  the  fire  on Hill's
division,  which  had  been  weakened  by  the  previous  attacks,  the  Federals
launched  a  furious  assault,  along  the  ent,ire  Confederate  line.    It  was  in
18
this  attack  that  Anderson  received  a  wound  in  the  thigh,      and  it  was
possibly  this  occurrence  that  forced  t,he  two  divisions  to  fall back  t,o  a
place  called  Piper  Farm;  for,  when  Anderson  fell  fainting  from. his  horse,
his  division  ''ceased  to  act,  as  a  unit.''    But  Anderson's  wound  was  not
entirely  unfortunate,  says  Freeman,  ''because  it  demonstrates  how  much  of
the  efficiency  of  his  Division  is  due  i,o  his  personal  influence  and
19
leadership."
The  wound  forced  Anderson  into  a  brief  convalescence  and  he  did
not  take  part  in  the  subsequent  Battle  of  Fredericksburg.    Instead,  his
division was  used  in  t,he  str.engthening  of  the  works  around  Drewry'§  Bluff,
where,  along  with  three  brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill,   it,  worked  in  the  int,ense
heat  of  the  summer  of  1863,  sometimes  as  long  as  ten  houl`s  a  day.    Although
the  works  were  of  lit,tie  use  in  1863,  their  value  became  apparent  when
LBEqu.,  x|x,  pt,.I,1036-1037.
19Freemani
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Ander.son  defended  Petersburg  in  186lt,   and,   according  to  one  accr]unt,,   t,hey
"gave  one  year  of  life  t,o  i,he  Confederaey.n2°
11,   199.
CHARTER  V
CHANCF,LI0RSVILIE
(APRIL-mT,   1863)
April's  for.epart  brought  General  Joseph  Hooker,  Anderson's  old
foe  at Williamsburg,  to  the  banks  of  the  Rappahannock  at  Fredericksburg,
Virginia,  with  designs  to  force  I.ee  to  fight  him  in  the  open  field.    On
April  30th,  having  earlier  crossed  the  river,  part  of  Hooker's  army  united
at  Chancellorsville,  eleven  miles  west  of Fredericksburg.    This  union
brought  the  total to  four   corps,  two  divisions  and  a  cavalry brigade.
Except  for  a  single  brigade,  Hooker  had  sent  his  entire  cavalry  force,
under  General  George  Stoneman,  to  Leels  rear  to  cut  off  his  communications
with Richmond.    This  was,  perhaps,  singularly,  his  most  costly  el.for--
for  the  brigade  failed to  keep him  informed  as  to  important  movements,
1
although  supplemented  by  signal  stations,  field  telegraphs,  and  balloons.
The  cavalry brigade  was  placed  on  roads  leading back  to  FI.edericksburg
and  the  infantry  concentrated  on  Lee's  left.    The  two  Confedel.ate  bri-
gades  here  were  Mahone's  and  Posey's  of  Anderson's  division,  which  fell
t>ack  until  Anderson  reinforced  t,hem  with Wrightls  brigade.2    There  was
little  friction,  however,  for  Anderson's  close  vigilance  had  presaf:ed  a
•gathering  of  heavy  Union  colurms,  and  he  wit,hdrew  his  t,I.oops  back  to  t,he
east,  where  a  more  t,enable  position was  afforded  by  trenches.
1Aiexanderi ng± Memoirs pp.  320-32h.    For  dispatches  from  the  aero-
nauts,   see  9.  E.,  XXV,   pt..  2,




D`ming  tlie  earlier  campaigns,  except  for  Jomini's  law  of  concen-
t,ration,  Anderson  did  not  extemporize  and  seemed  to  stay  fairly  close  to
t,he  est,ablished  rules  of warfare.    But  as  rail  and  rifle  had  made  entr'ench-
ment  necessary,  so  had  they  made  obeisance  to  the  pl.inciples  of  Jomini
questionable.    At  Chancellorsville,  and before  I,ee  ordered  it,  Anderson
built  t,he  most  extensive  syst,em  of  entrenchment,s,  on  a  single  line  of
battle,  up  t,o  that  time  seen  in the  world.3    The  work was  sustained  through-
out  the  afternoon  of the  30th,  the  entire  night  following,  and  until  early
the  next  morning.h    ''To  b`ny  an  arty  in  entrenchment  .   .   .  is  manifest
folly,"  wrote  Jomini.    Now  it  would be  folly  to  do  ot,herwise.
Perhaps,  Anderson  also  saw  the  psychological  advantages  of  entrench-
ment.    Nothing  prevents  panic  more  than  having  men  do  something  and  Hooker
had  the  largest  arry he  had  faced.    Panic  was  furt,her  allayed by the  fact
that  men huddled  closely  together would  less  likely t>e  fearstruck,  and
the  chance  of  confusion would  be  greatly  mitigat,ed.    Except  for  Gettysburg
and  the  Wilderness,  Leels  last  genera.1  offensives,  Anderson's  men  would
live  in these  cold  ditches  until  I-educed  t,o  a  mere  picket  line.
Informed  of  the  large  Fedel.al  force  at  Chancellol`sville,  I,ee  sent
three  brigades  under  Lafayette  MCLaws  to  take  position  on  Anderson's
Simply  a  paraphl.ase  from  John  Selby,  Stonew.all  Jackson:    ±±  _Mi±i_Eery
.  T.  Bats ford,  Ltd.;       inceton,  N.  J.:rs.WEECommander   (London:   8
Nostrand  Do.,   Inc.,1968),  p.189.    Cited  hereinafter  as  Selby,
IP a..E.  ±9.yo}..11,  p.  5u,
Jackson.
Freeman  st,ates  that  Lee,  f or  i,he  first
time  in  open  field  operat,ions,  ordered  fortifications  to  be  construct,ed.
These  orders,  dating  April  30,  1863,  were  not  dispatched  until  2:30  p.  in.
(9.  i.t  XXV,  pt.  2,  761).    In  his  official  report  dat,ed  almost  four
mont,hs  later,  Lee  acknowledged  that,  Anderson  had  anticipated  him by
st,at,ing  that  Anderson  ''retired  early  on  the  morning  of  t,he  30th  .   .   .
and  began  to  intrench  himself."    9.  E.,  XXV,  pt.I,   796.    Thus  liee,
indeed,  ordered  the  construction,  but  only  after  Anderson  had  begun  to
entrench.
ho.
a.,  XXV,   pt.I,   85o.
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0n  t,he  morning  of  May  i,   Jackson  w]..th  his  cc>rps,  exc].`)sive  of
Early's  division  and  Barksdale's  brigade,  which  had  t>een  lef.b  i,o  hold  t,he
line  around  Fredericksburg  against  a  rear  at,tack  by  Sickles,6  came  `,ip  and
suspended  work  on  the  entrenchments.7
To  some  writers  Jacksonls  action  implied  that,  Anderson  lackc,.d
8
initiat,ive.      It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  with  only  four bri-
gades,  Anderson  could  have  hardly  launched  an  offensive.    With  Jackson's
arrival  Confederate  forces  increased  four.  times,  and  the  prospect  of  a
successful  advance  was  manifestly  a  bright  one.    Had  "Old  Jack"  been  at
Tabernacle  Chul.ch  on  April  30,  however,  he,  too,  would  have  tteen  forced
to  await  reinforcement.    At,  any  rat,e,  with  the  forces  a,llied,  the  assault,
was  ordered  by  Jackson  and  led  by  Anderson,  beginning  one  of  the  gI`eat
bat,ties  in  the  records  of  man,  and  one  which  signalled  R.obert,  E.  Lee's
most  brilliant  military  achievement.
The  t,ime  was  11  o'clock  when  Anderson  filed  Mahone's  men  down  the
Old  Turnpike,9  the  very  same  moment  that  Hooker  ol`der.ed  Slocum's  lst  Corps
10
on  his  right  to  advance  up  t,he  Plank  road.        Anderson's  troops  on  the
Plank  road were Wright's  and  Posey's  brigades,  with  portions  of Alexander's
reserve  artillery,  and  they  advanced  only  two  miles  before  the  firing
9.  E.,  XXV,   pt.I,   797.
7E2¥.'  p.  85o.
8se|by,  Jackson
American  a
p.   189;   G.   F.  R.   Henderson,
ivil War
Fi;-;I--656=637TCI£5d  hereinaft,er  as  Hender;-on,
9g.  E.,   XXV,   pt.1,   85o.
Stonewall  Jackson  and  the
H-.c-6T,"i915TLondon,   New  York:   I,ongmans,   Green,
St,onewall  Ja,ckson.
L°Aiexanderl  ngE± Memoirs p.  325.
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commenced.    Anderson  then  ordered Wright  to  follow  the  line  of  t}ie  Fred-
ericksburg  and  Gordonsville  Faill.o`cjd,   unfinished  at,  i,he  t,ire,  arid`  t,o
march  unopposed  until  he  reached  t,he  Catherine  Furnace,  where  he  would
be  beyond  the  Fedel`al  flank.LL    Fort,unate|y  for Wright,  visibility was
low  and  t,he  fog  concealed  his  movement  against  det,ection  from  the  observa-
tion balloons.12    The  maneuver was  as  brilliant  in  practice  as  it  was  in
consequence.    It  allowed  for  a  speedy  march,  no  opposition,  and  most
important,1y,  an  unexpect,ed  at,t,ack  on  the  enemy's  rear  right  flank.    Duly
accomplished,  the  movement  pl.ecipitated  the  near  rout,  and  with  its  flank
turned  and  t,he  Confederates  pressing  its  front,  the  large  Federal  force
continued  to  wilt  unt,il  night,  called  a  halt  to  the  action.
Anderson  had  effected  this  tut.ming  movement  successfully with  only
three  slim brigades,  followed  by  MCLawsl  division  and  Jackson's  corps.
Wilcox's  and  Perry's  brigades  of  Anderson's  division,  coming  up  fl`om Fred-
ericksburg,  had  arrived  too  late  t,o  join  the  vanguard,  and  had  assisted
MCI.aws'  division  on  the  old  Turnpike.13
In Andersonls  official  account,  of  this  phase  of  the  campaign,  he
stated  simply  that Wright  ''was  directed"  to  side  slip  to  t,he  left.    Py
whom he  modestly  omitted  to  say.Lh   Wright  himself  noted  that  he  received
the  order  from Anderson,L5  and  as  the  wording  in  Lee's  report  is:    ''General
Wright,  by  direction  of  General  Anderson,  diver`ging  to  the  left,''  it,  is
Llg.  a.,  xxv,  pt.I,  85o.
L2Freeman,  E.  E.  i,  IIj  516.
L3g.  a.,  xxv,  pt.1,   797.
LhFreeman,   Lee ls  Lieut,enant`q
L5g.  E.,  xxv,  pt.  1,  866.
11,   53h.
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reasonably  certain  t,hat  Anderson  .rr,ave  the  order  with  n-i  reference  to
16
Jackson.     Thus  Anderson  alone  was  resr>onsible  fol`  the  t,urning  movement.
The  night,  of  May  lst  was  spent  devising  some  plan  to  assail  the
Federals.    When  Hooker  met  t,he  unexpectedly  forceful  attack which  tuned
his  right,  he  had  ordered  a  countermarch.17   With  dense  forest  on  all
sides  and  tangled  underbrush,  in  the  midst  of  which  t,hey  had  constructed
a  nearly  impenet,rable  abati.6,  Union  forces  had taken  a  strong  position
which  nature  had  provided  them.    Against  this  awesome  defense  Lee  endeav-
ored  to  again  turn  the  eneny's  flank,leaving  Anderson  and  Mcljaws  to
18
demonst,rate  in  front  and  conceal  t,he  movement,.        What,  happened  after
Jackson's  famous  march  has  been  a  subject  exhausted  by  students  t,hrough-
out  i,he  world.    One  of  t,he  most  I`espected  of  these  wol-ks  is  Henderson's
classic  account.    The  famous  English  biographer  so  exaggerates  Jackson's
contribut,ions  in  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville  that  one  is  ama?.ed  how
the  Federals  could  have  held  out,  for  t,he  two  yea.rs  that  followed  such  a
rout.    Indeed,  Jackson  established  himself  by the  successful  execution
of  the  movement  in  t,he  front  rank  of  heroic  soldiers,  but  what,  he  accom-
plished  he  did  not  do  alone.
On  t,he  morning  of  May  2nd  Jacksonls  columns  proceeded  rapidly  down
t,he  Furnace  and  Brook  roads.    As  Hendel`son  I.ecords  it,  Jackson  mar.ched
his  men  steadily  and  not  once  did  he  turn  around,19  while  entire  regiments
16Freemanj Lee's  Lieutenants
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11,   53h.
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succumbed  t,o  t,he  hot  may  sun,2°    fa].ling  face  downward  in  the  dry  dust
of  the  appropriately  styled  ''Furnace"  road.    So  forceful  and  stealt,hy
Was  the  march  on  TJnion  Genel-al  Howardls  star.tied  "foreigners,"2L  t,hat
their  curious  vernacular  was  only  heard  in  the  choked  and  terrified  shrieks
Of  ''Zhackson!     Zhackson!w22
Jacksonls  march  did  not  go  endirely  unobserved,  however,  for  no
sooner  had  t,he  rear  of  the  train  passed  t,he  Furnace  road  than  it  was
attacked  by  a  large  force  of  the  enernyr.23    In  his  haste,  Jackson  had  left
only  a  single  regiment,  to  guard  a  whole  convoy  of  Confederate  al.`tillery
and  ambulances.    This  sin.all  force  somehow  kept  t,he  enengr  back  until  the
train  had  passed,  but,  -it  was  soon  enveloped  and  the  greater  part  of  it
Captured.2h Jackson's  movement,  certainly  would  not  have  been  so  success-
ful,  if ,  indeed,  successful  at  all,  had  t,hese  trains  not  been  on  hand  for
his  assault.    But,  before  it  could  be  pursued,  Anderson  send  Posey's  bri-
gade  to  assist  the  remnants  of  t,he  little  rear  guard,  which  unluckily
chanced  t,o  be  the  twenty-third  Georgia.    At  about  10  a.  in.  Posey  moved
his  brigade  down  t,he  Furnace  road  and  formed  three  of  his  regiments  in
line  of  battle.25    The  eneny.s  superior  force  made  it  necessary  for
2°chesnut,`  Dife,  pp.  330,  331.
2LHoward's  lit,h  Corps,   comprised  most,1y  of  German  troops,   is  broken  doun
in  9.  i.,  XXV,  pt.1,182-183.
22Henderson. Stonewall Jackson,   p.   675.
23The  Union  force  was,   indeed,large,   composed  of Whipple's  division  of
Sickle's  corps,  Birney's  and Wi].Iiamsl   divisions  of  Slocun's  corps,
Barlow's  bl.igade  of  Howard's  corps,  and  t,hree  regiment,s  of  Pleasonton's
cavalry,  9.  ±.,  XXV,   pt.1,   386-387.
2hE2±.,  p.  798.
25E2¥.,  p.  871.
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Anderson  to  move  Wright's  brigade  to  the  support  of  Posey's,  correspondingly
placing  Mahone's  on the  left  of  the  Plank  road,  t,he  position  formerly
26
occupied  by WI`ight.        After  briefly  consulting  Posey,  Wright,  formed  his
brigade  on t,hat  officer.a  right,27  and with  Posey bearing  the  brunt  of
the  enerngr  assault,  t,he  two  brigades  checked  any  further  advance  on  the
28
i,rain,      thus  allowing  Jackson his  famous  assault  on Hooker's  flank.
At  daylight  on  Sunday  moming  Lee  ordered  Anderson's  whole  force
in t,he  direct,ion  of  Chancellorsville,  lfahone's  brigade  filing  off  to the
right,  Wright's  and  Posey's  successively  forming  a  line  nearly  perpendic-
ular  to  the  left  of  Nlahone's  brigade.29    In  order  to  scour the  proposed
line  of  assault,  Anderson  directed  Perry's  brigade  t,o  move  down  the
Catharpin  and  t,hen  to  the  Furnace road.30
Anderson was  later  criticized  for  sending  an  entire  brigade  on
recormaissance,31  but  Mfahan  called  for  as  much  as  one-third  of  a  whole
force  for  such  a  mission.    For  only  a  strong  force  could,  after  seeking
32
and  finding  position,  hold  it  until  support  came.
Finding  t,he  coundry  clear,  Perry  moved  his  brigade  up  by  the
26
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Furnace  to  the  left  of  Posey's.         Anderson  ordered Wright,  to  advance
his  ttrigade  through  t,he  woods,  connect,ing  his  right,  with  Mahone's  left
flank,  whi.Ie  his  left  would  meet  Posey's  right  flank.    But,  having  decided
to  affect,  independent  command,  Wright  took  a  short.  cut,.    Having  done  so,
he  moved  to  such  a  dist,ance  from  t,he  advancing  line  that  a  courier  he  had
sent  t,o  find  Mahone  could  not  find  that  officer  or  his  brigade,3h  and
Wright  encountered  the  most  terrible  fire  he  had witnessed,  temporarily
35
checking  his  advance.
Shortly  afterwards,  Posey's  timely  ar.rival  relieved  the  pressure
on Wright,.    He  was  ordered  t,o  advance  on  t,he  enemyts  right  flank,  which
was  fol`midably  perched  upon  a  hill.    Advancing  in  columns  of  regiments,
Posey  pushed  forwal`d  his  skit.mishers  and  at,tained  t,he  position  on  the  hill.36
Followed by  Perry  on  his  left,  who  soon  found  himself  inside  t,he  enery's
37
breastworks,      they were  joined by Wright,38  and  t,he  division  fell  in
line  with  t,he  old  Tunpike39  as  the  emery  steadily  gave  up their  positions
to  the  advancing  Confederates.    The  ret,I`eating  Federals  elected  to  make
a  stand  at  t,he  Chancellorsville  house,  where  ro  breastwol.ks  protect,ed
33g.  £.,  xxv,  pt.I,  875.
3hMahonels  excuse  for  not  keeping  up  with Wright  was  det,ermined  by Wright
himself  by  his  taking  the  short  cut,  which  put  him  ahead  of  t,he  ot,her
columns.    Mahone  saw  limited  action  at  Chancellorsville,  however,  because
he  was  detached  to  MCLaws  a  litt,1e  aft,er  noon.    9.  i.,  XXV,  pt.1,   851.
35EE±.,  p.  868.
36Ibid.
37Eng.,  p.  875.
38qu.,  p.  868.
39EnI.,  p.  85i.
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i,heir  posit,ion,  and  Which was  so  cant,racted  t,hat  Alexander's  guns  poured
ho
fire  upon  5t  from  three  d-:.rections.
Just  before  reaching  the  Chancellorsville  house,  Anderson's  right
was  being  incessantly  bot,hered  by  a  bat.tery  and  sharp  skirmish  fire.
Anderson  then  ordered Wright  t,o  move  up  the  Third  Georgia  to  dislodge
them.     Led  by  Major  John  F.  Jones  until  he  was  wounded  and  succeeded  by
Captain  C.  H.  Andrews,  t,he  regiment  moved  along  a  line  of  rifle  pit,s  and
charged  the  confused  enengr  about  200 yards  from  t,he  Chancellorsville
hl
house.        Observing  his  forces  while  ].eaning  on  one  of  t,he  pillars  of  the
house  was  none  other  than  "Fighting  Joe"  Hooker,   t,he  Union  CTenel`al  himself .
For  several  hours  thereafter,  his  army- was  without,  a  commander,  for  the
Federal  Commander  was  incapacitated  when  a  fragment  was  ripped  from  one
of  the  pillars  by  a  field  piece  and  knocked  him  unconscious.h2    About
this  time  St,uart,,  who  had  taken  comTmnd  of  the  2nd  Arny  Corps  after  the
wounding  of  Jackson,  and  MCLaws,  with  I.ee  directing  his  division,  con-
verged  at  the  clearing  behind  Anderson.     It  was  Lee's  supreme  moment  as
a  soldier,  as  he  was  greeted  wit,h  ''One  long,   unbroken  cheer,  in which  the
feeble  cry  of  those  who  lay helpless  on  the  earth,  blended with  the  st,rong
voices  of  those  who  still  fought,  rose  high  above  the  roar  of battle,  and
hailed  the  presence  of  the  victorious  chief .wh3
But  before  Lee  could  reorganize  his  offensive  and  pursue  his  crip-
pled  opponent,  fate  decided  on  a  different,  course.    Disastrous  news  came
that,  Early  had  lost  Fredericksburg  and  that  his  left  had  been t,urned  by
h°Aiexanderj  ngi±
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Sedfrwick.    With  his  roar  threatened,  Lee  had  t,o  abandon  his  plan  to  fol-
low  up  the  r,feat  vict,ory.    Wit,hal  his  fear`less  spirit,  he  could  not  now
at,tack  Jiookel.'s  five  corps  entrenched  in  his  front,!J['  and  surrmarily  de-
t,ached  MCLaws  who  had  seen  limited  action  t,hat  day  and  whose  front  was
not  in  danger.h5    With  the  exception  of  Mahone,  who  was  detached  w].th
MCLaws,  Anderson's  tit-ed  division  proceeded  to  Nat,ch  the  River  road  below
United  St,ates  Ford,  and  with Wright,'s,  Perry's  and  Posey's  brigades,
t,hreaten  Hooker's  communications  and  line  of  ret,r'eat  fl.om  Chancellorsville.
But,  after.  completing  a  reconnaissance  of  enengr  posit,ions  on  t,he  River
road,  Anderson believed  i,hat  it,  was  too  late  to  effect  any  damage  to
Hooker.h6
About,  daybreak  on  the  hth,  however,  after  Captain  S.  R.  Johnston
of  t,he  Hngineer  Corps  had  brought  news  of  large  parks  of  wagons  in  the
camps  of  enengr  troops  on  the  opposit,e  side  of  the  river,h7  Anderson  ordered
major  R.  A.  Hardaway,  of  t,he  First  Virginia  Artillery,  to  fire  in  its
midst.    Hardaway  found  the  view  fair.  and  the  range  easy,  as  he  poured
forthy  fifteen  rounds  to  the  gun,h8  which Anderson  believed  was  llwith
good  effectrh9
Before  Anderson  could  discover  the  eneny's  st,ren.givh  and  position
at,  the  River  Road,  he  was  sent  to  Salem  Church.    He  reached  this  position
with  t,hree  of  his  brigades  about  noon  and  was  ordered  t,o  gain  Sedgwj.ck's
hhAiexander,  Ee_I.I Memoirs p.   3h9.
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left  and  then  form  a  junction  with  Early.    Mcltaws  was  disposed  to  hold
t,he  front  and,  as  soon  as  Anderson  advanced,  was  t,o  push  ahead  and  connect
with  his  line.    MCLaws  did  not,  get  into  t,his  fight  until  it  was  almost
dark  and  by  that  time  the  eneny was  already  beginning  t,o  recross  t,he
50
river,
The  signal  being  given,  Anderson  and  Hardy  speedily  advanced  their
51
divisions  upon  the  enengr  and  encountered  litt,1e  resistance.         Anderson
ordered Wr.ight  to  side-slip  t,o  t,he  right  of  t,he  Turnpike  road,  pass  t,he
left  of  Union  Gener.al  Sedgwick,  and  to  get  into  posit,ion  on  a  slope  be-
hind  Downman's  farm,  forming  a  link  wit,h  the  left  of  Hoke's  brigade,  of
Ear|yls  division.52    He  ordered  Posey  t,o  form  on Wright's  left  in  front
of  a  place  called  Dounmanls  house  near  Hazel  Run.53    Perry  he  order.ed  to
t,he  ext,reme  left,  to  remain  there  and  guard  a  gap  of  about  three-fourths
of  a  mile  between  his  and  MCLawsl   line,  unless  opportunity  to  strike
present,ed  itself .
Opport,unit,y  soon  came,  and  as  Perry  was  about  t,o  advance  upon  a
battel`y  and  much  infantry  in  front,  which  he  felt  confident  he  could  cap-
t,ure,  Wright,  came  'lswinging  across  the  line  of battle"  and  annulled  all
prospect  of  st,Piking  a  blow.5h   Wright,  as  he  subsequently  reported,
"charged  across  t,he  field,  swept  by  the  house,"  and  drove  the  enengr  before
him ''like  chaff ."    Obliquing  so  extremely  to  the  left  as  to  fear  encountering
5°g2¥.,  pp.  8o2,1002.
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Woffordls  bl.igade  of  MCLaws'   division,   even  though  he  had  been  3.rformed
t,hat Wofford  would  move  in  that  direct,ion,  Wright  halted  and  informed
Anderson  of  his  position.     Undoubtably  discomposed,  Anderson  inst,ruct,ed
his  subaltern  t,o  remain  where  he  was  and  to  await,  further  orders.    It  was
at  t,his  tine  t,hat Wright  was  subjected  to  what  he  called  ''murderous  fire,"
and  suggested  that  he  was  hamst,rung  by  t,he  ordel`s  he  had  received  and
could  only  remain  thus  disposec`].    However,  he  never  t,hought  t,o  inform  his
55
commander  of  this  unpropitious  circumst,ance.        Wright  had brought  upon
himself  t,his  same  holocaust  when  he  flatly  disobeyed  orders  the  day before
and  took  the  short  cut  through  the  woods,  arriving  at  Chancellorsville
before  the  other brigades.    Now,  his  feat,hers  fluffed  since  t,he  tuning
movemeho  on  the  lst,  Wright  again  assumed  independent,  cormand  and  a  com-
parable  conclusion  await,ed  him.    The  Brigadier  simply  possessed  an  inordi-
nate  propensity to  remonstrate.
Union  General  Sedgwick's  left  was  not  turned  because Wright
othiqued  t,o  the  left,  instead  of  moving  to  the  right  as  he  was  ordered.
Nevertheless,  the  two  divisions  launched  such  a  furious  assault  with  such
compelling  vigor that  the  Federal  corps  was  forced  from  its  entrenched
posit,ion  and  the  retreat,  was  so  swift  that,  Kershaw  and Wofford,  of  Mcl,aws'
division,  coming  up  t,hrough  the  woods,  ''could  only  join  in  thePursuitr56
Although  Sedgwick  escaped  across  the  river,  it  was  not  with  impunity.
The  battle  was  almost  as  A.   P.  Hill  report,ed,  Sedgwick  had  been  Wdemo|ished,W57
-  and  t,he  following  night  Hooker  abandoned  his  defensive-offensive  and
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recrossed  the  Rappahanock,  without  having  achieved  even  a  pyrrhic
victory.
cHAprER  vl
GETTysBimG  AhD  TRE  wllDERNEss
(JUNE,   1863-MAY,   186h)
After  Chancellorsville  and  prior  to  the  invasion  of  Pennsy]vania,
General  Lee  I.eol`ganized  his  arny  into  three  corps.    Ewell  succeeded  Jack-
son  in  command  of  the  Second,   Longstreet  I`etained  command  of  t,he  First,
and  the  new  Third  Corps  was  assigned  to  Ambrose  Powell  Hill.    Believing
t,hat,  Longst,r`eet's  command  had  become  t,oo  large,   I,ee  had  Anderson  det,ached
1
and  assigned  to  Hill.s  corps.       He  and  John  8.  Hood  had  been  considered
'
for  the  promotion  given  t,o  Hill,  but  as  the  Virginian was  their  senior,
they  were  both  passed  over.    But  Anderson  and  Hood  were  both  ''capital
officers,"  Lee  noted,   and  would   make  ;rigood. corps  commanders."2
0n  the  afternoon  of  June  lh,  1863,  Anderson  moved  his  division
from the  battle  line  around  Chancellorsville  and  followed  in  the  march
t)ehind  the  First  and  Second  Corps.    After  Crossing  the  Shenandoah  Valley,
his  division  forded  t,he  PotomaLc  on  the  2hth.    On  the  27th  it  moved  through
Chambersburg  to  Fayetteville,  where  it  bivouacked  until  i,he  ne3de  morning.
]Freemanj I,eels  Dispatches
:S.H:.riiJH'w::.n:i  i:::n
p.   91.
More  than  one  general  expressed  surprise  that
a  corps  in  t,he  reorganizati.on.     T3oth  he  and
Lafayette  MCLaws  out,ranked  "Little  Powell"  and  few  considered  the  Virginian
&u_E::i::I:o2E3,  ¥£::hHg£:o:::ang€[:.v±:::a:::e::dn:::€  S£::a:::€::]¥a{E.
det,ermined  Lee's  choice.     Porter  Alexander  also  advanced  D.  H.  Hill's
superior  claims  to  the  command.    See  Alexander,
note.    Apparent,1y,  neither  Hill  nor  Mcl,aws  were
(58)
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considered  by  I,ee.
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Soon  after  sunrise  on  July  lst,  A.  P.  Hill  ordered  t,he  divisirtn  toward
Cashtown,  where  Anderson  was  to  halt  and  airait  orders.3    Anderson  reached
Cashtown  at 'a  little  before  twelve  olclock,  noon,  and  he  was  shortly
afterward  summoned  by  Lee,  who  believed  t,hat  the  Ma.ior  Cieneral  could
answer  a  troublesome  quest,ion.     ''1  cannot  think what  has  become  of  Stuart,"
Lee  told  Anderson,  "I  ought  to  have  heard  fran him  long  before now."h
After  a  century  of  research,  analyses,  charges  and  countercharges,
perhaps  no  better  explanat,ion  can be  given  for  the  Confederate  fail`ire  in
probably  t,he  most  memorat`1e  and  controversial  battle  in  American  military
history  than  these  two  brief  st,atements  by  Lee  to  Anderson.    For  without
the  cavalry,  Lee  came  very  near  repeat,ing  the  failure  of  Hooker  the  previous
month  at  Chancellorsville.
'`In  the  absence  of  reports  from him,"  Lee  continued  as  Anderson
listened,  ''1  am  in  ignorance  as  to  what  we  have  in  front ....  It  may be
the  whole  Federal  force,  or  it  rriay be  only  a  detachment.    If  it  is  the
whole  Federal  force,  we  must  fight  a battle  here.    If we  do  not  gain  a
victory,  t,hose  defiles  and  gorges  which we  passed  this  morning will  shelter
5
us  from disaster."      His  worst  t,houghts  were  soon  confirmed,  for,  in  his
front,  were  seven Federal  corps  and  the  disaster  that  he  feared  would
soon  confront  him.
After  Iee  rode  off, Anderson  could  hear  the  dist,ant  ruhole  of
art,illery,  and,  before  t,he  next  hour`,  Hill  ordered  him  in  t,hat  direction.
As  he  approached  Gettysburg  the  firing  suddenly  stopped,  and  Anderson  was
3g.  E.,  XXVI,   pt.   2,   613.
hAnderson  quoting  Lee  in  an  undated  letter  in  Longstl.eet,




direct,ed by  Hill  to  bivouac  in  t,he  rear  of  the  tart,1eground.    13elieving
that  the  Federals  were  beaten,  Hill  decided  not  to  pursue  with  his  two
exhausted  divisions  over  ground  that  he  knew  nothing  about  and  which  was
6
probably full  of fresh Federal  infantry.
General  Lee  was  now  in  t,he  precarious  position  of  having  to  attack
when  he  was  not  fully  prepared.    This  had  not  been his  intention,  but
wit,h  seven Federal  corps  directly  in  his  fl.ant,  he  doubted  that  he  could
conduct  a  safe  retreat  through  the .mountains  with his  extensive  convoy  of
wagon  trains,  and,  on  July  2,  he  gave  the  order to  attack.7
The  batt,1e  plan  was  for  t,he  principal  attack  to be  made  on  the
Federal  left,  where  it,  was  thought  that  Confederat,e  artillery  could  be
best  ut,ilized.    Longstreet  was  ordered  to  lead  the  attack  while  Ewell
demonst,I.abed  on  the  I.ight.    Hill  was  ol`dered  to  i,hreat,en  the  Federal  center
to  pl.event  any re-enforcements  fran being  detached  from either  Federal
wing.    Lee  ordered  Andel.son  t,o  "cooperatew  with  Hill  and  Longstreet.8
''This  order  was  t,he  vaguest  he  ever  gave,"9  said  one  student,  and  it  may
help t,o  explain Anderson's  seemingly  poor  showing  in the  first  assault,  on
Federal  positions  at  Gettysburg.    Not,  only was  t,he  order  vague  but  liaison
would  be  hard  to  effect  between  two  corps  commanders,  who  had  almost  come
to t)lows  only  a  shout  time  before.    There  was  little  affinity bet,ween
James  Longst,reet  and  Powell  Hill  and  probably  even  less  at  Gettysburg
6g.  E„  XXVI,  pt.  2,  6o7,  613.
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10
when  Longstreet,  disagreed  w5.t,ti  Ijee's  entire  plan  of  at,t,ack.
Anderson's  advance  would  be  refiulated  by  the  movement  of  t,he
division  on  his  right,  which  chanced  to  be  that  of  Lafayet,i,e  Mcl,aws.
Anderson  had  his  troops  ready  by  two  o'clock,  but  it,  was  four  o'clock  be-
ll
fore  t,he  first  brigade  of  MCLaws  began  to  move.         MCLaws  formed  in  line
at  right,  angles  t,o  Anderson's  ext,reme  right,  across  a  road  parallel  to
Wilcox's  front  and  into  the  Ermitsburg  road  leading  to  Gettysb\irg.12
It  was  not  long  after  MCLaws  filed  his  men  int,o  position  when  two
Federal  batteries  opened  fire  across  an  open  field  t,hat,  str.etched  in  his
front  for  more  than  a  mile.    The  Confederat,es  advanced  int,o  the  fire.L3
As  ordered,  Anderson  advanced  his  brigades  en  echelon formation,  with
Wilcox,   Perry,  Wright,  and  Posey  moving  in  rapid  progression.    Wilcox  made
a  brilliant  advance  that  took  him t,o  the  foot,  of  Cemetery  Hill,  and was
soon  followed  by  Perry's  brigade  commanded  by BI.igadier  General  David
I,ang.    `'These  t,wo  charges,"  observed  Porter  Alexander,  ''followed  with  the
least  delay  of  any during the  affairrLh
When Wilcox  reached  the  foot  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  he  was  met  by
two  lines  of  Federal  infantry.    After  driving  them  across  a  ravine,  he
was  left  a  battery  of  six  pieces.    From  the  t,op    of  i,he  ridge,  hovevel.,
ot,her  Federal  bat,tel.ies  poured  grape  and  canister  upon  his  ranks  and
L°Although  in  retrospect  and  not  in  prospect,  for  Longstreet's  alleged
proposals  to  Lee  before  the  att,ack  on  Cemetery  Hill  on  July  3,  1863,  see
Longstreet,   F_r_om  Manassas pp.   362-369.
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prevented  him  fl.om  hauling  it,  away.    After  a  sharp  cont.,est  with  anot,her
force  supported  by  the  batter.ies  from the  ridge,  a  fresh  line  of  infatitry
descended  upon  him  and  forced  a  halt,.    Seeing  his  advance  checked,  Wilcox
det,ached  his  a.djutant  general  to  Anderson  for  re-enforcement.    None  came
to  the  beleaguered  brigadier,  however,  and  after-  repulsing  three  succes-
sive  charges  all within  the  space  of  thirty  minutes,  Wilcox withdrew back
to  the  original  line  on  the  Hmmitsburg  road.L5
Advancing  behind  the  left,  of  Wilcoy„  Lang  threw  forward  a  strong
skirmish  line.    Coming  upon  the  cl.est  of  a  hill  he  drove  back  the  first
Federal  line  he  encountered  until  they  rallied  on  a  second  hill.    A
furious  volley  broke  up  the  rally  and  they were  dislodged  a  second  time.
Confident,  the  Confederat,es  charged with  a  rebel  yell,  and  hang  halted
to  regroup  his  scattered  columns  before  his  final  assault.
While  reforming,  hang  received  word  t,hat, Wilcox was  being  driven
back  from t,he  foot  of  Cemetery Ridge.    With Wilcox  falling  back  and  the
enengr  in rear  of  his  right  flank,  he,  too,  fell back  t,oward the  original
line  on  the  Rmmitsburg  Road,  reforming  and  fighting  the  entire  way.L6
To  the  left  of  Perry's  brigade  was  the  brigade  of  A.  F,.  Wright,,
whose  advance  was  the  most  successful  of  the  day.    He  immediat,ely  followed
Perry's  brigade,  swept  across  the  open  field  and  attacked  the  Federal
position  wit,bin  rifle  range  of  the  Emmitsburg  turnpike.    Here  WI`ight
observed  that  Posey's  brigade  on  his  left  did  not  advance,  and,  with  his
left  flank  exposed,  he  send  for  r'e-enforcement.    Anderson  assured  him
that  Posey  had  been  ordered  to  advance  and  that  he  would  repeat,  t,he  order.
L5g.  E.,  xxvll,  pt.  2,  618.
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Aft,er  he  drove  the  Federals  upon  a  second  line  behind  a  stone  fence  a
short,  dist,ance  from  the  pike,  Wright  pressed  on  and  captured  several  pieces
of  artillery.    Then,  wit,h  an  impetuous  thrust,  Wright  found  himself  less
than  one  hundred yards  from what  would  become  the  ob.iect,ive  of  the  fateful
assault  i,he  following  day,  the  crest  of  Cemetery  IIill.    The  hill was  lined
with  Federal batteries  and  surrounded t>y  the  obstruction  of  another  stc>ne
fence.    With  a  furious  chat.ge  and  a  hail  of  musketry Wright's  men leaped
the  stone  fence,  ascended  the  heights  and  drove  t,he  Federals  into  the  dark
and  stony  gorge  below.     'We  were  now  complete  masters  of  i,he  field,"  he
boasted,  "having  gained  the  key  .   .   .  of  the  eneny's  whole  line."    For  a
brief ,  ecstatic  moment, Wright  proudly  viewed  his  regimental  t>anners  flying
high  over  the  rolling  hills  beneath  him.    As  the  smoke  from  the  Federal
batt,eries  moved  above  the  ridge,  however,  he  could  see  the  scattered  gray
columns  of  Pet.ry's  brigade  falling  rapidly  to  the  rear.    With  no  support
forthcoming,  and  his  left  flank  thus  exposed,  he  prepared  to  fight,  his
way  t,hrough the  Fedel.als  closing  in  on  his  rear.    This  he  did with heavy
losses  and  fe].i  back  until  he  reached  a  depression,  where  he  halted  to
redress  his  I`anks.    But  the  Federals  did  not  attack,  and,  at  dark,  he
moved  back  to  the  line  he  had  occupied  before  the  advance.17
The  foregoing  individual  accounts  constituted  the  action  Of Ander-
son's  division  on  July  2,  1863.    Each  brigade  advanced  separately  in  a
single  line  wit,h  its  flanks  exposed,  and  each  was  defeated  in  a  detached
and  independent  action.    Alexander  thought  that  better  results  would  have
been  achieved  had  the  brigades  moved  simultaneously.    This  would  have
simplified  the  positioning  of  t,roops  and  would  have  lessened  the  delay
L7Quotation  is  from W|.ightls  report,  ±±±±.,   pp.   623-62h.
6h
t,hat  followed  a  progressive  attack.L8    Put  a  sim`]1taneous  advc.mce  may
not,  have  insured  success  against  t,he  Federal  mass  art,illery barrages,  ar\.d
Longst,reet  was  probably  correct  in  asserting  that,  t,he  rough  .ground  ori  the
19
field  of  Get,tysburg  made  concentration  ''at  any  point"  virtually  impossible.
Alt,bough  Lee  ol`dered  the  progressive  attack  and  Longstreet  and  Hill  simply
advanced  as  prescribed,  he  left  the  det,ails  Of  formation  to  each  corps
commander.    But  it  was  A.  P.  Hill  who  made  t,he  biggest  t,actical  blunder
in  ordering  Anderson  to  att,ack  "by  br.igades"  and  to  move  in  a  single  line®
Hill  also  advanced  Hood  in  the  same  formation,  and,  had  not  Lonto,street
Mchaui5
recalled^whose  movement  was  t,o  signal  Hood's  att,ack,  Hood  would  have
repeated  the  mistake  rr,ade  by Anderson.2°    Therefore  the  error  was  Hill's.
For  some  reason,  however,  Anderson  received  most,  of  I,hc  criticism.     "Always,"
says  D.  S.  Freeman,  ''it,  was  Anderson's  nature  to  i,ake  the  largest  blame
21
and  the  least  praise."
During  the  week  that  f ollowed  the  t>attle  several  Georgia  and  Vil`-
ginia  newspapers  accused Anderson  of  negligence  for  not  supporting Wright.
and Wilcox.    Although  he  could  have  easily  shifted  the  blame  upon  t,hree
other  generals  besides  himself ,  Anderson  admit,ted  the  accusation.    In
reference  to  the  support,  for Wilcox,  he  answered  only  that  when  he  received
Wilcox's  dispatch  he  could  not  locate  his  corps  commander  t,o  refer  it  to
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t,o  Mahone,  nor  of  the  int,erview  that  followed.
Anderson  had  been  ordered  by  Hill  to  hold  Mahone  in  reserve,  but,
when Wilcox  sent,  word  for.  help,  he  immediately  sent,  Captain  Shannon  to
hurry  Mahone  to  his  support.    It,  was  probably  t,hen  t,hat  he  rode  to  look
for  Hill.    Ithen  Shannon  gave  the  order,  Mahone  refused  to  mc>ve,  saying
that  Anderson  had  told  him  to  stay  wher.e  he  was.
''1  am  just  from  General  Anderson,"  retort,ed  the  dist,ressed  aide,
''and  he  orders  you  to  advance."
"No,"  said  Mahone,   ''1  have  nor  order.s  from  General  Anderson  hirnself
23
to  remain  here.''
Realizing  that  Mahone  could  nob  be  persuaded,  Shannon  rode  back
to  headquarters.    Precisely why  Anderson  did  not  take  action  against,  or
at  least  reprimanr3.,  Mahone  for  his  peculiar  stubbornness  is  impossible  to
say.    Perhap?s:CM%#oene ls  support  could  probably  not  have  been  utilized  so
lat,e  in  t,he  attack,  Shannon  may  not  have  reported  the  incident  to  Ander-
son.    In  deference  to  Shannon,  however,  it  would  have  been  his  word
against  lfahone's,  and  a  brigadier  general  could  have  made  it  plenty  uncom-
foutable  for  a  lowly  aide-de-camp,  especially  if  the  brigadier  happened
to  be  one  with  the  stature  of  ''Lit,tie  Billy"  Dfahone.
Anderson  did  send  aid  to  Wright,  however,  and  detached  Posey's
brigade,  which  was  advanced  in  colurms  of  regiments.    But,  when  within
range  of  t,he  batteries  on  Cemet,ery  Hill,  they  quickly  fell  back,  as  Wright
23Wi|cox  to  Lee,   n.   d.,   in  Freeman,  E.  E.  ±g±,Ill,   555.     Posey  confirmed
Shannon's  claim  that  Mahone  had  been  ordered  to  advance   (9.  ®R„  XXVII,
pt.  2,  63h),  but  he  did  not,  elaborat,e,  saying  c>nly  that  he  himself  called
on  Mahone  for  support.     But  Mahone  "being  at  t,his  t,ime  ordered  to  t,he
right,   could  not  comply."
66
I.ecorded  disgustedly.2h
Anderson's  division  at,  Gettysb`]rg  was  no  less  successful  than  any
of  Lee's  ot,her  divisions  on  July  2,  and  having  observed Wright's  sweep
up  Cemet,Cry  Hill,  I,ee  may  have  at,  this  time  made  his  decision  to  take  it
the  next  day.    When  Longstreet  advanced  his  colurms  forward  on  the  3rd,
Anderson  had  ordel`s  to  hold  his  division back  until  it,  should  be  needed.
Anderson  quickly  perceived  this  need  and  immediately  positioned Wilcox
and  Perry's  brigades  for  an  advance.    As  the  two  brigades  were  about  tc,
move  forwal`d,  however,  Longstl`eet  directed  their  halt,  adding  that,  Pickett
had  been  repulsed  and  t,hat  another  assault  would  be  useless.25    Union
General  Mbade  did  not  pursue  and  t,bus  ended  unsuccessfully  Iiee's  s6cond
invasion  of  the  Nol`th.    On  the  lhth,  Lee  crossed  the  Potomac  to  the  safety
of  Virginia.
Anderson  had  high  praise  for  the  commendable  behavior  of  his  troops
on the  march back  from Gettysburg.    ''In  a  land  of  plenty,"  he  pointed  out,
"they  often  suffered  hunger  and  want."    While  his  ragged  and  barefooted
soldiers  marched  through  the  towns  of  Pennsylvania  and  lfaryland,  t,hey
knew  that,  concealed  behind  the  barred  doors  of  many  a  merchant  shop were
abundant  supplies  of  clothing  and  equipment;  yet  looting was  I.eported
nowhere.    He  not,ed  t,hell.  usual  courage  in battle,  "and,  if  complete  sue-
cess  did  not  attend  their  efforts,"  he  believed,  "their  failure  cannot be
laid  upon  their  short,coming,  but  must,  be  recognized  and  accepted  as  the
Will  and  decree  of  the  Almighty  disposer  of  human  affairs.W26
2hg.  i.,  xxvll,  pt.  2,  62h,  63h.
25ERE.,   pp.   359,  6lh-615.
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Except  for  a  brief  action  on  October  ]J+,  1863,   in  whi.r`h  rrcneral
Posey  was  killed  attempting  to  protect  General  Hothls  flank,27  Ande|.sonls
division  saw  no  action  until  Lee  confronted  Grant  in  the  Battle  of  the
Wilderness  on  May  6,  186h.     It  has  beer]  said  of   this  Union  General,  when
he  left,  the  west  for. Vi.rginia,  that  he  left  the  minor  league  for  the  major.
The  analogy  may t)e  justified,  but,  from the  events  that  ensued,  it  was
manifest  t,hat  Grant  was  one  minor  leaguer who  made  it.    If  the  Confederacy's
death  knell  had  been  sounded  at  Gettysburg,  GI`ant  now  made  it  distinctly
mol`e  audible.
Grant's  objective  aft,er  crossing  the  Rapidan  was  to  turn  Lee's
right  and  force  him  back  upon  Richmond--h]..gh-minded  strategum  +What,  failed
to  note  t,he  knotty  tangles  and  broad  forests  of  t,he  Wilderness.    Realiz5ng
tr,.is,  Lee  hit  Grant  before  he  could bring  to  bear  his  superior  force  and
artillery.    On  May  5,  he  sent  the  divisions  of  Heth  and W5`1cox  i.,o  meet
Grant  on  t,he  Orange  plankroad,  where  t,he  two  divisions  of  A.  P.  Hill
almost  met  disaster  after they  failed  to  construct  any  ground  forces.28
With  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  however,  Kershaw's  and  Field's  divisions
filled  in  the  gaps  of  the  broken  lines.    Although  still  assigned  to  Hill's
corps,.  Anderson was  at  this  t,ime  the  real.  colurm  of  Longstreet's  corps,
and,  aft,er  Longstreet  cleat.ed  the  plankroad  in  his  front,  he  joined  his
old  chief  at  about  8  p.  in.  the  next  day.29
About  the  time  of  Anderson's  a.rrival,  Major  rreneral  M.I,.  Smith,
chief  engineer  of  the  al`ry,  who  had  been  sent  to  reconnoiter  the  emery
27For  the  action  of  two  of  Anderson's
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posit,ion,  reported  that,  Grant,'s  left  extended  only  a  short  dj.stance  beyond
the  plankroad.     A  movement,  Was  then  suggest,ed  by  r]eneral  William  T.  Wofford
to  at,tack  Grant's  flank  with  his  our  brigade  of  Kershaw's  division,  G.  T.
Anderson's  of  Field's  division,   supported  by  Mahone's  of  Anderson's  divi-
sion,  while  the  remainder  of  these  divisions  demonstrated  in  front.3°
The  soldiers  of  the  Arry  of  Northern  Virginia  could  nc>t,  have  had  memoi.ies
so  dull  nor  hearts  so  ungrateful  as  to  forget  wha+,  had  happened  in  this
very  same  wilderness  precisely  one  year  earlier.    Anderson  had  ordered
Wright,  to  march  down  the  unfinished  railroad,  side-slip  to  the  left,,   atirl
attack  Hooker's  flanl..     Now,  May  6,  186h,  what,  follrjwed  is  instructive  t,rt
all  who  qu€`stion  the  value  of  following  precec]ent.
Longst,reet  ordered  his  chief  of  staff ,  Moxley  Sorrel,  to  form  a
good  line  on  the  unfinished  railroad,31  with  his  "I`ight  pushed  .forward
and  tuning  t:or  side-slipping=  as  much  as  possible  to  the  left.W32    The
movement,  was  completely  successful,  and,   in  Union  General  Hancock's  ourl
laconic  descript,ion,  the  brigades  rolled  him  up  ll|ike  a  wet  blanket.W33
It  was  Longstreet's  supreme  military  achievement,  and  he  could  i,hank
Anderson  for  the  instruction  given  the  previous  year  at,  Chancellorsville.
The  repetition  of  Chancellorsville  was  not,  complete,  however,
until,  like  Jackson,  Longstreet  had  been  shot  down  by  his  our  men.    But
that  Grant  would  have  t>een  annihilated  by  Lee  had  not,  Longstreet  been
wounded  was  not,  likely,  and  Lee  may  not  have  been  able  t,o  deliver  a  blow
3°g.  E.,  XXXV,   pt,.1,   lo6o-1o62.
31The still  unfinished  Fredel.icksburg  to  riordonsville  Railroad  was  the
very  sane  cut,  from which Wright  tul`ned  Hooker's  flank.
32sorrel. Recollect,ions
33Epe.,  p.  237.
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severe  enough  to  send  him  reeling  back  across  t,he  Rapidan  as  he  had  done
IIooker  at  Chancellorsville.    The  truth  was  that  th6  Confederates  were
just  about  as  disorganized  as  Grant,  and  Lee  had  to  halt  his  last  general
offensive  of  the  war.    When  he  I`egrouped  his  forces,  Ijee  went  back  to  his
headquarters  to  consider  the  question  that,  was  foremost  in  his  minr1--a
replacement  for  Longstreet.    The  three  men  considered  were  Edward  Johnson,
Jubal  Early  and  Richard  Anderson.
Int,Crest,3ngly  enough,  Anderson  had  i.unit,ten  his  old  friend  and
West  Point  classmat,e,  General  D.  H.  Hill,  less  than  two  weeks  before  the
Bat,t,le  of  the  Wilderness  and  rank was  the  subject  of  his  letter.    Hill,
like  Anderson  at  Pensacola,  had  the  misfortune  to  serve  under  and  incur
the  wrath  of  i,he  irascible  General Braxton  Bragg.    After  the  Battle  of
Chickamauga,  several  generals  were  relieved  of  command  for  having  signed
a  I.ound-robin  demanding  Bragg's  replacement  and  among  them was  D.  H.  H5_11,
one  of  the  most  out,spoken  of  Braggls  antagonists  and  the  petitibn's  chief
architect.3h    Hill  had  recently been  promoted  to  Lieutenant  General  on  a
provisional  footing  to  command  a  corps  in Bragg's  army  vacated by  liieu-
tenaLnd  General William A.  Hardee,  and  his  temporary  commission  became
inactive  when  he  was  relieved.35    He  was  once  again  a  ma`ior  general  and
an  extremely  embittered  one.    The  following  thoughtful  lett,er  t,o  Hill  is
Anderson's  expression  of  what  were  pl.obably the  views  of  nearly  every
general  in  t,he  Confederate  Arny:
3hFor  Leels  opinion  of  Braggls  generalship  see  let,ter  in  Longstl`eet,
From  Manassas p.  h69.
35For  Hi||ls  correspondence  with  the  War  Department  see  a.  E.,  XXXV,  Pt.  2,
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camp  near  Orange  CO#;:i:°¥;:,LB:i
fry  dear  friend,
I  read your  correspondence  with  the  War  office  with  all  the
interest  which  our.  long  and  uninterrupted  friendship would  naturally
inspire.    That  you have  been  harshly  and  unjustly  dealth with,  is
plain,  and  I  regret  beyond  measure  that your  zeal  and  ability,  and
your  devotion  to  our  cause,  should  have  been  so  easily  forgott,en--
your  future  usefulness  impaired  and  your  feelings  wounded  merely  to
gratify the  spit,e  of  a  disappointed  and  unsuccessful  military  superior.
I .assure  you yot)r  word  is  clear beyond  a.1l  question with  me  and  I
believe  viLth  all Fho  lmov you well  in  this  Arngr.    Whilst  I  agree
with you  that  the  treatment, which you have  received  is  calculat,ed  to
diminish  the  confidence  of  troops  over  whom you  might  be  placed.
I  think  that you would  soon  dispel  that  cloud  and  your  courage--
ability  and  fidt=31ity  would  afterwards  shine  all  the  bl.ighter.    There-
for`e  I  would  say  T€rork  on--make  the  bricks  although  t,hey  have  taken
away  the  straw  and  your  i,riumphant  deliverance  from your  persecutol`s
will  be  given  in  due  time.
I  appreciate  and  value  your  kind  allusion  to  me  in your  letter
to  the  Adjutant  General.     I  pray  God  to  bless  and  preserve  you  in
whatever  course  you  may  decide  upon  adopting  in  this  mat,i,er.
Believe  me  ever your  friend,
Lt.  General  D.  H.  Hiii36
R.  H.  Ander.son
Anderson  was  only t>eing  considerate  when  he  addl.essed  his  comrade
as  Lieut,enant  General,  and  perhaps  it  never  occurred  to  him,  especially
aft,er being  discredited  at  Gettysburg,  that  before  t,wo  weeks  were  to
pass,  his  own  rank would  be  superior  to  t,hat  of  his  f.riend  Harvey  Hill.
:?f;r¥ing¥#iis79=::!°;i¥::i::fiat:t:::::b::Fie:t::in::dAd6:::::S°nl
General  Cooper  probably  refers  to  Hillls  statement  to  the  effect,  the,t
had  officers  of  the  ability  of Anderson,  "Maryland"  St,euart  or Barly
replaced  him,  t,here  would  have  been  no  issue.    See  9.  i.,  LII,  312-313.
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The  choice  of  a  successol`  to  I,ongstreet  was  a  selection  that  could
not  be  long  delayed  and  on  the  morning  of  May  7,  186h,  Colonel  Moxley
Sorrel,  Longstreet's  chief  of  staff who  had  led  the  turning  movement,  on
Grant's  left  t,he  previous  day,  was  called  to  I,eels  headquarters  and  in-
vited  to  express  his  sentiments  on  the  subject.1    His  opinion  of  Anderson
was  set  down  in  his  book,  which  Freeman  thought  ''One  of  the  most  charming
of  all  books  on  the  War  between  the
erate  Staff Officer.
states,"2 Recollections  of  a  Con fed-
Says  Sorrel  of  Anderson:    ''His  courage  was  of  the
highest  order,  but,  he  was  indolent.    His  capacity  and  intelligence  excel-
lent,  but  it  was  hard  to  fret  him to  use  them.    Withal,  of  a  na:Lure  so  true
and  so  lovable  t,hat,  it,  goes  against  me  t,o  criticize  him."    Concerning  the
alleged  indolence,  Sorrel  went  on  to  say  that  perhaps  Longst,reet  alone
knew.how  to  elicit  Anderson's  dormant  capabilities.3    Then,  with  singular
incongruity,  he  relat,ed  to  Lee  nothing  that  was  uncompliment,any  to  the
Sout,h  Carolinian.h    Like  Ambrose  R.  Wright,  Sorrel  was  simply  an  individual
LSorrel,  E±1lections,  p.  238.
2Freeman,  E.  E.  ±,  Ivj  567.
3sorrelj Rer®1lecti.ons p.  128.    Freeman  dispels  the  assertion  that
Anderson  was  lazy  and  inert  except,  in  the  presence  of  Longstl`eet  as  a
"persistent  yarn,"  Freeman,
hsorrel,  Recollect,i.ons
Lee's  L.ieutenants
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who  was  critical  by  nature.5    This  is  all  the  more  evident  when  one  con-
sidel`s  t,he  fact  that  Anderson's  very  soubriquet  denoted  aggr'essiveness
on  t,he  batt,1efield  and. that,  his  two  greatest,  contributions  to  t,he  Confed-
erate  Army,  Chancellorsville  and  Spotsylvania  Ccturt  House,  both  occurred
during  the  absence  of  Itongstreet.
If  I,ee  himself  thought  that  Anderson had  any  shortcomings,  how-
ever,  one  of  them  may  have  been  that  Anderson was  not  quick  enough  on  the
march.    When  his  division  was  the  lead  colurm  of  Hill's  corps  in  the
retreat  fl.om  Gettysburg,  there  was  a  suggestion  of  this  belief  in  Lee's
words  to  S'orrel  when  he  asked  t,hat  officer  what  was  Hill's  front  division.
''General  Anderson,  sir,"  answered  Sorrel.
'`1  am  sorry,  Colonel,"  Ijee  told  Sorrel,  "nor  friend  Dick  is  quick
enough  pursuing,  but  in  retreat  I  fear  he  will  nch  be  as  sharp  as  I
Should  like."6
At  any rat,e,  Sorrel  heard  later  that  day  of  the  order  ''assigning
chivalrous,  deliberate   'Dick'  AnQerson  to  the  command  of  the  First  Army
Corps  and  it  was  not  long  before  he  was  made  lieutenant general.w7
Anderson  could  take  pride  in  knowing  that,  he  was  the  only  non-
Vil`ginian  ever  to  be  given  t,he  covet,ed  commission  by  General  Robert  E.
5Another  member  of  Longstreet's  staff  was  Francis  W.  I)awson,  who  described
Sorrel  as  remonstrative  and  "over-bearing,"  Francis  W.  Dawson,  Reminiscences
(The  Chrlrlest,on  Neuls  &  Courier  Press,   i882-) -,--i;:i36Tof  Confederate  Service
hereinafter  as  Dawson,  Confederate  Service.
6EE¥.,  pp.   171-172.
:g#;e:; 23:ta:;sEtfex¥¥:;t::; €£a€6z;de:::nofa:h;±3::t:o:::::i:: the
First  Corps  at,  the  special  request  of  the  wounded  Longstreet,.    The  writer
has  found  no  confimation  of  this  in  any  of  the  uritings  of  I,ongstreet,
however.     See  The  Charleston  News
Oct,ober  8,   1891;
&  Coui-ier,  Charleston,  South  Carolina,
Second  Edition,  p.   3.
73
8
Lee.      Out  of  t,he  six  lieutenant  generals  in the  Arry  of Northern Virginia,
only  two  were  not  nat,ives  of  the  stat,e  of Virginia,  I,ongst,reet  and Ander-
9
son.      Anderson  was  also  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  was  not,  the  senior
majc>r  general  in  Lee's  aITnyr  and  that,  except  on  this  occasion,  I.ee
never before  exercised  the  irregularity  of tl.ansferring  an  officer  from
one  corps  to  take  command  of  another.    It  was  a  distinct  and  unusual
honor.
The  men  of  the  First  Corps  could  not,  have  been  more  delighted
whet-i  i,hey  heat.d  that  Andel`son  was  to  command  them.     It  had  been  over  a
year  since  he  had  been  wit,h  the  corps,  but  t,hat  ''he  was  remembered  and
beloved"  had  been  demonst,rat,ed  on  May  6,  the  day  before  he  received  his
commission.
His  old  Brigade  of  South  Carolina  t,roops  had  passed  long  previously
to  the  c.ommand  of  Micah  Jenkins,  and  had  not  seen  him  for  months  until
he  came  upon  the  men  as  they  were  sitting  on' t,he  ground,  in  t,he  Wilder-
ness,  after  t,he  fall  of  Jenkins.    As  soon  as  the  men  observed  Anderson
riding  up t,he  line,  past  the  left  of  the  Brigade,  they  rose  with  a
yell  to  welcome  him.    They  had  to  be  silenced  because  the  enengr  was
close  at  hand,  and  they  silently  resumed  their  places  without  grumbling;
but  as  Anderson  passed,  they  took  off  their  hats  and  t,brew them  into
the  air.    Close  to  the  centre  of  the  Brigade  Anderson  drew  rein,
t`mned  to  the  troops,  removed  his  hat  and  said  simply:  "lq}r  friends,
your  silent  expression  makes  me  grateful  for  your  kind  remembrance,
I  thank you  sincerely."    He  could  say  no  more  because  of  tears.    The
men  wept,  t,oo,  without  abashment.    They  rejoiced  the  next  day  to  tmow
i:::s::e:::i±Ot  another  Officer  tempora.ri ly would  succeed  the  wounded
8In  effect,  Longst,feet  received  his  promotion  t,o  Lieutenant  General  from
General  Joe  Johnston.    For  details,   see  Ijongst,feet,  I=9±  Manassas,  p.   332.
9Wade  Hampton  and  D.  H.  Hill  attained  t,he  rank  of  I.ieutenant  General
after  they  had  left  Lee's  arrTnr.    It  may be  of  interest,  to  note  that
Hampton,  Hill,  Arderson  and  Longstreet,  were  all  born  in  Sout,h  Carolina.
Anderson  was  promoted  aft,er  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill.
10This
grade  belonged  to  Lafayet,t,e  MCLaws  of  I®ngst,reet's  corps.
]LFreeman  noted   (Freeman, Ijee I s  Lie`]t,enanttat  IIIi  375)  tthat  the  General
accountmust  have  cherished  t,he  memory  of  this  I.eunion  because  the  above
7h
On  May  7,  Andel.son  received  his  first  orders  as  a  corr)s  commander.
He  was   given  t,he  messa,ie  from  Lee  by  General  W.  N.   Pendleton,   I,he   army's
Chief  of  Artillery,  instruct,ing  him t,o  follow  a  f:uide  along  a  new  road
that  had  been  cut  out  t,hat,  day  with  Kel.shawls  and  Field's  divisions.
His  orders  from  Lee  were  to  st,art  by  3:oo  t,he  next,  morning.12    Grant  was
then  moving  toward  Spotsylvania  Court  House.    This  simple  fact  should
have  demanded  no  ngrsterious  perspecti.ve,  for  it  was  t,he  nearest  location
t,hat  was  large  enctugh  for  him  to  regroup  his  scattered  co|urms.13    Put
report,s  indicated  to  Lee  t,hat  the  emery  wrtuld  go  to  Fredericksburg,  for
the  War  Department  received  from him  on  May  8,  at  h:29,  the  dispatch  that
''the  enemy  has  abandoned  his  position  and  is  moving  toward  Frederir,ksb`irg.
This  army  is  in  motion  on  his  right  flank,  and  our  advance  is  now  at
Spotsylvania  Court  House."Lh    But  even  if  Lee  had  anticipated  Grant'`s
intention,  he  certainly  misjudged  his  resolve,  for  r]rant,  encumbered  by
an  immense  convoy  Of  wagon  trains,  start,ed  the  famous  race  at  9:oo,15  and,
if  so  acutely  aware  of  this  fact,  Lee  hardly would  have  ordered  Andersen
to  mal`ch  six  hours  later.    At  any  rate,  Anderson  did  not  march  at  the
designated  hour,  but  began  making  preparations  to  move  by  11  p.  in.    Anec-
dote  has  it  t,hat  Anderson  I`eached  i,he  Court  House  early  simply  because
he  found  the  woods  on  fire.     It  seemed  t,o  make  a  good  st,oly  and  haLs  per-
sisted  for  that,  reason.    How  else  could  the  lazy  Anderson be  galvani7,ed
is  fl.om  an  undated  newspaper  clippi.ng  which  is  one  of  t,he  very  few  that
Andel`son  kept  concerning  himself .
12g.  E.,  xxxv,  pt.I,lob.
13GrantJ Memoirs 11,   306.
Lhg.  E.,  xxxv,   pt,.   2,   97h.
13Ibid.'  pt.1,  3.
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into  action?    The  fire  seemed  an  appropriate  stimulant.
This  self-effacing  corps  commander  had  told  r]eneral  Pendleton
that  he  would  begin  his  rriarch  four  hours  earlier  than  had been  ol.dered,
before  he  was  even  aware  of  any  conflagrat,ion.     ''General  Anderson,"  wr.ote
Pendleton,  ''stat,ed  that  his  orders  were  to  mat.ch  by  3:00  neat  morning.
16
He  was  preparing  t,o  start  at  11:00  that  night."        Anderson withdrew  his
i=`
t,roops  from  line  of  batt,1e  precisely  as  he  had  told  Pendleton,  at  11  p.  in.
As  he  t)egan  his  march,  he  then  found  the  1.roods  on  fire,  and,  as  his  gut.de
had  inform`?.d.  him  that  the  road  he  fo].1owef3  ''was  narrow  and   frequG`nt,1y
obstructed,"  he  continued  the  march  so  that  he  ''should  be  within  ea.sy
reach  of  that  place.WL7    Thus  Ander.son  continued  the  march  solely  to  reach
his  dest,ination  early,  not  because  he  found  t,he  woods  aflame.    But  regard-
less  of  any  preliminaries  to  the  Battle  of  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  the
significant  fact  is  that  Anderson  fought  a  great  batt,1e  there  and  saved
t,he  Confederate  capital.
As  Anderson  approached  the  open  fields  near  the  Court  House  at
darirn  on  the  8th,  he  issued  the  much  delayed  order  to  t>ivouac.    But  the
rest  was  brief,  and,  before  the  hour  was  spent,  a  message  came  from Fi.t?,
Lee  urging  artillery  support.18   unat  followed  would  dazzle  t,he  mind  of
any  seasoned  soldier.    The  incessant  rnassed  attacks  of  Grant's  heavy
colurims  would  demand  of  the  new  corps  commander  such  a  shifting  and
counter-shifting  of troops  seldon seen  on  any battle  field.    The  threat
`16Eng.,  p.  loll.
L7Quotation  from  letter  to  Captain  E.  8.  Robins,  May  lh,   1879,  ±!2±£!:LS£T,
¥=S.,  Military  Societ,y  of  Massachusetts,  Boston.    The  letter  is  I`ertro-
duced  in Walkerj  a.  E.
similal`
1o,   186h,
|8Tbid.
Anderson pp.  162-163.    Anderson  also  wrote  a
letter  immediately  after  the  bat,tie,  Anderson  to  Longstreet,  May
Anderson !!§E.,  Duke  University,  Durham,  North  Carolina.
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to  i,he  Confederate  Arry  had  never been  more  crucial.
General  Field's  tired  men  were  quickly  moved  towards  the  Court
House,  but,  t>efore  falling  in  line,  Union  infantry  from Warren's  Corps
poured toward  Anderson's  left.    He  did  not  fol.get  t,he  peril  of Fitzhugh's
cavalry  unit,  however,  and,  after  detaching  Kershaw's,  Huriphrey's  and  Law's
brigades  to  the  Court  House,19  he  turned  Fieldls  division  off  to  riieet  i,he
threat  t,o  his  left.    Although Fitzhugh  Lee  was  forced  t,a  ret,ire  at  the
Court  House,  luckily  the  enengr  there  was  not,  in  strong  fol'ce,  and  ''Ker-
20
shawls  Brigade"   came  up  in  time  to  ref,ake  it.        The  immediate  danger
confront,ed  Field,  and,  as  the  remaining  columns  of  the  First  Corps  cane
up,  Ande,r.son  swiftly  pushed  them to  his  support.    As  the  last  of  these
took  position,  the  Fedel.als  fell  on  them,  advancing  in  four  successive
21
lines ,
As  if  Anderson  needed  another  diversion,  world  came  from  one  of
Hampbon's  brigades  of  cavalry  that  it  had  arrived  at  Spotsylvania  and was
desperate  for  help.    It  was  no  mc>re  desperat,e  than  Anderson,  himself ,
but  he  did  not  hesitate.    Anderson  could  spare  no  more  t,ham  i,wo brigades,
but,  if  he  could  send Wofford's  and  Bryan's  of  Kershaw's  division,  and
gain  the  enery's  rear,  t,hat  might  be  all  that  was  needed.    This  could  be
done  by  a  detour .through  the  woods,  which  would  also  preclude  a  hazardous
move  act.oss  the  fields  that  lay west  of  the  Court  House.    Anderson  issued
these  orders  immediat,ely,  but  before  Wofford  and  Bryan  arrived,  Union
19E.  ± i.,  IV,  128.
2°The  Union  force  here  was  Wiclchamls  brigade  of  General  J.  H.  Wilson's
division  of  cavalry,  which Wilson  reported  was  ''struck  in  the  flank by  a
gallant  charge  and  scatt,ered  in  all  directions,"  9.  E.,  XXXV,  pt.  I,  878.
21Aiexander. ± Memoirs p.   511.
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Cavalry  leader  J.  H.  Wilson  became  ai.fare  of  the  intent,ion  and  wiJ.hdrew
his  counand  from  the  C„]rt  House.22
Between  attack®j  Andersonls  men  lay  down  their  guns  and  picked  up
t,he  spade.    The  shallow  trenches  at  Spot,sylvania  Court  House,  coupled  with
a  courage  rivaled  only  in  a  myt.h,  was  about,  all  t,hat  saved  t,he  Confederat,es
from Warren's  four  fresh  divisions.    Anderson  also  had  his  men  hoard
ammunition,   a  practice  in  which  he  had  always  t`een  di.1igent.23    0rie  of
2h
his  brigades  held  its  fir.e  until  the  Federals  came  within fifty yards.
The  lead  column  of  Ewell's  cdxps  arr'ived  at,  five  o'clock  in  the
afternoon.    SedgrJick's  corps  had  already  re-enforced Warren's,  however,
and,  after  being  shifted  to  the  left  behind Warren,  they  delivered  a
four-coluned  assault  on  Anderson's  right.25    Anderson's  men  stood  firm,
howevel`,  but  the  timely  arrival  of  Ewell's  corps  proved  t,o  be  an  inval.ng
uable  addition.    Anderson  immediately  ol.dered  Bodes.  division  of  Etrell's
corps  into  the  action  on  his  right.    This  move  flanked  i,he  Federal  colurms
and  they  immediately  fell back,  th`is  ending  the  first  day's  battle  at
Spotsylvania  Court  House  and  the  threat  to  the  Confederat,e  capital.26
General  Lee  expressed  his  gratitude  to  Anderson  and  his  men with
a  persctnally  autographed  letter,  expressing  his  admirat,ion  for  the  way  in
::S;o::: b¥id::.t±;t8:8; a8:::r:: 5: :tt¥::::0::.t£:m=:::n:i:::offRosser i s
brigade  of  Hampton's  cavalry  division  as  infantry  from  the  First  Corps.
The  Union  officer  erred  again  in  reporting  Bryan's  and Wofford's  route
as  that  one  from the  Block  House  leading  to  the  Court  House,  ±!££.,  p.  887.
23Dawsonj Reminiscences p.   123.
2hBratton's  brigade  of  Field's  division,  9.  E.,  XXXVI,  pt.  lt  1066.
25E2¥.,  pp.  666,1o71;  E.  ±  I.,   IV,128.
26g.  E.,  xxxvT,  pt.  I,  1o56-1057,  1081.
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which  the  new  r.orps  commander  had  hantiled  his  troops.     Publf shing  only
what  related  to  his  men,  Anderson  "suppressed  the  just  encomium  General
Lee  had  paid  to  him  personally.w27
Colonel  Sol.rel  gives  us  a  valuable  appraj.sal  of  Anderst>n  t,he  man
and  soldier  and  seconds  the  above  example  of  Anderson's  unassertive  and
modest  nature :
General  Anderson,  as  already  st,abed,  was  well  known  to  `is,  and
fell  easily  into  position  as  corps  commander.    During  the  events  just,
ske'tched,  he  had  shown  commendable  prudence  and  an  int,elligent  com-
prehension  of  t,he  wo.rk  at  hando    He  was  a  very  brave  man  .   .   .  and
by  no  means  pushing  or  aggressive.    Ify  relations  with  him were  uni-
formly  pleasant.    He  seemed  to  leave  the  corT>s  much  t,o  his  staff,
while  his  own  meditat,ive  disposition  was  constantly  soothed  by whiffs
from  a  noble,  cherished  meershaum  piT}@  in  process  of  rich  coloring.
I  sometimes  found  nyself  sleeping  in  the  same  tent  wit,h  him.    He
had  a  way  on  waking  of  sit,t,ing  on  his  bed  and  proceeding  to  mend  and
patch  his  belongings  out,  of  a  well-filled  tailor's  "necessaire"  he
always  carried--clothing,  hats,  boots,  bridles,  saddles,  everything
came  handy  t,o  him.     He  caught  me  once  watching  this  wor`k,  and  said,
smiling:    "you  are  wondering,   I  see;  so  did  rrryr wife  when  first  married.
:h;i:€::8::c:::t:::u::c::i:::L=;:#88. but  I t.Old her  I ought to have
On  May  lh,  186h,  Grant  began  to  withdraw  his  forces  from  t,he  al.ea
of  Spot,sylvania  Court  House.     thderson,  immediately  realizing  what  a  good
opportunity was  presented  t,o  capt\]re  the  picket  lines  of Warren's  and
Wright's  c.orps,  quickly  advanced  his  troops,  flanked  the  pickets,  and
captured  the  gredyer  part  of  them,  and Warren's  field  hospital.    He  then
marched  his  corps  to  join  t,he  rest  of  Leels  arry.29
:::€:£:::::af;:mur¥a±:eusr:,E67e#:r#::Ea:'B?.s±::it:::±£E1:::::t±:;i::
Tavern.    Without  citing  his  aut,hority,  Walker  assertis  (E!±£.,  p.173)
that  when  General  Lee  was  informed  of  Stuart's  cleat,h,  he  offered  the
cavalry  command  to  General  Anderson,
gested  that,  the  posit,ion be  given  to
South  Carolinian.    The  claim  has  not
E.  P.  ±'  Ill,  330.
28sorre|,  Recollections,  pp.   2J.t2-2L3.
29Robert  M.  Stribling,  Gettystlurg  £
but  that  Anderson  declined  and  sug-
General  Wade  Hampton,   a  fellow
been  subst,ant,iated.    See  Freeman,
9=+tp±_|=8_I  e±£  Campaims   of  186h  and
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Anderson's  ne}rd  action  came  ten  days  later  when  Grant  again
sought  to  interpose  his  arngr  between  Lee's  and  Richmond.    He  began  his
movement  on  the  night  of  the  20th by  marching  for  the  North  Anna  River.
Lee  ordered Anderson to  form the  apex  of  a  superbly  drawn  line,  an  "invel.ted
V,"  which  Grand  said was  stronger  than  any  position  Lee  had  yet  taken.30
Moving  his  arngr  ahead,  GI.ant  was  met  by  Anderson,  who  drove  t,he  wedge
straight  through and  split  Grant,'s  arngr  into  two  wings.    Anderson's  attack
had  put  Grant's  arny  on  eaLch  side  of  the  North  Anna,  and,  before  he  could
re-enforce  either  position,  Grant  would be  forced  to  ITlarch  around  Anderson
31
and  cross  the  river.  tw5`ce.        The  situati.on  offered  Lee  the  best  oppor-
tuni.ty  since  he  had  met  Grand  to  deliver  t,he  crippling blow that  he  had
hoped.    But  the  commanding  general  was  st,ricken  wit,h  an  int,estinal  malady,
confined  to  his  t,eut,  and  did  not  order  the  att,ack.    The  chance  then
Slipped  away  as  the  Union  Arny  entrenched  itself .32
At  one ,.of  the  Nort,h  Anna  tributaries,  Anderson's  corps  was  situa-
t,ed  directly  across  from the  Federals.    Graut was  sharpening  the  accuracy
of  his  artillery. fire  with the  First  Corps  as  target.    As  he  poured mortar
upon  the  unconfortable  Confederates,  Anderson  fl.ugally  preserved  his  and
made  no  reply.    His  headquarters  were  t,emporarily  set  up  in  an  attractive
grove  which  surrounded  a  large  frame  residence.    Attached  to  this  large
st,ructur.e  wel`e  two  quite  steep  chimeys  of brick  which  stretched  high
int,o  the  gI.ove.    The  staff  officers  and  orderlies  huddled  under  the
1865  in  Virf!inia  (Petersb`mg..  Virginia:  The  Franklin  Press,1905),  p.132.
EL8dHeF5IHff't€r  as  St,ribling ,  .G£±±±:=ELm.P. .a.nL£ !£iI€±±Li±.
3°E2¥.,  p.139.
3L.|bj2ee.,p.136.
32Freeman,  E.  E.  ±e,  Ill,  358-359.
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shelter  of  a  lee  of  one  of  the  gables  to  protect  t,hemselves  ar?ainst,  fly-
ing  debris  from  the  mort,ar  shells.    General  Anderson  was  among  the  groves
walking  ''coolly"  about,  whiffing  away  at  his  big  pipe,  and  warned  the.in
that,  t,here  would  be  trouble  if  one  of  t,he  chimneys  was  struck.
Their  Commander  was  right.    Within  seconds,  t,he  roaring  mortar
came  crashing  into  the  chimney,  pelting  those  who  were  not  quick  enough
i,o  get  away with bricks  and  fragments.    Two  of  the  couriers  received  minor
bone  frar,tures,  hut  what  increased  their  agony  and  e}.ibarrassmeho  was  t,hat
t,hey  had  not  been  wounded  by  ''honorable  bullets."    ''The  laugh,"  Sorrel
Was  to  say,   ''was  de.ided|y  on  us.w33
After  I`ealizing  the  strenrf,h  of  Lee's  line  around  t,he  Nctrt,h  Anna,
Grant  withdrew  his  troops  on  the  26th  and  ret,ired  toward  white  House
Landing,   once  again  at,tempting  t,o  get  between.Lee's  arny  and  Richmond.
Once  again  Lee  marched  along  with  him  and,   again,   it  was   Anderson  who
stopped  the  F`ederal  dl.ive  t,o  Richinond.
General  Lee  had  project,ed  an  attack  on  Grant's  flank  as  it  moved,
and  deputized  Anderson  to  effect  it,.    The  strategic  point,  to  which  both
armies  moved  was  Cold  Harbor.    Precisely  two  years  earlier  to  t,he  month,
Anderson's  flank  movement,,   in  the  words  of  llstonewa||W  Jackson,3h  had
`'detel.mined  the  fortunes"  at  t,he  battle  of  First  Cold  Harbor,  and  t,he
att,ack  precipitated  Mcclellan's  retreat,  to  Harrison's  Landing.    Would
Anderson  repeat  his  performance  at,  Second  Cold  Harbor?
The  story  was  differ-ant.     r7ran+.  rli`scerned  the  importance  of  Cold
Harbor  Road,  which  secured  his  lines  to  his  base  at  white  Ho`ise  Landing,
33Sorrelj Recollect,ions pp.   2h7-2h8.
3huackson's  report,  9.  E.,11,  Pt.  2t   555.
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and  he  ordered  Sheridan  to  hold  that  poin.+u  at  all  cost,s.     Sher5.dan  enor
trenched  himself  on  the  afternoon  of  May  3].,   and,  eqiiipped  with  ttie  ne.w
Spencer  repeat,ing  magazine  carbine,  he  presented  an  awesome  ribstructir)n.
Anticipating  t,he  Confederate  att,ack  on  the  moming  of  June  1,  rTrand  tried
to  ass`me  himself  of  the  occupation  of  Cold  IIarbor  by  sending  Wright's
Sixth  Cor.ps  to  the  support  of  Sheridan,  and  he  ordered Wright  to  be
there  by daylight.35
I,eading  the  Confederate  van  were  the  veterans  of  Kershaw's  division,
and,  as  they  approached  t,he  ene]ny,  Kershav  decided  t,o  det,ermine  what  lay
ahead,  sending  forhtard  his  old  brigade  to  ref?onnoiter.    This  brigade  was
led  by t,he  inexperienced  Colonel  Laurence  M.  Keitt  i:f  South  Carolina.
His  regiment,  the  Twentieth  South  Carolina,  was  the  newest  in  the  any,
and  ''behaved  badly"  when  confronted by Sheridants  rapid  firing  rifles.
The  skirmishers  broke,  and,  after  one  more  attempt,  Ker`shaw  drew them
back  and  threw  up breast works.    This  ended  the  projected  assau}tg  for
Wright's  Corps  came  up  to  reinforce  Sheridan.36
Anderson  had  appointed  Keit,t  to  command  the  brigade  because  that
officer was  its`  senior  Colonel.    It was  a  matter  of  military  propriety,
and,  if  a  mistake,  t,hen  Richmond  was  culpable,  not,  Andel.son.    At  any  rat,e,
Kershan  could  have  been  more  discriminating  and  held  t,he  new  regiment  as
a  reserve  unit,  while  the  rest,  of  that  brigade  comprised  the  skirmish
line.    The  results  of  the  attack  at  Cold  Harbor  may  have  been  the  same,
however,  for  Anderson's  infantry  was  t,he  first  to  ever  encount,er  t,he
35Equ.,  xxxvl,  pt.i,  79h.
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Spencer  magazine  r.ifle,  and Anderson  was  certain  t,hat  at  least  two  corps
Were  ent,renched  in  his  front.37
In  any  event,  the  claim t,hat  the  behavior  of  Keitt's  regiment  had
demoralized  the  rest  of  Anderson's  corps38  Seems  to  have  little  foundat,ion.
If  the  assertion were  t,rue,  then  against  t,he  superior  force  that  confronted
him,  Anderson  could  hardly have  been  able  t,o  mai.ntain  his  possession  of
t,he  st,rategic  point  that  Grant  ordered  to be  taken  "at  all  hazards.''    In
fact,  said  artillery.  officer Robert  Stiles,  "our  other troops  stood  firm,
and  we  lc`st  no  ground.M39
Perhaps  t,he  most  important  factor  in  determining  the  outcome  of
Anderson's  attack  was  t,he  failure  of  Robert  Hoke's  division  to  support
it.    Because  he  commanded  the  largest,  division,  Hoke's  cooperat,ion  was
essent,ial.    More  important,  however,  was  the  fact  i,hat  his  division was
positioned  on  the  right  and  would,  therefore,  be  required  not  only to  sup-
port  it,  but,  would  be  demanded  to  actually  lead  t,he  attack;  for,  if  Ander-
son was  to  move  against,  Grant,'s  flank  at  all,  the  attack  would  have  t,o  be
delivered  from his  right,  because  t,he  Federal  arny was  in  motion by  its
oun left  flank.h°
In  the  afternoon  of  t,he  3lst,  Anderson was  ififormed by  General
Ramseur  that  the  Federal  Sixth  Corps  was  ent,renching  on  the  Old  Cold
37Fietcher  Pratt,  4_ ih_QrL±
Books,   Inc.,1953)?
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Harbor  Road.    A1.rare  that  more  t,roops  would  be  needed,  Andersen  informed
Lee  of  this  intelligence  and  asked  specifically:     'W±11  General  Hoke  be
under  liry  corrmand,   or  is  his  a  separate  and  cooperating  force?nhL    General
Lee  replied  affirmatively:    ''General  Hoke  will,  whilst,  occupying  his
present  position  relative  to you,  be  under  your  control.    He  was  directed
tio  see  you  and  to  arrange  for  cooperation  t,omorrovh   .   .   .Wh2    This  was
short  not,ice  because  the  attack  wa.s  scheduled  to  begin  at  daybreak  on
June  1;  yet  I,ee  directed  Hoke  on  the  3lst,  to  see  chderson  and  ''to  arrange
for  cooperat,ion  tomorrow9"    Was  he  suggesting  that  the  at,tack  be  postponed?
Anderson  did  not  think  so  and  attacked  as  projected.    While  Kershaw  was
delivering  his  attack,  he  reported  to  Anderson  that  he  had  lost  all  con-
tact  with  Hokels  division.h3    As  there  is  no  record  of  Hoke's  getting
the  order  from  Ijee  and  his  subsequent  failure  to  move,  one  must,  surmise
that,  he  simply  did  not  receive  the dispatch.hh
Realizing  that  no  support  from Hoke  was  forthcoming,  however,
Anderson  did  drive  the  Federals  back  far  enough  to  enable  the  First  Corps
to  secure  the  heights  around  New  Cold  Harbor,: and  he  immediately  began
to  fort,ify  them.    ''The  importance  and  value  of  this  success,"  said  one
veteran  officer,  '`can  only be  realized when  it  is  understood  t,hat  had
Grant's  order.  cto  seize  t,he  heif:hts  at,  New  Cold  Harbora  been  carried  out,
the  Federals  would  have  occupied  the  ridge,  and  the  Confederates,  instead
of  defending,  would  have  been  compelled  to  assail  them,  inasmuch  as  it
hL9.  E.,  LI,  pt.  2,  97h.
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was  t,he  ke{y  to  the  Confederate  Capit,al."
"Somet,ime,"  before  10  p.  in.,  during  Kershaw's  att,ack  on  Sheridan,
Anderson  had  become  worried  and  sent  his  chief  of  staff ,  Moxley  Sorrel,
to  ascertain  "horJ  matters  had  gone  with  Hoke."    By  noon,  Sorrel  still  had
not  returned,  and  by t,his  time,  the  Federal  Sixth  and  parts  of  the  Highteenth
Corps  Were  already well  into  t,he  fight.h6
Andel.son  was  correct  in  assuming  that  Hoke  was  in  trouble.     As
liaison  had  still  not  been  effect,ed.  betwee,n  Anderson  and  t,hat,  general,
Hoke  had  allowed  a  gap  to  be  created  bet,ween  his  and  Kershaw's  division.
The  gap  amount,ed  to  about,  fifty yards,  wit,h  a  patch  of  woods  and  a  stream
separating  the  t;wo  divisions.    Grant  was  now  determined  i,o  break  through
Anderson's  thin  and  disjointed  line.    His  position was  such  t,hat,  he  could
not  move  further by his  left  flank  unless  he  moved  in  t,he  direct,ion  oppo-
site  Richmond.    Therefore,  he  would  have  to  break  through  Anderson's  line
before  Lee  could  send  re-enforcement,  or  else  abandon  his  entire  plan  of
taking  Richmond  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  River.    By  6  p.  in.  Grant
had  the  full  st,rencde,deh  of Wright's  and  Smith's  corps  and  threw  the  t,wo
commands  forwal`d  four  ranks  deep.    Portions  of  this  for.ce  slipped  through
the  cover  of  the  woods  that  ran  through  t,he  gap bet,ween  Hoke  and  Kershaw
and  went  `mobserved  until  they  came  upon  the  Confederate  rear.h7    Moving
to  the  left,  and  right,  t,hey  captured  over  two  hundred  prisoners  from t,he
h8
exposed  flanks  of  t,he  two  Confederate  divisions.
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Andersnn,  wit,hout,  reserves  or  re-enforcements,h9  ant,icirated
Hr`ke'.s  dilemma,   and  had  detached  one  br.igade  fr.om  Field,   one  from  Pickett,50
and  one  bat,tery  of  guns5L  before  t,he  t>reak  had  occurred.52    The  Federa|s
were  checked  with  t,his  aid  and  t,he  exposed  flanks  of  Kershaw  and  Hoke  were
connected  with  a  re-fused  line  in  the  shape  of  a  horseshoe.    At,  dark  Grant
halted  the  assault.    He  had  lost  three  thousand  men.    Anderson's  losses
were  less  than  t,hree  hundred.53    l'Narrovly,"  said  'Freeman,  ''Lee's  lieu-
tenant,s  had  saved  their  flank,  and,  probably  their  capital.W5h    Again,
as  at  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  the  responsibility was  Anderson's.
That  night  Anderson  informed  the  Cornmonding  General  t,hat  he  expected
a  renewal  of  the  attack  at  daylight  on  June  255  and  requested  re-enforce-
ment.    Luckily  for  the  Confederacy,  however,  Grant  spent  t,he  entire  day
56
posit,ioning  the  additional  t,Poops  that  were  coming  in.        Had  he  been
able  to  attack  as  scheduled,  Grant,  would  have  almost  certainly  dislodged
Anderson's  three  divisions,  because  Anderson's  support  did  not  arrive
until aft,er twelve  o'clock.    Apparently  Lee  did  not  stress  i,he  gravity
of  Anderson's  situation,  for  Breckinridge,  who  did  not  even  begin  to
march  until  after  10  p.  in.,  had  rested  his  men  every  half-hour,  and  lfahone
49Ibid.
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and Wilcox  did  not  arrive  `int,i|  afternoon.57
At  daylight  on  t,he  3rd58  Grand  was  ready,  r\owever,   and  launched
59
the  bloody  assault  that  he  thereaft,er  regretted.        Perhaps  a brief  hour
transpired  before  it  was  all  over.    With  clumsy butchery,  rTrant  massed
men  twenty-eight  deep  int,o  such  an  inferno  of  murder`ous  case-shot  and
cannister  that  even  historian  of  t,he  Armry  of  the  1'ot,omacS  H\]gh  Swinton,
60
recorded  the  sanguinary.  dc`at,h  t,oil  at,  over  thirteen  thousand!
Wit,h  thl.ee  corps  Grant,  concentrated  his  assault  on  Kershaw's
salient,  where  hc»  had  broken  throiigi]-I  on  June  1,  and,  when  the  firing
ceased  just  before  eiE!ht  olclock,  Andersen  had  counted  fourt,een  front,al
assaults  against  t,hat  sector.    Hxcept  for  a  final  one  at  dark,  Grant  de-
livered  no  more  assaults  at  Cold  Harbor.61    ''The  sight  in  our  front,"
said  So:i rel,  ''was  sickening,  heart  rending  to  the  stoutest  soldier.    Not,hing
like  it, was  seen  during  the  war,  and  that  awful  mortality was  inflicted  in
but,  1itt,1e  more  t,ham  an  hour!"    After  the  battle  Grant  issued  general
orders  st,ating  that,  such  assault,s  should  never  again be  made  on  entrenched
positions.62    Less  than  one  month  later,  however,  in  an  att,empt  to  dislodge
Anderson  from the  trenches  at  Petersburg,  he  would  t,ry  it  again.
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CHARTER  XIII
rmoM  DREWRyis   BLUFF  TO  FORT   HARElsoN
(JUNE-SEPTEMBER,   186b)
Early  in  the  month  of  June,  186h,  I,ee,  short  of  a  large  enough
cavalry  force  in  the  immediate  al.ea,  was  eluded by the  Federals  as  Grant
slipped  past  his  forces,  crossed  the  James,  and  threatened  the  defenses
of  Petersburg.    Confederate  forces  that  were  holding  this  line  tter`e  under
the  direction  of  Genel`al  P.  T.  G.  Beauregard,  whose  forces  at  this  time
consisted  of  only Wisels  brigade  of  infantry  just  up  from the  defenses  in
Chariest,on,  Dearing's  cavalry brigade,  and  the  Petersburg  Home  Guard.
Beauregard  had  just  abandoned  his  works  at  Drewry's  Bluff  in  the  Bermuda
Hundred  sector  and  had  rushed  to  defend  Petersburg.    I,ee  sent  Robert
Hoke's  and  Bushrod  Johnsonls  divisions  across  the  James  to  assist.1
General Anderson  moved  to  Drewry's  Bluff  on  the  17th  to  regain
the  works  left  by Beauregard,  which  Union  General  Benjamin  Butler's  Tenth
Corps  now  occupied.    Upon  arrival,  Anderson  ordered  Pickett  t,o  take  a  hill
on  the  Clay Farm,  the  results  Of  which were  little  reminiscent  of  Pickett's
immortalized  charge  up  another  hill  in  1863.    Field was  ordered  to  support
him.    In  two  assaults  the  First  Corps  took  the  ent,ire  works,  sweeping
away  the  eneri}y  from  two  entrenched  lines.    By  the  end  of  the  day  Anderson
2occupied  the  entire  front.
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Anderson's  fine  success  is  all  t,he  more  admil.able  when  it  is
noted  that  two  full-generals  expressed  doubt  that  his  force  was  a  suf-
ficient  one  t,o  take  such  a  stl.ongly  entrenched  position.    Beauregard  wired
I-ee  with  a  warning  that  Anderson  would  need  to  be  re-enforced.3    When
hearing  from  Anderson  that  ''It  is  to  be  presumed  that,  he  cButler=  has
possession  of  our  breastworks  opposiJu-e  Bermuda  Hundred,"  Lee  became  as
apprehensive  as  Beauregard  and  warned  Jefferson  Davis  that,  lacking  full-
st,rength  wit,h  the  absence  of  Kershawls  division,  the  First  Corps  might
not  be  able  to  carry  out  its  assignment.h   Then  informed  t,hat  Anderson
had  gained  complete  possession  of  Drewry's  Bluff 9  hc;-uJever,   Lee  expressed
his  confidence  and  admiration  in  another  congratulatory  dispatch  to  the
generali  adding  t,hat  his  belief  now was  ''that  they will  carry  anything
they  are  put  against.w5
After  his  victory-over  But,ler's  tl.oops,  Anderson  was  ordel`ed by
Lee  to  leave  Pickett  at  Bermuda  Hundred  and  to  take  Field's  division  to
the  Petersburg  line  t,o  join  Kershaw.    Beauregard  had  been  attacked  by  a
determined  Union  f orce  on  t,he  17th  that  had  broken  his  lines  and  captured
six hundred  prisoners  and  five  guns.    But  the  Federals  did  not  gain  any
works  until  late  in  the  afternoon when  t,hey  drove  Beauregal.dls  forces  back
a  half-mile  from the  original  lines.    The  action  ended with  the  day,  but
the  capture  of  Pet,ersburg  seemed  almost,  a  certainty.    For  some  reason,
however,  the  Federals  wet.e  satisfied  with  the  ground  gained  on the  17th
3E¥.,I,I,  pt.  2,  lo78-1079.
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and  did  not  assail  the  new  lines  of  the  Conf ederates  until  late  in  the
afternoon  of  the |8th.6
Followed  by  Field's  division  shortly  aftervards,  Kershaw  moved
towatrd  Petersburg  at  about,  three  o'clock.    Dot,h  divisions  arl`ived  in  time
on  the  l8th  to  relieve  Beauregard's  forces  against  a  new  attack by  two
fresh  corps.    Barely  had  Kershaw  adjusted  his  lines  when Warren's  Union
corps  delivered  it,s  assault.    Just  before  Field  arrived  at  five  o'clock,
Union  General  Meade  began  advancing  toward  the  works  wit,h  his  fresh,  stron{-j
columns.    ''General  Anderson  and  his  whole  .Corps  were  in  a  position  to  meet
this  furious  onslaught,"  said  General  Kershaw's  biographer,  ''and  he  de-
1ivered the  Federals  a  total  repulse  at  every poind!"7
''If  Anderson  had  not  been  there  on  the  18th  of  June,"  said  a  con-
federate  general,  "Petersburg would  surely  have  been  captured  by the  strong
force  wit,h which  the  Eneny  att,acked,  and  Grant's  program would  have  been
carried  out ....  General Anderson  thus  saved  Petersbur.g,  saved  Richmond
8
and  saved  the  Confederaey!"
Aftel`  the  assault  on the  First  Corps  had been  checked,  A.  P.  Hillls
corps  came  up.    The  lines  were  strengthened  and  the  long  siege  had  begun.
With  one  exception,  however,  there  wet.e  no  more  coordinated  assaults  as
at  Spotsylvania  Court  House  and  Second  Cold  Harbor.    For  about  three  months,
the  only  fight,ing  on the  Peter.sburg  front  was  the  sniping  from the  trenches.
Once  in  a  while  a  separate  unit  would  show  itself  and  throw  its  weight
upon  what,  it  thought  to  be  a  weak  point,  in the  Confederate  line,  t>ut  the
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the  Valley,  Grant,  might,  send  more  troops  t,o  Sheridan  and  thus  relieve,
the  ever-tightening  pressure  on the  Petersburg  front,.
Major  General  Wade  Haxpton  was  ordered  to  report  to  Anderson  at
Culpeper where  Ap.rlerson would  give  him  specific  inst,ructions.    Haxpton
was  t,o  command  a  unified  cavalry  corps  consisting  of  M.  a.  Butlerls  and
Fitz  I,eels  divisions.    This  force,  hoveve,r,  along  with  Kershaw's  infan-I.,ry
division,  waLs  to  be  under  the  general  direction  of  Anderson.    Anderson's
conmand  in  the  Valley was  thus  to  be  coxpletely  independent,  aLnd,  to
illustrate  Lee's  confidence  in him,  he  was  ordered  by the  Commanding  Gen-
eral  to  use  "ent,erprise"  and  ''t,o  be  governed by  circumstances."    Before
Harnpton  could  join  Fitz  Lee,  however,  he  was.  recalled  and  returned  to
Richmond wit,h  Butlerls  division.11    So  with  Kershawls  division  and  a  bat-
talion  of  artillery,  Anderson  reached  Culpeper  around  noon  on  the  12th  of
August.,  and was  joined ty  Fitz  I.ee.s  cavalry  division  four hours  later.12
0n  the  lhth,  Anderson  arrived  at  Front Royal  and  pickets  were
posted  on the  Berryville  and Winchester  roads.    At  about  noon  on  the  16th,
he  sent  forward  artillery,  Wofford's  infantry brigade  and Wichaml s  brigade
Of  cavalry t,o  dislodge  Union  cavalry attempting to  obstruct  his  passage
across  the  ShenandoaLh  River.    The  Union  position  at  Guard  Hill  and  the
passage  were  easily  taken,  but  the  success  emboldened Wofford  to  such  a
degree  that  he  decided to  swing  his  right  and  attack  a  larger  force  of
cavalry  that  had  just  come  up  as  re-enforcement.    The  cavaLlry  quickly
retired,  however,  but  not  before  its  lightning  attack  had  driven Wofford
LLERE.,  pp.  996-999.
L2E±.,  pp.  862-873.    Anderson  did  not  receive  a  detailed  map  of  t,he
Valley  until  August  2h.    The  receipt  of  the  map  is  in  the  Manuscript
Division  of  the  Library  of  Congress,  signed  by  Andel.son  on  August  2h,
186h.    For  a  duplicate  of  this  map by  Captain  Jed  Hctchkiss,  see  0.  R.
4±.  Plate XLIII-3.
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back  to  Guard Hill  and  inflicted  a  loss  of  over  three  hundred  men.    Wof-
ford was  made  cognizant  of  his  mistake  at  headquarters,  where  the  joke
13
was  that  ''he  swung  his  right  and  made  a  water-haul."
The  next  day Anderson  moved  his  force  across  the  river  and  ad-
vanced  toward  the  Federals  on the  Winchester  Pike,  who  retired without  a
fight,  however.    Anderson  followed  in  pursuit.    During  this  march  an  in-
teresting  incident  occurred.
Andel`son  usually  required  his  staff  and  couriers  to  accompany him
as  he  rode  well  ahead  of  the  main body  of  troops.    If  there  were  any trouble,
he  wanted  to  be  there  when  it,  started.    Suddenly firing  began,  and  to
Anderson's  ineffable  disgust,  the  cavalry  squadron  that  he  had  send  up  as
an  advance  guard  came  racing  back  as`  if  i,hey  had  seen  spit.its  from the
depths  Of  darkness.    General Anderson's  indignation  ''was  painful  to  see,''
said  one  of his  staff  officers,  and,  for  once,  his  inimitable  self-control
simply  deserted  him.    Unconsciously,  he  reached  for  his  sword.    "Oh,  if
I  had  ny.  sabre!''    His  usually  gentle  eyes  blazed  as  he  glared  at  his  staff.
''Charge  those  people  in front,"  he  told  them as  he  pointed to  his  assail-
ants  who were  no  less  appalled  at  the  encounter  than  he,  and  whose  force
was  no  more  than  a  cavalry  squadron  itself .    In  an  instant,  not  knowing
what  lay before  them,  in  one  mingled  mass  of  equestrian bewilderment,  the
likeness  of which resembled  anything but  a battle  line,  staff,  courier
and  cavalry  squadron went  teal-ing  down  the  turnpike  in  ''a  glorious  race"
that,  did  not  end  until  reaching the  suburbs  of Winchester  itself i    The
chase  had  cariied  them  five  miles  from t,heir  aroused
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0n the  21st,  t,he  combined  forces  in  the  Valley  launched  a  unified
three-pronged  attack  against  the  Federals.    Early  advanced  by Smithfield,
Fitz  I-eels  cavalry by  Berryville  and  Anderson  from Summit  Point.    In  this
move  Anderson  encoil.ntered  the  advance  of Wilson's  cavalry  division  and
drove  it  before  him.    The  other  colurrms  met  like  success  and  the  Federals
15
failed  to  rna.ke  a  stand,  continuing  to  fall  back  toward  Chat.lest,oun.
Gerieral  Ijee  had  told  Anderson  to  ut,ilize  whatever  ent,erprise  avail-
able  ''to  injure  the  eneny,"16  and  on  Septefroer  2,  Andersen  proposed  to
surprise  the  Federal  cavalry at  Berryville.    He  coordinated  his  force  of
Fitz  Leels  cavalry.  and  Kershaw's  division,  but,  before  his  plan  could  be
executed,  the  Federal  cavalry  dropped back  again  toward  Char|estoun.17
In  the  morning  of  Sept,ember  3,  Anderson  sent,  Fitz  Ijee's  cavalry.
on  a  reconnaissance  mission,  and,  about  noon,  he  st,arted  Kershaw's  divi-
sion  for Bel`ryville.   Within  four miles  of  his  destination Anderson  re-
ceived  a  challenge  t,hat,  few  imaginations  could  have  matched.    He  ran
squarely  into  an  entrenched  force  of  such  proportions  that  he  should  have
been  enveloped!    lthat  amount  of  enterprise  could  save  a  single  Confederate
division from the  entire  Any  of Western Virginia?18
Anderson  may  have  been  lmovn  for  his  deliberate  nat'ure,  but  his
actions  on  the  3I.d belied  t,hat  reput,ation.    Instantly,  he  was  ordering
15g.  E.,  xL|I,  pt.I.  87h.
L6EE±.,  XLIII,  pt.  i,  995.
L7E2¥.,  XLII,  pt.1,  875.
LBMistaken|y  referred to  in  the  diary  of  the  First  Corps  as  the  Eighth
Corps,  9.  E.,  XI.II,  pt..i,  875.    This  Union  force  on  whose  muster  roll
belonged  such  names  as  Rutherford  D.  Hayes  and  George  Armst,rong  Custer,
was  commanded  by  General  George  Crook,  who  had  superceded  Major  General
¥::::a:.rg;ti:: :: €#gus::g:;e:gft: gal?:I:;.P;67:'35:9'3;2:.ho::I
hog,  ho9.
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attacks  on both  flanks  of  the  Federals.    One  of  his  units  immediat,ely
took  cover  from  nearby  woc>ds  and  a  cornfield,   and,  from  nowhere    t,hought
t,he  bet.Jildered  Federals,  the  Confederates  were  on  their  flanks,  rolling
them  up  scarcely before  they  could  fire  a  single volley.19   Dispositions
were  even  made  by  one  commander  to  guard  the  Federal  wagon  t,rain  in  the
Prospect  of  an  attack  from the  rear!2°
Confusion was  so  great  in  the  Federal  ranks  tha.'c  Union  Commander
George  Crook  wend  to  the  front  himself  in  an  attempt  to  rally  his  men.
Another  Federal  division  came  up,  but  t,o  no  avail.    The  Federals  gave  way.
Anderson  had  defeated  and  put,  t,o  flight  an  arngr  that  should  have  made
short  work  of  capturing  his  ent,ire  command  and  which  had  the  advahoage
of  occurEring  an  ent,renched  position!    1then  Crookls  Second  Division  charged
within  a  few yards  of  Anderson's  line,  it,s  cormander thought  that  such  an
advance  against  so  "strong"  a  force  denoted  a  "discipline  and bravery  that
has  not  been  surpassed  in this  war."21    His  counterpart  of  the  First  Di-
vision waLs  more  realistic,  however.    "It  is  with  mortification,"  he  dole-
fully  admitted,  ''t,hat  I  report  the  giving way  of  t,he  comuriand  on  the  left.
I  can  assure  you that,  the  men  and  officers  feel their  disgrace,  and  also
22
believe  t,hemselves  capable  of  doing bet,ter  things."
Early was  not  expected  to  reach Berry.ville  until  the  next  moming,
so  Anderson  kept  up  carmonading  throughout  t,he  night  and  cont,inued  to
L9g.  E.,  xL|II,  pt.I,  367,  1026.
2°ERE.,  p.  ho9.
21
Ego.,  p.  ho1.
22E2±.,  p.  367.
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advance  small  units  from the  works  that  he  now  occupied.23    By  intern.it.
t,ently  delivering these  threatening  assault,s,  he  deluded  the  Fede,rals
into  believing  i,hat  he  had  a  superior  force,  and  they  failed  t,o  take
advantage  of  their  oppol`tunity  to  envelope  him.
Staff-officer  Francis  W.  Dawson  gives  this  account  of  the  engage-
ment:
Then we  marched  and  counter-mar`ched  and  danced  about  in  every
direction  .   .   .  urfuil  September  3rd,  when  we  moved  out  from Winchester,
and  attacked  the  eneny  near  Berryville,  and  drove  him  away.    It  was
at  this  time  that,  the  whole  command  could  have  been  gobbled  up.    We
had  only  Kershawls  Division  wit,h  us,  the  cavalry  having  been  sent  off
ch  a  reconnaissance.    The  eneny,   in  ove.rwhelming  force,   came  upon  us,
and  General  Anderson  reached  t,he  conclusion  that  not,hing  but.  audacitry.
would  save  us.    Present,ing  as  bold  a  front,  as  if  the  whole  of  the  Arny
Of  Northern  Virginia were  wit,h  us,  and bl`inging  our wagon  trains  right
up to  the  line  of bat,tie,  he  opened  on  i,he  enerngr with  our  artiller}J-.
To  our  great  surprise  and  relief  the  game  was  successful,  and  the
enengr  drew  off .    General Early  arrived  the  ne]de  morning,  and  his  first
salut,ation  was:     ''General  Anderson,  i,hose  Yankees  came  might,y  near
getting you yesterday."    General  Andersonls  only  reply was:    "Yes,
General,  and  it  is  not  your fault  that  they  did not."    It was  a  strange
I)usiness  anyway.    General  Anderson  ranked  General Early,  but  did  not
utsh  to  take  command  of  his  cEarlylsa  troops,  as  he  would  necessal`ily
have  done  had  the  two  commands  operated  together.    The  result  was
that  the  two  commands  swung  corners  and  chasseed  in  every  direction
to  no  good  purpose,  that  any  of  us  could  see.    It  was
sort  of  military  p±c-nic,  and  in  that  sense  everybody :n::::gh#h
But  it  was  a  far  more  dangerous  situation than  any  of  t,hem  realized
at  the  time.    General  Lee  did  not  lmov  it,  nor  did  Anderson  and  Early,
but  the  Federal  force  in the  Valley  since  the  9th  of  August,  just before
Andersonls  arrival,  had  groun  from  Hunter.'s  Arty  of West,ern  Virginia  to  a
tremendous  force  of  four  corps!    Anderson was  lucky  that  he  encountered
no  more  than  one  of  them.25
23E±i£.,  p.  386.
2haawson, Confederate  Service pp.   122,   123.
25g.  a.,  xl,III,  pt.1,125-129o
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The  works  Anderson  gained  at  Berryville  remained  uncontested  until
Septefroer  13,  when  t,wo  brigades  of Federal  cavalry  captured  one  hundred
26
and  fifty  of  his  pickets.       This  minor affair was  the  last  encounter that
Anderson  had with  the  Federals  in  the  Valley.    He  was  ordered back  to
Richmond  and  pursued  the  route  through  Thomton's  Gap  t,o  Gordonsville,
during which time  Early had  suffered  a  series  of  reversals.    Kershawls
division was  sent  to  aid  him,  but  Anderson  and  his  staff  and  couriers  con-
tinued  to Richmond,  where  they  arrived  on  the  26th.27    0n  the  28th,  Ander-
son  received  orders  to  take  comand  on  the  north  side  of  the  James.28    on
the  morning  of  the  29th,  he  started  out  for  Chaffin's  Bluff,  and  it,  was
during  this  ride  that  a  courier  came  up  and  imf ormed  him that  Battery
Harrison  had been  taken  and  that  the  F`ederals,  at  this  moment,  were  probat)1y
moving  toward  Richmond.    After  sending  t,he  courier  to  General  Lee,  Anderson
and  his  staff rode  on toward the  river.
Battery  Harrison had been nanned by  only  a  small  force  of  one
hundred  and  fifty  men  and  "Nothing but  want  Of  dash,"  said  one  of  General
Lee's  critics,  ''prevented  them  from taking Richmond."    Fortunately,  when
Anderson  arrived the  Federals  believed  his  force  to tte  a  superior  one
26For an  interesting  account  of  this  minor  affair  see  t,he  report  of Brig-
:::e:e::::::Lh:sap:k:::::::nc;nsth:: , asia:i, f:::I:;ep:; :£e5:2;::3:   con.
surgeons  and  a  PI.ivate  Moore,  who by  hast,ily  clawing  their way  up  the
nearest  t,ree,  escaped  notice.
27The  detachment  of  Kershawls  division back  to  join Early  accounts  for
the  claim  advanced by  numel.ous  Federal  generals  that  t,hey  defeated  Ander-
son  in  the  Valley.    In act,ualit,y they were  fighting KershatJls  division
under  the  direction  of  Early.    The  only  general battle  .in'which  Andel`-
son  confronted  t,he  Federals  was  at  Berry.ville  on  Septefroer  3.    He  did
not  witness  Early being  routed  at  Fisherls  Hill,  Winchester  and  Cedar  Creek.
28g.  E.,  XLII,  pt,.  1,  875.
97
and  waited  for  re-enforcements  to  arrive.29
In  the  afternoon  the  Federals  made  a  vigorous  att,ack  on  Fort  Gilmer,
which  was  successfully  defended  by  Anderson.    The  Fort,  was  situat,ed  on  the
same  defensive  line  as  Battery  Harrison  and  Grantls  Tenth  Corps  attempted
its  capture.    General  Field  arrived  shortly before  the  attack with  Law's
brigade,  and,  together with  Greggls  and  Benning's  brigades,  their  reso-
lute  defense  limited  the  act,ion  to  one  assault.    Some  of  t,he  retreating
Federals  sought  refuge  in  a  nearby  ditch.    Shells  from Fort  Gilmer were
directed  toward them with  t,he  fuse  cut  to  a  half-second,  and  the  only
factor  that  kept  Anderson  from repeating  his  success  at  ForS- MCGruder  in
1862  was  the  fact  i,hat  somewhere  outside  the  fort  lurked  an  additional
Union  Corps.30
When  General  I.ee  rode  up  the  neat  morning  he  made  preparations  to
re-take  Battery Harrison.    After t,he  arrival  of  Hoke's  division  and  the
remaining  two  brigades  of  Field's,  Lee  order.ed  the  charge.    The  first
attack  failed  because  Hoke  did  not,  support  Bratt,on.    Soon,  I,ee  rode  up  to
the  lines  and  ordered  another  assault,  which was  no  more  successful  t,ban
the  first,  and  the  Confederates  withdrew to  a  new  .line.    Lee's  failure
to  re-take  Ford  Harrison,  General  Bratton believed,  ''was  because  the  dif-
ficulties  fran beginning  to  end  of  the  at,t,aLck  were  too  much  f or  human
Valor.„31
i:Q!::a::::'ist?I:?E;;:a;6'C;#:derate
3°Dawson. Confederate  Service
Service pT>.   125-1263   see  also
p.  126;  9.  E.,  Xlill,  pt.  1,  935.
3LQuotation  is  fran Bratton's  report,  9.  E.,  XLII,  pt.1,  880.    The  fore-
going  account  of  the  Fort  Stedman  assault  is  based  upon  the  sources  that
have  been  accessible  to  the  writ,er.    With  the  exception  of  but,  one,  all
::::p::: ;::::a:fs °:€:::::n€°:#:::::i ,W±:C±.m±`: t£: :t::r2g?ns;:twhat
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For the  ne3ct  week  all  remained  quiet  around  Petersburg  until  the
relative  calm was  broken  on  October  7,  186h.    The  moming  was  brisk  and
chilling  and  the  campfire  seemed  especially  alluring  to  the  thinly-clad
gray-coats  who  huddled  about  it,s  warmth.32    They  had been  a|`oused  in  the
early  dawn because  Grant  had  ext,ended  his  right  to  where  it  covered  the
Darbytorm  Road.    The  right  of  Kautzl  Union  cavalry  division  reached  the
33
Williamsburg  Road.        It  was  a  serious  threat  to  Lee's  left  and  Anderson
was  sent  to  check  it.
With  Field's  and Hoke's  divisions,  a bat,talion  of  artillery  and
Hart  Gary's  cavalry brigade,  Anderson began  his  attack.3h    Moving  his
brigades  as  orderly  ''as  if  they were  on  the  parade  ground,"  Anderson  excited
the  acclaim  from  several  officers  ''that  they had  never  seen  a  more  reg-
ular  aLnd beaut,iful  advance."35    Just  before  8  a.  in.  Brat,tonls  brigade
''Andel`son's  handling  of  the  assaults  on  fixed  positions  during  the  fight,-
ing  around  Fort  Harrison  had  not been  of  the  sort  to  indicate  that,  he
would  make  a  success  of  the  at,tack  on  Fort  Stedman.''    For  evidence  that
£:::::o€h¥a:s:::¥t:: :::e_5TeE. :tx:::: :b=r±:o§5;:±5;6=:6o:i;;;:f;3g:n.
p.   126.     Lee
day  before
Confederate  Service9hl;  ±±±g.,  pt.  2,  i293,13d5;-I)awsoh,
had  pis-n-n-ed  the  strategy  and  t,he  disposition  of troops  the
Andersonls  arrival  at  Ford  Hal`rison,  j±±§.,  pP...1301-1303.    It  is  not
easily  underst,ood  how  Anderson,  arriving  on  the  scene,  could t>e  expected
to  take  complet,e  charge  of  so  unfamiliar  a  situation.
:£:;rki:::!:=::p£:ccalap::£n:::.a::t:¥:::%t:;io:::::i,PksLfaL7::.
ularly  diligent  in  noting  weather  conditions.    For  the  evening  of  the
day  following  Anderson's  attack  on  the  Williamsburg  Road  he  recorded  a
curious  combination  of  hail  and  snow.
33strib|ing,  Get,tysbung  e=± ±Z±=g±±±±,  pp.   273-27h.
3hg.  E.,  XLII,  pt,.I,  876.
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f iled to  the  right  of  t,he  road  connecting  his  left with  the  brigade  of
Geol.ge  T.  Anderson.    Gary  and  Law were  to  Bratton's  right  on  the  Charles
36
Cit,y  Road.
Anderson's  attack was  quick,  furious  and well-aimed.    In  short
order  it  became  a  rout.    As  Kautzl  dismounted  troops  began  to break,  Ander-
son,  as  a  shock  tact,ic,  ol`dered  Gary's  cavalry.  swiftly  to the  rear,  where
Gary found  an entire  Federal battery. left  him for the  effort.    Kautz  was
37
pursued  for  about  a  mile      and his  division did  not I.ally  unt,il  safely
behind  t,he  main  works  on  the  New  Market  Road.38
Anderson  advanced  in  t,he  direction  of  the  retreating  cavalry.    He
threw Hoke's  division to  the  inside  of  the  exterior  line,  flanking  it, with
Field's  on t,he  outside.    After  crossing  a  thick  swamp,  Field  established
39
contact  with  Union  General:Birney's  Arry  of  the  James.
With  a  quick  grasp  Of  the  sit,uation,  Bimey  made  no  attempt  to
help Kautz,  but  threw his  .infautry behind  the  interior  line  before  Field
I.Cached  it.h°   Anderson  pressed  the  entrenched  position,  sending  Bratton
to  wit,him  sevent,y-five  yards  of  t,he  work.    As  the  contest  sharpened,
Bratton thought,  for  a  t,ime  that  the  Fedel`als  were  going to  fall back.    As
36The  writer  has  not  been  able  to  determine  the  position  of  Brigadier
General  John  Gregg's  brigade.    General  Gregg  was  killed  in  the  attack  on
the  main works  of  the  Federals  and  his  death  was  one  of  t,he  most  lament,ed
in the  army.    None  of  his  officers  filed  a  report.    Positions  of  the
brigades  are  approximated  from the  diary  of  the  First  Col`ps,  9.  E.,  Xlillj
pt.1,  876;  Bratton's  report,  ±E±§.,  p.  881.
37g.  £.,  xL||,  pt.1,  881.
38stribiing,  Gettysburg iVirginia p.   27L.
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t,heir  fire  slac\{ened  he  confident,1y  moved  ahead.    Hoke`s  div.ision  was  up
and  was  to  tal{e  position  ori  BI`at,ton's  right.    For  some  reason,  however,
Hoke  did  not  move,leaving  Brat,tonls  advancing  line  exposed  to  flank  fire.
Although wounded,  the  courageous  brigadier  rode  down  his  line  to  deter-
mine  the  trouble.    Seeing  t,hat  he  was  "abandoned,"  he  ol.dered  his  men  to
fall back behind  a  crest,  and  Anderson  called  off  the  attack  shortly
L'|
afteIvards .
Although  the  second  att,ack  did  fail,  Anderson  accomplished  his
design;  he  prevented  Grant  from  extending  his  line  t,o  the  right,.    Anderson
had  also  gained  a  decided  advant,age  by  his  capture  of  9, guns,  10  caissons,
2  regiment,al  banners  and  loo  mounts,  besides  prisoners  and  a  large  supply
of  entrenchmerfu  tools  and  much-needed  forage.    His  losses  in  t,he  first
att,ack  were  negligible,  and,  as  his  second  attack  never  fully  materialized,
his  losses  in  this  attack  wet-e  cormensurately  small.h2    If  a  mist,ake  can
be  attributed  to  him,  however,  it would  have  to be  t,hat  of not  relieving
Hoke  of  his  command.    The  North  Car-olinian  had  repeatedly  failed  him;
first,  at  Cold  Harbor  and  again  at  Fort  Harrison.    Now,  on  October  7,  Hoke
made  no  attempt  to  redeem himself .    The  attack would  have  been  success-
ful  ''had  Hoke  supported  us,"  wrote  Fieldls  candid  aide  de  caLmp,  ''but  as
usual  he  was  slow  or  showed  the  white feather.wh3
Evidently,  Andel`son  ant,icipated  an  attempt  by  Gr`ant  to  renew  the
ext,ension  of  his  lines,  which  had  been  interrupted  on  the  7th,  because
hLThree  sources  charged  t,hat  Hoke  gave  no  support
9.  E.t  XLIIj   pt.i,   876,   881;   Corbin,LetteTfi  PP.
XLII,  pt.  i,  852,  881;  Stribling,
Letters pp.   78-79.
in  this  attack.    See
78i.79,
Gett,ysburg  and Virginia
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he  constructed  a  line  of  rifle  pits  on  i,he  loth,  and  spent  t,he  next  two
days  strengt,hening  his  works.    Hokels  and  Field's  divisions  were  placed
in  front  of  Comelius  Creek,  with  two  regiments  of  Gary's  cavalry.  to  the
left  of Field's  division.
Early  on  the  morning  of  October  13,  the  expected  assault  came  when
Gary's  pickets  were  driven  in  near  t,he  Charles  River  road.    Again  Anderson
foresaw his  opponent's  move  by realizing  that  the  attack  to  his  right  was
only  a  feint.    This  is  evident  from the  fact  that  he  sent  only  t,wo  regi-
ments  of  cavalry to  the  relief  of  Garyls  pickets.    The  att,ack would be  to
the  left,  Anderson  s-urmised,  and  he  threw  Gregg's  and  Law's  brigades
farther  in  that  direction.    The  remaining  brigades  of Field's  division
contraeted  their  lines:.toward  Greggts  and  I.awls,  while  Hoke's  division
was  rapidly  moved  beside  them.    The  Federals  made  repeated  attempts  to
break  Anderson's  re-fused  line  and  occupied  the  entire  day before  realizing
its futility.th Anderson's  defense  was  ''a  brilliant  success,"  ur.ot,e  an
aide  de  camp to  his  family  in Europe,  and by nightfall  Bimey's  arngr  had
disappeared  fran  Andersonls  front..h5    The  men  of  the  First  Corps  were
proud  of  t,he  way  in which  their  t,emporary  chief  had  led  t,hem,  and  they
did  not  lmov that  they had  fought  their  last  battle  under the  leadership
Of  their  ''bl.ave  old  commander."    In  less  than  a  week,  the  modest  soldier
when they  affectionately  spoke  of  as  "Fighting I)ick"  Anderson would  lead
another  "corps.`'
::i;eE.:fx:::'Frr;tL:n€8?i±!!8b±3:§ion:h:fa:a:i:::ghF8::::::::::#:€hc°m-
Kautz'   division  of  cavaLlry.     The  commander  of  this  force,  Brevet  Ma.jor
Genel`al  Alfred  H.  Terry.,  was  completely  bewildered  by  the  position  of
Anderson's  troops.    F'or  his  report,  see  ±±±1.,  p.  682.
h5corbini IJetters p.   78.
cHAprER  H
ANDERSONts   ''CORPS''
(OCTOBER,   186h-AmlL,   1865)
On  October  19,  186h,  General  I-ongstreet  returned  to  the  Arty  of
Northern  Virginia  and  re-assumed  command  of  the  First  Corps,  and  General
Andel.son was  never  again  in  a  position to  lead  a  force  of  any  consequence.
He  was  given  the  conmand  of  t,he  newly  organized  Fourth  Corps,  thereafter
referred  to  as  simply  ''Anderson's  Corps."    Supposedly,  it  was  a  force
commensurate  with  his  rank  of  Lieutenant  General,  but  it  was  hardly  a  ccmps
in  reality.    Com|)osed  of  Robert  Hoke's  and Bushrod  Johnson's  divisions  at
the  outset,  it  became  only  a  few  small  t>rigades  when the  end  of  the  waLr
came  for  Anderson  at  Sailor's  Creek.    Before  it  could  t>e  utilized,  Hoke's
1
division was  detached  to  Beauregard  in North  Carolina.
From the  time  that  he  assumed  command  of  his  new  "cot.ps"  to  the
disastrous  action  at  Sailor's  Creek  two  days  before  I,ee's  surrender  at
Appomatox  Court  House,  only  on  two  occasions  did  Anderson  encounter  the
Federals.    The  first  engagement  occurred  on  the  29th  of  lfarch,  and  the
second  action took  place  two  days  later.
The  attack  on  the  29th  was  delivered  by Wise's  and Wallace.s
brigades  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the  eneny  on the  Quaker  and  Plank
roads.    Convinced  that  he  was  in  sufficient  number.s  and  could  not,  be
10.  R.,  LXII,  pt.   3,1280-1286,   13h8-13h9.     Lee  asked  Longstreet  to  choose
t,he  force  t,o  send  Beauregard  and,  although  he  had  three  divisions  in  his
own  corps,  Longst,feet  chose  Hoke's,  which  left,  Anderson  the  single  division
of  Bushl`od  Johnson.     Anderson  made  no  protest.
(102)
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driven  from his  present  posit,ion,  the  t,wo  brigades  retired  to  the  trenches
2
to  await  a  bett,er  opportunity.      It  soon  came  when  a  Federal  corps  com-
manded  by  General  Samuel  Crawfor.d  advanced  in  the  direction  of  Five  Forks.
A  violent  st,orm  began  early  in  the  morning  of  t,he  3lst,  and  did  not
abate.    The  Not,tovay  River  rose  by the  minute  and  before  noon  it,s  gushing
red water  was  already  impassable.    The  Fifth  Corps  had  st,arted  for  Five
Forks  shortly  after  dawn,  but  their  progress  was  so  retarded by  the
slushing  mud  t,hat  by  noon  they  had  not  even  reached  the  half-wa.v  point.
The  petting  rain  made  reconnaissance  difficult,  and,  if  an  attack by
Anderson  was  to  be  made,  his  chance  would  not  be  improved  by  waiting.
Although  he  had  a  force  of  only  four brigades,  Anderson  could  not  allow
Crawfol.d's  corps  t,o  reach  Five  Forks,  where  it  could  form  a  link  with
Sheridan  and  overrun  Pickettls  and Fitz  Lee's  forces  that  had  just  posi-
tioned  themselves  at  this point.3
Anderson  had  never  failed to  drive  away  an  un-entrenched  force
and,  as  always  when  a  superior  one  confronted  him,  he  hit  its  flank  to
avert  a  costly frontal  assault.
During  the  worst  part  of  the  fierce  storm,  contact  was  established
with  the  Second  Division  of  CI`awford's  corps,  and,  before  it  could  move
into  formation,  Confederate  artillery t>ellowed  forth  as  if  t,o  challenge
the  rolling  thunder  of  Neptunels  fury  itself.    Crashing forward  into  the
fir.st  line,  the  Confederates  threw  it  back  upon  the  second.    Only  one
brigade  of the  first  line,  after  retreat,ing back behind  t,he  Third Division,
felt  secure  enough  to  rally beside  it.    The  others  continued  in  a  hot)eless
2g.  E.,  LXvl,  pt.I,1263.
3Eng.,  p.  892.
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stampede.    Anderson's  two  brigades  of  Hunbon  and  Moody  were  now  up  and
advanc...d  t.a  the  Federal  center.    MCGowan  flanked  t,he  left  of  this  line
while  artillery  fire  was  direct,ed  at  the  Federal  right.    This  attack was
also  too  much for  the  Federals  and  an  almost  general  rout  ensii.ed  that  took
t,he  pursuing  Confederate  brigades  to  more  than  a  mile  fl.om their  original
position!h
General  Lee  observed  t,he  action  and  in t,he  excitement  lost  restraint
and  rode  up to  the  front  to  join MCGowan.    Toget,her  i,hey  rode  to  Gravelly
Run  and  examined  the  gI`ound.     Lee  thought  that  a  stand  could  be  made  here
5
if  artillery  could be  moved  up.      He  then  sent  Major  J.  F.  J.  Caldwell  of
MCGowan's  staff  to  Anderson  to  1.equest  a  battery  to  be  brought  up  since
6
a  counter-attack  led by  Crawford's  Fir.st  Division    had  gotten  bet,ween
MCGowan  and  the  Confederate  breast,works  while  he  and  MCGowan  had  been
observing the  terrain  at  GI.avelly  Run.    By  this  time  the .Confederates  were
falling rapidly back to  their breastworks.
Sensing the  danger to  his  brigade,  MCGowan's  staff  officer  struck
out  straight  across  the  open field  father t,ham  take  a  safer,  more  circuit-
ous  route.    He  found  Anderson  `'in  front  of  the  works''  and  asked  to  be
introduced to  him.    Anderson  did  not wait  for  amenities,  protesting that
the  major  could  have  been  killed  by exposing himself  so  recklessly.    Cald-
well  t,hen  reported  from Lee.    Anderson  answered that  artillery  at  such  a
point  would  certainly  have  been helpful but,  that  it  would be  useless  and
too  dangerous  to  attempt  to  put  it,  there  now.    He  requested  t,hat  the  major
hE±±g.,   pp.   827,   8h3-8h6,   863,   868,   873-876,   879,   88h,   892,   899.
5Freeman,  E.  E.  ±i  Ivj  3h.
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This  attack  was  ably  led  by  Colonel  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain,  the  gentleman
who  accepted  Gordon's  surl`ender  at,  Appomatox.
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remain with  him.    Anderson  repeated  the  sollcitat,ion,  but,  seeing  t,he
major's  concern,  he  allowed  his  departure,  after  ordering  him baLck  t,hrough
the  safety  of  the  woods.
Riding back  to  his  post,  Caldwell  could  not  erase  the  incident
fran his  mind.    Here  was  the  Confederacy.s  Sir  Philip Sidney,  he  thought,
''an  officer  of the  next  to  the  highest  rank  in  our  arty,  who,  in the  midst
Of battle  .  .  .  is  seriously  concerned  for the  safety  of  an  off icer  of  low
rank,  who,  until  now,  was  utterly  unknown to him,  and  had  not  the  least
claim to  his  consideration."    He  was  the  model  exemplar,  thought  Caldwell,
of  all  t,he  sentiment  expressed  in Bayard Taylor's  immortal  line:    ''The
t>ravest  are  t,he  tenderest--The  loving  are  t,hedaring."7
A  few weeks  before  the  batt,1e  on  the  31st,  Anderson  received  word
t,hat  Federal  Negro  troops  had  made  a  raid  in Stateburg.    His  father  had
died  just  after his  sonls  great victory  at,  Spotsylvania  Court House  in
the  summer  of  186h,  and  lfrs.  Anderson,  at,  t,he  time,  was  left  alone  at  the
Bol`ough  House.    Most  of  t,he  village  had  been  evacuat,ed  when  informed  of
the  coming  calamity.    When  told  t,hat,  t,he  invaders  burned  t,he  homes  that,
had been  left  vacant,  however,  to  save  the  beloved  old  mansion the  cour-
ageous  lady,  although  old  and  paralyzed,  determined  to  stay  and  face  them.
*:::e5:kEiogi pp.  206-207.    Anderson's  losses  in  the  Battle  ofdid  nch  exceed  eight  hundred  men,  t>ut  they  could  not  be
replaced.    Genel`al  Crawford  did  not  report  t,his  action  tiut,  General  G.  L.
Warren,  who  was  relieved by  Crawford  just  before  the  battle,  reported  the
Federal  losses  at  t,wo  t,housand.    This  list  included  the  casualt,ies
inflicted  on  the  29t,h,  but  as  this  act,ion was  a  minor  affair  against  two
brigades,  it  is  reasonably  certain  t,hat  F'ederal  1osses  on t,his  dat,e  were
:;i±±§i:;e!ifeEisi:=BEi3rfaf:if8:::t€:;e::::i;t:i:::a;:i:;::::i:€;:::p.
the  White  Oak  road,  and  one-half  the  numbel`  of  ambulances  present,  were
const,antly  occupied  in  t,ransporting  wounded  .   .   .  from the  hospital  at,
Quaker  Church  to  t,he  railroad  station  at  Humphrey's."
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Her  presence  was  respect,ed,   and,   except  for  a  few  mar.ks  on  the  doors  card
8
the  loss  of  some  valuable  heirlooms,  surprisingly  litt,le  dame.ge  tw~as  done.
By  this  time  General  Anderson  knew  that  it  would  not  be  long  before  be,
too,  would  join  his  family  at  Borough  House.
After  Pickett,'s  and  Fitz  Lee's  defeat  at  Five  Forks,  Anderson
joined  t,he  rest  of  ljee's  arny  in  a  general  retreat  from  Petersburg.    On
the  3rd  of  April  he  skil`mished  all  day  to  protect  his  wagon t,rains  at
Bevil's  Bridge.    On  the  6th  his  broken  columns  of  less  than  five  hundl`ed
rifles  formed  a  line  of  battle  bet,ween  two  litt,le  watercourses  known  as
Sandy  and  Sailorl-s  Creeks  to  prevent  one  of  F,well's  divisions  from being
cut  off .     ''GeneraLI  Anderson  seemed  to  be  anxious  to  push  on,"  said  Custis
I,ee,  ''to  support,  General  Pickett,  who  was  engaged  with  the  emery  fart,ti.er
toward  Rice's  Station ....  "     As  he  approached  Sailor's  Creek  AnderLc.,on
was  informed  that  the  Federals  had  t,he  road blocked  ahead  of  him.    Genel`al
Ewell  came  up  and  request,ed  that  chderson  unite  with him  and  drive  them
away.    After  telling  Ewell  that  he  would be  needed  to  protect  the  rear,
Anderson  attacked  the  Federals  ahead  Of  him.9    It  amounted  to  nothing,
however,  and  "the  troops  seemed  to  be  wholly broken  down  and  disheartened.
After  a  feeble  effort  to  advance  they  gave  hay  in  confusion .... "    With
the  exception  of  a  few  hundred  men,  Anderson's  and  Ewell's  entire  commands
Were  captured.L°
8This  Mrs.  AndeI.son  was  the  second  wife  of  Dr.   Anderson,  whom  he  married
after  the  cleat,h  of  Mary  Hooper  Anderson.    She  was  the  daught,er  of  Chan-
cellor Waties  of  a  nearby  plantation.    Parler,  "Living  at,  Borough  House,"
p.  81.
:3;1:.;.X:Y].  Pt.  1,  1298;
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Dot,h  Anderson  and  Ewell  could  have  escaped  by  marching  toward  the
right  to  the  command  at  Rice's  Station,  ''but  they were  true  soldiers  8.nd
decided  to  fight,"  said  Longst,I.eet,  "to  break  or  delay the  pursuit  until
the  trains  and  rear  guard  could  find  safety beyond  the  High  Bridge.    Barely
lthown  in  the  retreat,  the  decision by  Ander`son  and  Ewell  to  stay  and  fight
constit,uted  one  of  the  most  noble  deeds  of  the  war.WIL
Ewell  himself  had  been  taken  prisoners,  but,  Anderson  managed  to
escape,  spending  the-nerfe  t,wo  days  trying  to  get  together  his  scattered
and  defeated  corps.     On  the  8th,  as  he  now  had  no  command,  Anderson  was
relieved  of  his  duty  and  ordered by  I-ee  to  return to  his  home  and  t,hen  to
I`epor.t  to  the  Secret,ary  of War.    ''Part  of  these  orders  Providence  has
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cmprER x
fflER  THE  WAR
(APRIL,   1865-JUNE,   1879)
For  General  Andel`son,  the  return to  the  little  village  of  his
birth  was  a  homecoming  that  had been  long  overdue.    As  far back  as  the
Valley  Campaign,  he  had  seen  the  hopelessness  of  his  country's  cause,  and,
while  riding  back  to  the  armor  in  Petersburg,  he  told  his  friend Damson,
as  he  viewed  the  peaceful blue  ridges  t,hat  rose  around him,  that,  it would
be  t,he  height  Of  his  happiness  to be  able  to  climb  to  the  top  of  one  of
those  lonesome  peaks,  to  lie  douri  alone  among  it,s  clouds  and  simply  I`ol]~
1
little  rocks  down for the  rest,  of his  life.
After  the War  General  Lee  thought  of  imiting  a  book  of  the  events
of  those  dreadful  four  years  and  I.equested  that  Anderson  send  him  a  I.eport
of  the  operations  Of  the  Fourth  Corps  in  the  last  mont,hs  before  Appomatox.
Anderson  responded  in  a  letter.  which  revealed  much  of  what  his  feelings
probably were  during  t,he  closing  months  of  the  struggle.    He  discussed
]Dawson. Confedel.ate  Set.vice p.   123.     Aft,er  the  war  Da.wson,  an  Oxford
educated  Englishman,  became  the
&  Courier
celebl.abed  editor  of  The  Chariest,on  News
t,he  Soul,h's  oldest  dailynewspaper.    He  riHled  Henry  Grala§
as  t,he  spokesman  for  the  New Sout,h,  but  his  contributions  were  cut,  short
by  an  old  nemesis  that  plagued  his  hazardous  profession  in  the  South--he
was  shot  doun  in  Cha.rlest,on by  an  assassin's  bullet.    F`or  a  biogl.aphical
::::£ho:ftE:gs ;::::i::: :;e±i±3;ds¥: dL5:-::2fra:£e L::::r::::::: sot. th e
Dawson,18ho-1889:     Sout,h  Carolina  Edit,or"   (unpublished  master's  thesis,
Duke  University,  Durham,  N.   C.,19h7).    For  Anderson's  recommendation  of
Dawson  for  survivors  benefit   see  Dawson,   C_o_nfe_d_e_r_a_t_e_  Siery.i€_e p.   281.
The  original  letter  was  writ,t,en  t,o  the  ''Cormittee  on  Applicat,ic>ns,"  Apr.il
16'   1869, Dawson !g=±.,  Duke  University  Librarv,  Durham,  North  Carolina.
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t,he  .',insuperable  condit,ions  t,hat,  corribined  to  make  victory  impossible  and
conceded  t,hat  desertion  proved  t,o  be  a  more  serious  problem  t,ham  most  of
his  comrades  wished  to  admit.2    I'The  depressed  and  destit,ute  condition  of
the  soldiers'   families,"   Anderson  believed,   'lwas  one  of  the  prime  causes
of  desert,ion,  but  the  chief  and  prevailing  cause  was  a  convict,ion  amongst
them  that  our  cause  was  hopeless  and  that,  further  sacrifices  were  useless."
When  Anderson  took  command  of  the  First  Corps  just,  before  the
Bat,tie  of  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  Lee's  Armry had  been  reduced  to  about
half  it,s  original  size,  and  no  conscripts  arl-ived  to  fill  i,he  f?ap.    Yet
the  Federal  Army  had  increased  in  power,  and  its  size,  equipment  and  sup-
plies  exhibited  to  t,he  hungry  and  ill-clad  Confederat,e  something  that  could
not,  fail  to  shake  the  stoutest  veteran.    "It  was  wit,him  the  capabilities
of  the  meanest,  soldier  and  most  unreflecting,"  wrote  Anderson,  ''to  calcu-
late  t,he  chances  of  a  further  prosecution  of  the  war  and  t,o  perceive  how
immensely  the  odds  were  against  us."    With  mounting  difficulties  and  daily
drain  of  st,rength,  understandably,  it was  with little  of  their  old  spirit
t,hat  the  soldiers  of  t,he  Arny.  of  Northern  Virginia  entered  upon  their
3
last  canpaign.
General  Andersen  came  home  with  his  wife  and  daught,er  to  a  family
that  had  been  sadly  ravaged  during  his  long  absence  as  a  soldier.    His
mother  had  long  since  passed  away  and  his  father  had  died  the  year before.
AIthough  it  had  been  a  close  family  of  seven  brot,hers  and  sisters,  only
his  brother  and  stepmother  remained  to  join  the  General.    The  brother was
Dr.  W.  W.  Anderson,  Jr;,  Surgeon  Major  in  the  Confederate  States  Army.
2The  Bureau  of  Conscription  set  the  number  of  desertions  in  the  Confed-
erate  Armies  at,  over.  one  hundred  thousand,  9.  i.,   LI,  pt.  2,106h-1066.
3Letter  in Walker, R.   H.   Anderson pp.   199-202.
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The  General  may  have  doubted  even  his  survival  when  a  curious
vehicle  came  up  the  lane  one  day.    It  was  a  Confederate  ambulance,  a  con-
veyance  he  had  seen  all  too  often  and  it,  was,  to  him,  anyt,hing but  a  good
omen.    He  was  gI`eat,ly  relieved,  however,  to  see  his  brother  at  its  direc-
tion.    Major  Anderson  had  been  allotted  the  ambulance  when  General  Lee
surrendered  and,  during  all  the  hard years  t,hat  followed,  it  acted  as  t,he
family  carriage.
Major  Anderson,  like  his  father,  was  an  able  surgeon,  whose  official
title  by  Oct,ober,  1863,  was  ''Medical  Inspector  with  Superintendence  of
Vaccination  of  the  Armies,  Hospitals,  and  Camps  of  Instruction  of  the
Confederate  States."    The  Doctor  shared  his  brother's  poverty  during  the
harsh  Reconstl.uct,ion years.  -He  never  deserted  his  professional  standards,
however,  and  called  on the  sick with  all  the  dedication  of better  days,
accept,ing  whatever  offered  in  ret,urn.    ''Strange  forms  t,hese  payments
took--a  pig,  a  chicken,  eggs,  corn,  cowpeas,  sweet  potatoes,  or  anything
with  which  the  patient  could  parrt,.    More  often  t,ham  not,,  the  promises  to
pay  .   .   .  were  soon  forgotten  and  the  bill was  eventually  marked  off  the
books.mh
In  addition  to  the  comrrion bond  of  brotherhood,  t,he  General  and
the  Major  had  markedly  similar  interests.    They  had  both  chosen  a  car.eer
in  the  United  Stat,es  Arngr  and  i,he  wives  of  the  t,wo  men  were  bot,h  from  the
hparler,   NLiving  at  Borough  House,"  pp.   80,   82.     Major  Anderson  uns  cap-
•tivat,ed  by  all  scientific  endeavors  and,  while  on  a  tour  of  duty  in  the
West  before  t,be  Civil  War,  he  collect,ed  rare  and  valuable  specimens  of
plants  and  birds.    One  of  his  collections  of  birds,  which  included  an
unclassified  specie  of  marbler,  he  gave  to  the  Smithsonian  Inst,itution.
The  specimen  is  still  displayed  at  the  Smithsonian  and  is  named  Vermi-
Vora-Virginiae  or  "Virginials  Warbler,"  not  for  the  ''Old  Dominion,"
H5=vel`,  but  for  his  wife,  Virginia  Anderson.    See  Spencer  T.  Baird,
Birds
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of  Nort,h  America   (Washinaton:  Smit,hsonianInstitute,1881),   11,
North.5
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The  brothers  also  shared  t,he  bold  sentiment  that  each  held  on
the  subject  Of  rrianumission,  a  belief  that  their  father  cou].d  never  accept.
As  they  had  kindly been  for  over  a  century befol.e  him,  the  senior
I)r.  Andel`son was  deterriiined  to  have  his  slaves  well  taken  care  of .    He
was  convinced that,  no  good  would  ever  come  from  liberation  as  long  as  the
Negro  had  no  suit,able  place  to  go  nor  any means  of  livelihood.    Unlike
his  brother  John Wallace,  Dr.  Anderson  had  little  faith  in the  Amel-ican
Colonization Society,  except  to  help those  slaves  who  had  already been
freed,  and  he  devised  a  way  of  keeping  ''his  people"  on  the  Borough  Plan-
t,ation.    When Dr.  Anderson wrote  his  will  in  1863,  the  year before  his
death,  he  stated  plainly therein that  should  any  of his  heirs  from "Scruples
of  Conscience"  refuse  to  own  his  slaves,  then  he  or  she  would  ''forfeit,
all  right  to  any  portion  of  them,  or  his  or  her  share  I:of  the  landa,  and
said  place  go  t,o  t,he  I`est  of  ny. Heirs .... "    To  inherit  the  land,  there-
6
fore,  t,he  slaves  would  have  t,o  remaLin  intact.
As  the  eldest  son  of  the  family,  General  Anderson  inherited  t,he
Borough  House  and  Plantation  upon  the  death  of  Dr.  Anderson's  second  wife
Elizabeth.    He  never  had  to make  t,he  hard  decision his  father had  pre-
sented  him,  but  after  the  war  he  maintained  his  convict,ions.    The  decision
t,hat  confronted  him  at  the  moment,,  however,  was  the  selection  c>f  an  occupa-
tion,  and  it  was  one  that,  presented  few  alternatives.
Although  a  welcomed  relief  to  the  weary  General,  to  turn  away
from the  attachment  and  devot,ion  of  a  lifetime  was  no  easy  task.    He  could
¢The  junior  Dr.  Andel`son  married  Virginia  Childs  Of  Massachusetts,  the
daughter  of  General  Thomas  Childs  of  Mexican War  fame.
6Wwi||  of  D|..  W.  W.  Ande|.son,"  Sunder  County  Court  House,  Sunter,  South
Carolina,  July  7,1863.
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have  had  comf ort,  and  power  had  he  accepted  the  command  t,hat,  the  Khedive
had  offered  him  in  t,he  Egyptian  AI`ry,  but,  he  preferred  the  sanctity  of
peace  even  at  the  expense  of  poverty.    To  seek  other  employment,  for  which
he  was  litt,le  prepal.ed,  however,  would  have  been  a  painful  disappointment.
The  only  available  prospect,  left,  to  him was  to  seek  out,  pc>1itical  prefer-
ment,,  but  such  a  I`ecourse  would  have  been  alien  to  his  every  impulse.    He
would  astc  only  for what,  was  his.    And  so,  with  a  total  absence  of  exper-
ience,  funds  and  labor,  and  with  a  market  at  least  as  uncert,aim  as  his
7
own  future,  he  set  out  for  what,  would  become  a  dismal  four  years  of  farming.
In  1867  General  Anderson  wrot,e  of  his  first  year's  failure  as  a
gentleman  farmer  in  a  letter  to  his  friend  General  D.  Harvey Hill,  who
was  now  a  professor  of  mathematics  at  Davidson  College.    Wrote  Anderson:
''1  began with  the  opinion  that  t,he  negro  would  wor.k  if  sufficient  induce-
ment  were  offered  him--so  I  borrowed  money  to  repair  damages  and  make  a
start.    I  made  liberal  advances  to  the  laborers  but  I  made  no  cotton,  no
corn,  no  peas,  no  potatoes.    Well!    We  had  an  unprecedented  drought  and
as  it,  prevailed  generally through  the  South  I  stuck t,o ry  opinion.    No
labor  could have  availed  against  a  dispensation  of  Providence.''
The  next  year,  1867,  he  had  t,o  borrow  again.    Although  it,  rained
excessively,  his  yield would  have  been  at  least  average  had  his  laborers
not  failed  him  at  a  t,ime  when  they were  most  needed.    But  an  over-extended
Fourth  of  July  took  them  far  away  from  the  cotton  fields.    1then  t,hey
returned,  however,  they  gave  little  I.eason  t,o be  welcomed.    ''At  last,"
explained  the  General,  ''when  corn  and  cotton began  to  ripen  a  syst,em  of
bare  faced,   indiscriminate  plundering  of  the  field  commenced  and  much  of
7walker,  E.  EH.   Anderson pp.   2ho,   265.
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the  lit,t,1e  which  we  were  going  t,o  make  has  been  stolen  already.    We  are
about  finished  I ,suspect  in  a  financial  point  of  viei,r .... W8
Until  the  eat.1y  part  of  1868,  General  Anderson  had  lived  at
Borough  House  with  his  wife,  daughter  and  step-mother.    Hopeful  that  his
presence  "might  do  something  towards  restrain.irig  the  st,ealing  and  pl`mdor-
ing.and  securing  more  diligent  attention  on  the  part  of  the  negroes,"  he
moved  with  his  wife  and  daught,er  to  his  smaller  plantation  on  the  Wateree
9
River,  where  most,  of  the  destruction  i;o  the  crops  3.,ad  occurred.
AIthough  no  more  encouraging  than  t,he  first,,  General  Anderson's
nend  letter  to D.  H.  Hill  manifests  a  philosophical  nature  and  contains
an  interest,ing  and  revealing  analogy.
I  would  assuredly  give  me'the  greatest  ha.ppiness  to  see  you ny
dear,  good  friend,  t>ut  unless  you  can  come  here,  I  see  not  any  pros-
pect  of  our  meeting.     I  am  unable  to  move  any further  from home  i,ham
nor  old  black  horse  ccuffy.  can  carry  me  and  he  grows  so  dejected  and
hangs  his  lower  lip  to  so  melancholy  a  length when  I  make  him  go  more
than  three  or four  miles  from his  st,able  that  I  fear  3T  I  undert,ook
t,o  travel  much  farther  upon  him he  would  insist  on  nor  doing  so  on  nor
own  legs  and  not  upon  his.;
Why  he  should  have  any  attachment  to  his  stable  is  somewhat  a
nystery to  me  for  I  should  say that  he  has  had  small  comfort  and very
short  rations  since  I hoped  two years  and  a  half  ago that  he  at  least
might  have  peace  and  plenty for the  rest  of  his  days.
We  have  our  instincts  and  our  infatuations  too,  so  I  will  cease
to wonder  at,  the  Old  Black.    You  propose  to  me  to  leave  this  afflicted
land  and  find  Some  other  home.    Most  gladly  would  I  do  so  if  I  could
--but  I  can  not  move--I  can  not  get  avay!    You  have  often  wit,hout,
doubt,  seen  at  your  camp  fire,  a  beetle,  or  an  ant  come  running  from
its  snug  quarters  in the  old  dry  log  and,  viewing  the  conflagration,
8Letter  f|.om Andersen  to  D.  H.  Hill,  October  26,1867j  2.  E.  g±±± ±!=±..
70-3360,  Virginia  Stat,e  Library,  Richmond.
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the  daughter  of  General  Anderson  was  Miss  Sara  Gibson  Anderson  who  married
Mr.  William D.  Blanding  of  Columbia,  South  Carolina.     It  is  int,erest,ing
to  note  that  a  daughter  and  namesake  is  Miss  Sara  Gibson  Blanding,  who
had  t,he  distinction  of  serving  as  the  only  lady  president  of  Vassar  Col-
lege.    She  and  her  sister  Ellen  now  reside  in  Lexington,  Kentucky.
General  Anderson was  the  grandfather  of  these  two  ladies.
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run back  again to  its  hole  vainly t,rying  to  re-enter  in  spite  of  heat
and  smoke,  and  thus  in hopeless,  unavailing  struggles  lingering  about
its  house  until  overcome  at  last  it  fell  into the  flames  and  perished.
And  you have  wondered  that  the  poor  infatuated,  stupid  beast  did  not
run  off by the  end  of  the  log  and fly  from  certain  destruction  int,o
the  broad  forest  where  there  were  plenty  of  old  logs  and  good  hom'::a.
Perhaps  in  the  goodness  of  your  heart  you  have  sometimes  helped  it  to
get  away,  but  nor  dear  old  friend  in  snatching  it  from  one  danger you
do  not  lmov  into  what  other  perils  you  may  not  have  thrown  it.    You
see  I  have  all  the  infatuation  Of  one  of  those  poor  insects.    Ruin
and  destruction  stare  me  in  t,he  face  and  yet  I  can  not  fly.
Since  peace  came  I  have  been  living  at  the  house  of  nor  step mother,
but  I  am  going  to  live  on nor  plantation  some  four  or  five  miles  dis-
tant.    I  shall  give  up  almost  every  comfort  in  doing  so,  for  there  is
but  a  poor  and  incommodious  house  on  the  place,  yet  circumstances  seem
to  point.  so  forcibly to ry taking this  step that.  I must try  it  for  the
next year  at  any rate.
It uill be ry last  effort however.    If  I fail neri year,  then  I
must  truly  cease  to be  like  an  infatuated bug,  and  must  act  like  aL
:a:±3::Eec::::u:::#¥i6rom the  burning  home  and  seek a  new  one  in
As  if  some  horrible  blight  had  sett,led  upon  him forever,  the  next
year brought  no  improvement  and  the  good  General  had  to  sullenly  I`ecord
another  failure.    '[Utter  e3thausti6n  of  resources  and  the  discouragement
attending  repeated  failures--with  the  dismal  prospect  and  foreboding  t,hat
under  t,he  present  system,  or  anything  like  it  we  cannot  look  for bet,ter
results  all  compel  me  to  give  up  planting  cotton  and  to  seek  for  some  other
mode  of  making  nor bread."    His  intention  now was  to  wind  up  his  remaining
business,  and  unlike  the  ''infatunted bug,"  seek  other  and  bett,er  circum-
stances.    ''California  runs  in  ny  head  in  various  ent,icing  views,"  he
aLdmitted,  and,  if  fortunate  enough  to  somehow  acquire  the  necessary  funds,
he  thought:it `not  unlikely  to  t>e  found  ''somewhere  on  t,he  western  slopes-of
11
the  Rocky  Mountains."
He  either  found  nothing better  or  the  situation  at,  home  would  not
:Fr::¥nfs:;:::in::tD6fHAr¥::::sN:::mE::t:#, L2:I: ±%£.E. E± ¥. ,  North
LLAnderson  to  Hill,   January  11,   1869i  ±}2±±.
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allow  his  removal,  because  the  Genera].  made  one  last  effort  to  make  a
crop.    It,,  too,  wa's  ent,irely  unsuccessful,  and  not  only  did  he  fail  to
secure  i,he  means  t,hat  wou].d  carry.  him  and  his  family  t,o  Ca.1ifornia,  he
lost  forever  one  of  his  most  dear  and  cherished  possessions.
Slave  and  successor  to  ''Dick''  the  butler was  faithful  Joe  Keene
who,  by  quickly  gathering  and burying  it,  salvaged  the  family's  precious
silver.  just  before  the  arrival  of  possibly marauding  Federal  forces.    He
had  a  dream  to  one  day  be  t,he  owner  of  the  house  he  had  so  long  served,
and,  when  hard  times  came  to  the  General,  nothing  could  be  done  to  feed
his  family  except  to  give  up  the  Borough House.    The  General  could  not
pay  t,he  taxes  on the  house,  and,  after  his  fourth  and  final  year  as  a
planter,  it  was  offered  for  sale  and  Joe  Keene  was  in  a  posit,ion  to  bay
it.    The  ``Radical  Regime''  had  allowed  i,he  freedman  to  become  one  of  the
wealthiest  men  in  the  area  and  only by  a  consolidated  effort  of  all  the
Andersons  was  he  denied  his  goal.    But,  thereafter,  when  the  General  re-
turned  to  t,he  Borough  House,  he  came  only  as  a  visitor.    Doubtlessly,  the
family  offered  to  permit  the  General  to  maintain  its  possession,  only  to
have  the  kind  gesture  graciously  declined.    By  mutual  assent,,  ownel`ship
of  the  house  then  passed  on  to  his  brother,  Major  Anderson.12
Even  had  he  wished  to  do  so,  the  General  could  not  have  remained
in Stateburg.    Certainly,  he  could  not  att,empt,  another year  of  farming.
But  what  other  employment  was  there  available  to  him?    He  would  find  out.
So  the  gentleman  whom  General  Robert  E.  Lee  reserved  to  pronounce  ''a  most
noble. soldier,WL3  who  had  lost  all  because  he  became  t,hat  great  soldier,
]2Par|er,   WLiving  at  Borough  House,"  pp.   81-82.
13The
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Democrat,
Resist,e
Orangeburg,  South  Carolina,   Ju].y  lL,  1879,
r,   Columbia,  South  Carolina,   June  29,1879,   p.   1.
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and  who  had  done  as  much  as  any  South  Carolinian  to  defend  the  honor  of
his  State  when  she  seceded  from  the  Union,  was  complet,ely  ignored by  that
State  he  had  so  leyally  supported.    But  he  took whatever  was  offered  him
and  was  employed  as  a  common  laborer  in  t,he  yards  of  a  Charleston  rail-
road  company..
In  1872  t,he  wife  of  General  Anderson  died,,   just  when  t,hings  seemed
to  improve.    The  General  had  been  promoted  t,o  the  position  of  ''clerk"  for
the  South  Carolina  Railroad  in  Charleston.    Two  years  later  a  happy  union
result,ed  in his  inarriage  to  Miss  Martha  Mellei,te.    Finally,  only  a  few
mont,hs  before  his  death,  the  General  was  given  a  position by  t,he  St,ate
as  its  phosphate  agent  in  the  little  coas.tal  touri  of  Beaufort,  wher.e  he
died  on  June  15,  1879,  and  was  lowered  into  a  grave  t,hat  went  urmarked
until  the  year  1887.Lh
If  the  busy  polit,icans  did  not,  lament  the  death  of  the  quiet  Gen-
eral,  his  fellow  officers  certainly  did.    There  was  something  about  the
good man,  they  thought,  that  had  to  be  as  much  admired  as  any  great vic-
tory he  had won  on the  batt,1efield.    The  high-mindedness  of  his  character
may  not  have  always  been  underst,ood,  but  it  was  always  respected.     ''No
filthy word  ever  polluted  his  lips,"  said  General  Thomas  Munford.15    It
Would  be  impossible  to  give  a  resume  of  his  life  and  services,  said  Gen-
eral  T.  A.  Huguenin,  ''for  with  a  modesty  wh.ich  was  almost  morbid,"  he  had
made  the  facts  `mattainable.    To  his  biographer,  General  a.  Irvine  Walker,
who  knew  and  understood  him,  not  even  his  greatest  victory  surpassed  the
H.   chderson pp.  2hl-2h2.
=±±  §±±±±,   Columbia,  South  Carolina,  September  17,   I.922,  Sectic}n  C,
Columbia,  Sout,h  Carolina,   June  29,   1879,
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most,  simple  virtue  of  his  charact-,er.     ''He  wa,s  as  truly  unself ish  as  he
was  absolutely  devoid  of  any  other  narro`w'riess.    He  was  broad,  nothing
small  or  illiberal  ever  touched  his  heart.    He  was  too  big  t,o  hold  petty
grievances."L6    In  demeanor,  impulse,  intellect  and  conscience  the  mol.al
excellence  of  Richal.d  Heron  Andel-son  assert,ed  itself ,  and  all  combined
t,o  make  him  the  gent,1eman  and  Christ,ian  that  he  truly was.
In  1891,  to  I`eplace  the  simple  headboard  that  for the  last  four
years  had  distinguished  his  from  the  hundreds  of  other  graves  in  St.
Helena  Church  Yard,  a  commit,tee  was  appointed  to  erect  a  mol.e  suit,able
marker..    Here  at,  the  unveiling  ceremonies  t,he  last  salute  to  the  General
was  the  firing  of  the  guns.    As  the  loud  roar  echoed  and  then  slowly  faded,
perhaps  it  signified  all  that  his  career had been.    At  the  zenith  of  his
reputation  his  name  had  echoed  loudly  t,hroughout  the  breadth  of  his  country,
the  Confederaey.    Yet  wit,h  the  dying  roar  of  the  cannon  now  fired  in  his
honor,  the  memory  of  "Fighting Dickw  Andersen  faded  with  it.17
::¥:#::: B;ugh ffi: E:i±26g;,2:;i7¥.#
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L7It  is  interest,ing  to  note  that  so  far  as  the  writer has  been  able  t,o
det,ermine,  t,he  only  visible  memorials  to  General  Anderson  i,oday  are  t,he
monument,  at,  Beaufort,  for  which  the  Englishman  F.  W.  Dawson  was  great,ly
responsible,  i,he  wrought  iron  fence  that  surrounds  it,  given  by  a  northern
officer,   and  a  memorial  plaque  in  the  Church  of  the  Holy  Cross,  donated
by  the  General's  family.    For  art,icles  relating  to  the  monument  and  cere-
¥i;;o:;::¥;:%::i::¥¥c%ob::::=±;£i8;::r5:::::'E§:¥::n:a::L±?a.
CHAPI'ER  XI
ttTRE   Fn\TAL  REvlEwii
Probably  no  American  general  has  endul`ed  the  suet,ained  and  deter-
mined  action  against  him  in  so  brief  a  period than  Gel,eral  Anderson was
forced to  suffer  in that  first,  of  the  world's  modern wars,  the  death toll
of  which  has,  to  the  present,  surpassed  the  combined  tot,als  of  Amel`ican
casualties  in  every  ot,her  wa.r  in  American  hist,ory.
In  1881  General  John Br.atton  stood  on  the  grounds  of  the  bat,tle-
field  of  Seven  Pines  among  the  stout  old  vet,erans  of Anderson's  brigade
during  that  engagement  to  pay t,ribute  to  their  ''brave  old  commander"  and
to  recourfu  the  action  on  that,  memorable  and  hot  May  day  in  1862.    "He  has
seen  aLnd  done  so  much  hard  fighting,"  lamented  the  Brigadier,  "that  t,here
was  no  higher  aut,hority  on that  subject  than  the  modest,  genial  gent,1eman,
but  bold  and  int,I.epid  soldier,  who,  in  an  armry  unsurpassed  in  chivalric
courage,  ,1.nd  in the  dash  and  skill  of  it,s  officers,  won  for  himself  the
soubriquet  Of  'Fighting  Dick Anderson. "L
As  a  t,actician  and  field  commander  "Fighting  I)ick"  Anderson  had
few  peers  and  seemed  t,o be  equal  to  every  challenge.    If  the  Federals  were
ungrouped  in  t,he  open  field,  he  would  charge  in  a  bold  phalanx.    If  his
adversary were  ent,renched,  instead  of  risking  a  dangerous  frontal  assault,
he  would  divide  his  force  and  effect  a  flank  movement.    If  the  situation
were  a  hopeless  one,  as  it  seemed  to  be  at,  Bet.ryville  and  t,he  action  on
t,he  Darbytown  road,  he  would  charge  with  a  wild  and  reckless  daring.     In
I
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most  cases,  however,  t,he  problem was  simply  the  usual  one  of  a  superior
force,  and  called  for  a  sliding movement,  a  tactic  of  the  highest  order.2
Side-slipping  is  about  the  most  difficult  and  dangerous  maneuver  on the
battlefield,  and Anderson  ut,ilized  it  to  a  rare  per.fection.    Against  a
superior  force,  the  movement  is  designed  to  keep the  assailant  occupied.
Face-to-face  with  a  large  aggressor  in the  open  field,  a  defensive  force
is  allowed  to  fall back and yet  to  present  an  aggressive  front while  doing
it.    It  also  presents  t,o the  defender a  position  to  determine  the  enery's
weak  point  and  an  opportunity to  strike  it.    At  Chancellorsville,  Ander-
son's  division  kept  busy  a  force  of  thl`ee  Fedel.al  corps  while  t,he  Second
Corps  rol`1ed  up  Howard's  Union  corps  and.  precipitated  the  general  rout
that,  lionized  the  names  of  "Stoneffall''  Jackson  and  Robert  E.  Lee.    From
Williamsburg  in  1862,  to  the  act,ion  on the  Williamsburg  road  in  1865,
Anderson was  deciding  the  outcome  of  almost,  every battle  in which he  fought.
The  Bat,i,1e  of Williamsburg  in  1862  was  the  first  Confederate
victory  of  the  Peninsula  Campaign.    It  was  Anderson's  first  general  encoun-
ter with  the  Federals--yet  he  led half  Of  Johnston's  arny  in  it  and  defeated
a  superior  force.    The  action allowed  Johnston to  cont,inue  his  retreat.
The  t,uming  point  of  the  campaign  was  at  Seven  Pines,  whel.e  Andel'son's
victory has  few  parallels.    With  one  brigade,  he  defeated  an  ent,ire  Fed-
Oral  corps  and  is  responsible  for  turning  what  had  been  a  Confederat,e
retreat  int,o  what  became  a  Confederat,e  pursuit.    In  every  subsequent  bat-
t,1e  of  the  campaign,  Mcclellan  was  on  t,he  defensive  because  Anderson  had
turned  the  tide  at  Seven  Pines.    In  both  of  these  act,ions  the  t,roops  com-
manded by  Anderson won  the  only  Confederate  victories  on  the  field.
2Freeman. Lee I s  Lieut,enants 11,   655.
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The  next  series  of  batt,1es  were  cal].ed  the  Seven  Days,  and  the
unit  that  most  dist,inguishcd  itself  in  them was  t,he  division  of  James
Ijongstreet.    But  in  every  engagement  of  the  camps.ign,   it  was  Anderson  who
had  led  it,  and  it  was  Longstreet  who  received  the  plaudits  of  his  coun-
trymen.    But,  t,he  fault  may  not  have  been  the  Georgian's,  for  Anderson
failed  to  file  a  report,  on  any  one  of  t,hem.
At  Second  Bull  Run  Anderson  advanced  upon  the  unfamiliar  Plains
of  Manassas  after  a  forced  march,  checked  the  retreat  of  Hood's  division,3
and  by  the  end  of  the  day  he  was  occupying  i,he  front  position  on  the  bat-
t'|efield.
At  Chancellorsville,  his  tactics  were  dazzling.    In the  first bat-
tle  of  the  campaign  Andel.son  directed  the  flank  movement  t,hat  turned  the
Federal  right,  and  ''Stonewall''.  Jackson  sixply  joined  him  in  the  pursuit.
Ithile  holding  the  front  along  with  MCLaws'  division  against,  three  Federal
corps,  Anderson  detached  two  brigades  of  his  own  division  to  save  Jackson's
trains,  which,  had  the  trains  been  captured,  would  have  foiled  Jackson's
t,urning  movement  on  the  Federal  flank.    The  final  blow  to  Hooker  was  the
advance  of  all  the  Confedel.at,e  forces  to  the  Chancellor  House,  and  it
was  execut,ed by  Anderson.h    The  lead  unit  of  this  advance  led  by  Anderson
was  his  own  division,  and  it,  was  his  art,illery that,  first  opened  fire  on
t.he  Chancellor  House.
At  Gettysburg,  the  success  of  Anderson's  division  on  July  2,1863,
probably  determined  Lee's  decision  t,o  attempt  the  capt`].re  of  Cemetery
39.  i.,  XII,  557,  629.    Anderson  ''came  gallantly,"  said  t,he  Cormandlng
General.    Although  a  somewhat  over-used  word  during  t,he  Civil  War,  the
term  "gallant"  was  not  applied  lightly  by  General  Robert  E.  Lee.
hFreemant Lee ' s  Lieutenants 11,   652.
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Ridge  t,he  following  day.    Two  of  his  brigades  took  the  strategic  point
of  the  entire  campaign,  a  feat  that  the  t,wo  divisions  of  Pickett,  and  Field
failed  to  equal  the  next  day.5
The  subseq\iL.:nt,  Bat,tie  of  t,he  Wilderness,  Longst,reet's  greatest
military  achievement,,  was  simply  a  reenactment  of  Anderson's  tact,ics  at
Chancellorsville  the  previous  year.    F`olloving  this  battle,  Andel`son was
placed  in  command  of  t,he  Confederate  First  Corps.    The  promotion  came
later,  hcmever.    Never  had  a  Confederate  commander  faced  such  odds,  and
at  a  time  when  the  offensive  power  of  every  arny  in  the  Confederacy  had
been  virtually  destroyed.    But  the  sp]..rib  seemed  to  I.erriain with  them.    In
his  first,  battle  as  a  corps  commander  Anderson,  disregarding  Lee's  direction
t,o  march  at  3  o'clock,  filed  his  men  toward  t,he  Court  House  four hours
earlier  and  interceded  between  Grant,  and  Richmond,  thus  saving  the  Con-
federacy  from a  decisive,  and  perhaps  a  final,  defeat.    A+,  Cold  Harbor
he  did  the  same.    At,  Petersburg,  after  Beauregard  had been  up-root,ed  by
a  single  Federal  corps  from the  trenches  Anderson  had helped  to  construct
in  1863,  Anderson  arrived  in time  to  check  ''at,  every  point"  a  furious
assault  by  two  fresh  Federal  col.ps.    As  usual,  however`,  he  did  not  get
the  credit,  and  t,he  ''Great,  Creole''  was  hailed  as  the  savior  of  his  count,ry.
But,  what  Confederate  general  could  honestly  claim the  distinct,ion  of  having
saved  the  Confederaey  even  once?    The  last  commander  in  the  armies  who
wou].d  have  ever  advanced  such  a  claim would  have  been  General  Anderson--
yet  not  once,  but,  t,hree  times  he  had  checked  the  Fedel`al  drive  t,o  Richmond
when  nothing  else  had  stood  in  the  way.
After  Anderson  had  fought  off  t,he  attacks  on  Petersburg,  Grant
did  not  renew  his  effort  to  take  t,hat  city.    Soon  afterwards,  Anderson
52.  a.  2.,I,  273.
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wa,s  detached  with  Kershaw's  division  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  he
did  much  to  assist,  Early  in  eluding  the  Federal  force  t,here  under  Sh::ridan.
At,  Berryville,  there  are  few  instances  of  such  audacity.    Confronted by
6
the  entire  Arny  of  the  James,     Anderson  attacked  it,  head-on with  one
small  division  and  drove  it,  from  its  entrenchment,s.
When  Anderson  returned  to  Pet,ersburg,  he  was  given  a  division  a
short  time  later,  and  he  did  not  contend  the  demotion.    In  the  act,ion  on
the  Darbytoun  road,  only  a  few  short  weeks  bef ore  his  last  batt,1e  at,
Sailorls  Creek,  Anderson  att,acked  a  Federal  corps  with  such  fury  that  it
was  driven  back  in  confusion.    Constituting  Anderson's  "corps"  at  this
time  were  four  brigades  that,  by  the  relentless  assaults  made  upon  them
by  Grant's  arty,  had  been  reduced  to  mel`e  regiments.    Surely,  deservedly,
he  had won  the  accolade  that  styled  him  "Fighting  Dick"  Anderson.
6Exclusive  of  it,s  cavalry,  which  arrived  later  on  in  the  day.
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